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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the pathological experiences of selfhood in 
schizophrenia and how this can be applied to a model of ‘mind’ in which 
‘mind’ is constituted of both the biological brain and external materials. The 
aim of this paper is not to provide a systematic taxonomy of schizophrenia 
(i.e. a psychological assessment), although such discussion is included. 
Rather, its focus is on how schizophrenic symptomology can manipulate and 
disrupt the self-world relations with which humans are so accustomed. Firstly, 
it explores how this mental illness can disrupt the first-person perspective 
and the implications this entails for ‘selfhood’, leading this paper to advocate 
an embodied form of selfhood: ‘the SCALED self’. Secondly, it investigates 
how the schizophrenic’s ‘mind’ and/or ‘selfhood’ becomes coupled to 
therapeutic strategies during psychotherapy and bodily-orientated therapy 
and argues for possible cases of extended SCALED selfhood. Finally, it 
argues extension occurs during a newly-developed clinical treatment: avatar 
therapy. An application of extended mind theory to schizophrenic pathologies 
within this text brings to fruition new additional conceptual resources for 
phenomenological psychopathology. It further explains how patients develop 
different kinds of cognitive capabilities and behaviours during therapies, 
ultimately explaining their success.    
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE EXTENDED MIND 
Since Clark and Chalmers’ (2010) paper The Extended Mind (1998), modern 
cognitive philosophy has witnessed an expansion in what is classified within the 
concept of ‘mind’. Externalists suggest objects, cultural elements and even other 
people, may partly constitute a person’s ‘mind’. This claim goes beyond a 
relationship of X aiding Y to achieve Z, to a relationship where X is part of Y that 
achieves Z. Clark and Chalmers suggest external elements can be as much part of 
one’s cognitive apparatus or selfhood, as any lobes or neurons of the brain (Bray, 
2008: 8). “In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a 
two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive 
system in its own right” (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 29). The entirety of this coupled 
system (X+Y) constitutes the cognitive system, rather than a causal sequence 
consisting of Y using or being influenced by X. The interactive link itself between the 
organism and objects is the cognitive processing. Therefore “cognitive processes 
ain’t (all) in the head” (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 29). This thesis endorses this 
position, and applies the externalist account of mind to schizophrenia. Like myself, 
Bray (2008: 8) thinks claims of extension have consequences not only for cognitive 
science, but also for how we envisage selfhood. 
1.2 THE SELF 
‘Self’ is a term frequented in the English Language, and means something to those 
using it, contrary to Kenny’s (2000: 83) claim that “grammatical error… is the 
essence of the theory of the self”, based on misunderstandings of the reflexive 
pronoun ‘I’ (Strawson, 1999: 1). I share Strawson’s intuition that it is implausible that 
the problems of characterising ‘selfhood’ arise purely from a linguistic disparity 
between our human experiences and languages. The meaning of ‘self’ arguably 
stems from an independent notion that selfhood is an ontologically distinct thing. We 
have a distinct sense of an ‘I’, or experiencing as ‘a self’, to which certain things may 
be attributed. This is an intuitive, natural sense of self, and those who accept this 
feeling hold that this is not “delusory” (Strawson, 1999: 2). 
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Nevertheless, Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 21) admit the “‘sense of self’ is a slippery 
phrase”. Therefore, to better understand what the ‘sense of self’ is, I now 
disambiguate this concept, highlighting the different dimensions commonly 
associated with ‘selfhood’, and situating my thesis within this vast array of literature.  
Persistence. Discussions of personal identity commonly ask, ‘what makes me the 
same ‘I’ today, as ‘I’ was yesterday and will be tomorrow?’ Locke (1894) questions 
how the same self can remain, despite qualitative psychological changes and 
numerical physical changes occurring over time. This question concerns two 
contrasting forms of continuity: synchronic (short-term) and diachronic (long-term). 
From moment to moment one seems the same person, who upholds the same 
beliefs and attitudes for example. This synchronic self seems stable and 
uninterrupted. However, we can reflect on our diachronic selves, questioning 
whether we are the same self as one year ago, or after long periods of unconscious, 
dreamless sleep or a medically induced coma. If person P1 and time T1 is 
numerically identical to person P2 and time T2, this means they are physically one 
and the same entity. Numerical identity, i.e. physical identity, is distinct from 
qualitative identity, a psychological, mental continuity. P1 and P2 are qualitatively 
identical if they are indistinguishable, namely possessing the same mental 
properties. Now, seeing as objects’ properties change over time, for example in 
cases of unconsciousness, numerically identical earlier and later objects (P1 and 
P2), will not usually be qualitatively identical (Dainton, 2014: 50).  
Such discussions raise questions about whether ‘persons’ even are substantive 
entities persisting through time; with some philosophers (Dennett (1992), Siderits 
(2011) and Metzinger (2011)) arguing ‘selves’ are illusory. To hold that ‘selfhood’ is 
myth is to be an Irrealist about its ontological existence. Others, like myself, hold 
Realist positions that the self truly exists and is epistemically experienced through 
our self-consciousness (Maiese, 2016: ix). The experiential validation of the self’s 
ontological existence highlights a second dimension associated with selfhood. 
Knowledge. Debates surrounding ‘selfhood’ seldom are without epistemological 
connotations: ‘how do I know who I am, how can I attain a sense of selfhood?’ 
Cartesian philosophy suggests such knowledge is gleaned from introspection, 
namely turning one’s attention back on itself and considering the first-person 
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perspective through which we encounter the world. In Meditations on First 
Philosophy, Descartes (2013) worries he is being deceived by a malicious demon, 
resulting in the possible fallibility of all his sensory beliefs. Nevertheless, Descartes 
(2013: 41) says, “I certainly seem to hear and to be warned. This cannot be false”, 
asserting he cannot be deceived about the contents of his own mind. Consequently, 
he thought knowledge of one’s own mental properties is therefore infallible: error and 
ignorance are eliminated. However, errors are possible regarding one’s sense of 
one’s physical body. For example, one can be deceived about the felt location of 
one’s limbs, when illusions such as the ‘rubber hand’ (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) 
disrupt the three-way modal interaction between vision, touch and proprioception. 
Thus, possibly one’s knowledge of body is corrigible, and can be reformed (Cassam, 
2011: 151), whilst some mental states, such as self-awareness or specific 
sensations of pain enjoy intuitive infallibility (Kind, 2016).  
The first-person perspective contrasts with the third-person perspective, namely 
knowledge of others. Introspection cannot reveal another subject’s mental 
properties; if two people, A and B both pierce their hands with pins, A cannot know 
B’s mental properties based on her introspection alone and vice versa. They must 
ask one another, giving A and B privileged positions to judge their own mental 
states, since they are fallible with regard to judging one another’s. However, it seems 
plausible that if they believe they themselves are in particular pained states, then 
they are in pain. Yet, I think endorsing infallible self-knowledge remains overly 
optimistic: Although suggested that introspective knowledge of one’s mental 
properties is epistemically privileged and thus incorrigible and infallible (Descartes, 
2013), because it is knowledge of facts that are self-intimating, philosophers and 
psychologists alike now almost uniformly reject this position. Churchland (1988: 76-
79) for example argues against the infallibility thesis, suggesting that especially when 
sensations are presented to us momentarily, mistakes are inevitable. He provides an 
example of a captured spy, whose interrogators repeatedly torture him with a hot 
iron. After many instances of experiencing pain, if the iron is replaced with ice, since 
the victim expects to feel sharp pain, Churchland (1988: 77) suggests the spy’s 
immediate response will not significantly differ; the spy will mistakenly think he is 
pained. 
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Consequently, my thesis does not allude to the infallibility of one’s knowledge of 
one’s mentality. Rather, my work endorses the ontological commitments of thinking 
itself. In the Second Meditation, Descartes (2013: 35) presents his notorious line of 
reasoning, ‘Cogito ergo sum’: I think, therefore I am. Even if an all-powerful demon 
could deceive Descartes about the external world, it could never bring about that 
Descartes was nothing, provided that he thinks that he is something. Therefore, 
Descartes can conclude with certainty that he exists (Kind, 2016). His existent 
selfhood is found in the structural entailments of his experience. This is the 
experience-experiencer thesis, put straightforwardly by Frege (1918: 27) in his 
statement, “an experience is impossible without an experiencer”. Shoemaker (1996: 
10) endorses this, stating it is an “obvious conceptual truth” that any experience is 
necessarily the experiencing by a subject of that experience. Experience involves a 
subject as intimately as sunlight involves the sun. Consider the pain A feels when the 
pin pierces her hand. It essentially is a feeling, namely a ‘being felt’, and this felt pain 
cannot possibly exist without the existence of A as something that is a feeler. The 
“…experience is necessarily experience for–experience for or on the part of 
someone or something” (Strawson, 2016: 270). 
Identity. Selfhood also concerns the identity of this experiencing thing. Humans talk 
about individualisation, using the words “I”, “you”, “we”, and “he/she”. When 
questioning ‘what is the self?’ one often aims to answer ‘who am I?’ This 
metaphysical question asks what sort of things are we, if at all, and is commonly 
answered with reference to necessary and sufficient conditions. We separate 
ourselves from other artefacts in the universe, drawing borders between subjects 
(‘selves’) and objects. As Burkitt (1991: 1) says, “the view of human beings as self-
contained unitary individuals who carry their uniqueness deep inside themselves, like 
pearls hidden in their shells” is deeply embedded. This concept of an individuated 
subject arises from our first-person experience, leading Damasio (2000: 12) to argue 
consciousness is “an entirely private, first-person phenomenon”. In James’ (2001) 
conception of the complex self for example, the “I” is equated with the self as 
knower, or, self as subject. A feeling of distinctness from others, namely 
experiencing individuality, is a necessary condition of substantive selfhood, and 
characterises this subjective nature of the “I”, known to oneself (Herman, 2011: 655). 
When I say human selfhood is essentially individualised, I mean the first-person 
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perspectival experience of one’s selfhood is unique. Within this first-person 
acquaintance, the body plays a crucial role. The skin becomes a boundary between 
inner and outer: everything happening outside the skin becomes ‘other stuff’, whilst 
everything happening within this boundary becomes one’s embodied first-personal 
world. Within the body, Sampson (1993: 34) suggests three natural ideas rule: 
1. The individual’s boundary is indistinguishable from the body’s boundary. 
2. The body is a container, housing the individual.  
3. The individual is best conceived as a self-contained entity. 
If we approach the body as if a container for the self or individual, then the necessary 
conditions for that individual’s continued existence are physiologically and 
psychologically confined within the body. Wilson (2004) argues individualism is a 
widespread assumption within cognitive, biological and social sciences, and 
assumes that in order to explain certain phenomena, one needs to explain what 
happens inside individual entities: “individualism is the thesis that psychological 
states should be construed without reference to anything beyond the boundary of the 
individual who has those states” (Wilson, 2004: 9-10). This is expressed in 
Sampson’s (1993: 36) claim that: 
“…an individual has an inside that contains all the important features that 
comprise the person – everything that the person owns – and that this is 
distinct, separate and cut-off from all that is not part of the person, located 
outside the container”.  
Within cognitive science, individualists claim that one’s mental states, processes, 
and capacities supervene on the intrinsic properties of that individual, most 
commonly the individual’s neurology or nervous system. Individualism may suggest 
for example, a person’s pain supervenes on the firing of the individual’s c-fibres, and 
this internal, physical subvenient base is metaphysically sufficient for the pain. This 
is the physical constitutivity thesis: realisers of states and properties are exhaustively 
physically constituted by the intrinsic, physical states of the individual to whom those 
states and properties belong. Consequently, individualists advocate what Jerry 
Fodor (1981) called ‘methodological solipsism’, bracketing off the world beyond the 
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individual by individuating and characterising cognitive states and structures. This 
thesis ultimately opposes this view.  
Nevertheless Chapter 3 argues that the individual is essentially embodied, and thus 
distinct from all worldly artefacts. The overall structure of first-person experience is 
necessarily determined by our bodily dynamics as embodied individuals. Like Maiese 
(2016: ix), I endorse the view that this conscious experience with which each 
individual is tacitly acquainted is subjective, insofar as it necessarily involves an 
egocentrically centred, single experiential viewpoint that is spatio-temporally located 
wherever one’s body is. Therefore, this thesis answers the question ‘what am I?’ by 
suggesting humans are fundamentally embodied subjects. However, the latter half of 
Chapter 3 argues that our identity as individuals has a certain vitality and thickness. I 
propose this awareness of one’s body is complemented by a multiplicity of narratives 
that emerge through our interpersonal interactions and environmental engagement. 
Consequently, my own favoured account of selfhood, which builds on the theories of 
Sass and Parnas (2003), Maiese (2014, 2016) and Lysaker and Lysaker (2008, 
2011), concludes that a holistic account of selfhood requires many layers. I term this 
theory of selfhood ‘the SCALED self’, explicitly referring to the different yet 
necessary levels that constitute what I am; fundamentally rooted in our embodied, 
biological nature.  
In line with Wilson (2004), this thesis adopts a pluralistic position: the SCALED self 
accepts that whilst some states, processes, and structures are best understood as 
internal (e.g. pain, bodily sensation), it urges us to move beyond the biological 
boundary of the individual and recognise that some states are widely realised. 
Furthermore, it goes beyond Wilson, and argues that the self can extend and is 
widely realised by non-biological parts. Yet, I reiterate throughout; SCALED selfhood 
remains anchored in an embodied subject, and therefore cognition and selfhood 
remain “organism centered” (Clark, 2008).  
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE  
Schizophrenia is widely considered the most ‘philosophical’ of all mental disorders, 
as its pathologies of the self challenge the philosophical theories of selfhood 
grounded in the first-person perspective. Therefore, schizophrenia is the empirical 
foundation for this paper. It is suggested that some schizophrenic psychoses are 
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disorders of pre-reflexive self-awareness (Sass and Parnas, 2003), thus challenging 
fundamental assumptions within philosophy of mind, including the Cogito. I think 
clinical characterisations of schizophrenic persons may profit from philosophical 
understandings of the syndrome’s symptoms and from clear definitions of 
philosophical concepts such as ‘subjectivity’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘minimal self’ 
(Stanghellini and Fulford, n.d.). Equally, the empirical evidence the syndrome 
supplies enables philosophers to gain further insight into consciousness and test the 
adequacy of philosophical theories of selfhood. Therefore, this thesis draws upon 
multiple testimonies detailing first-hand experiences of schizophrenia.   
In order to better understand what schizophrenia is and how schizophrenic 
symptoms manifest, the following chapter explores literature on this pathological 
illness. Firstly, I discuss its history and its problem of definition. To qualify for a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia a person must exhibit at least two characteristic 
symptoms (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 3). I secondly explore each symptom, 
discussing both positive symptoms (delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech, 
catatonic or unorganised behaviour), and negative symptoms (i.e. a diminishment in 
one’s immediate acquaintance with his/her experience). I endorse Owen’s (2009) 
claim that there is, “something fragile about phenomenology: it requires a kind of 
living contact with thinking and clinical experience to be at its best”. This thesis takes 
a phenomenological approach, considering like Parnas and Sass the first-person 
perspective to be the “ultimate arbiter of validity” (2011: 522), thus Chapter 2 
explores schizophrenic symptomology with case studies that exemplify how patients 
have undergone these categorised symptoms. This chapter thus serves as a 
foundation for my discussions of schizophrenia.  
In Chapter 3, I argue, “not only the sense of self, but also the self itself [is] essentially 
embodied and rooted in our biological nature” (Maiese, 2016: x). Arguing for what I 
term ‘the SCALED self’, I ground Sass and Parnas’ (2003) theoretical arguments for 
three dimensions of selfhood that come apart in schizophrenia, in the neurobiological 
dynamics of our embodied subjectivity. I suggest selfhood consists of multiple levels, 
some of which can extend, that build upon one another and originate from a 
perspectival subjectivity. Here, I draw upon the works of Albahari (2006), Sass and 
Parnas (2003), Lysaker and Lysaker (2008), and Maiese (2016).  
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Chapters 4 and 5 explore the complementary disorders of ipseity, firstly diminished 
self-affection and then hyperreflexivity, in relation to the SCALED self. Chapter 4 
firstly sets out conventional arguments for extended mind, and the subsequent 
natural recognition of extended selves. I then explore diminished self-affection, and 
argue that the schizophrenic’s recognition of mental states as ‘theirs’ can be widely 
realised by psychotherapy’s specific languaging. Therefore, I argue the SCALED 
self’s personal ownership can extend. Finally, I explore some questions surrounding 
the self’s extension. I notice a disparity between Clark’s (2003) claim that the self is 
illusory, and his (2008) claim that the self is nevertheless “organism centered”, 
reaffirming that the SCALED self is grounded in desiderative bodily feelings. Chapter 
5 firstly consolidates the notion that the first-person giveness of experience is body 
based. Via an analysis of hyper-reflexivity, I consider whether this symptom of 
schizophrenia results from a disruption in essentially embodied consciousness, and 
thus evaluate the SCALED self’s notion of foundational embodied subjectivity. I 
argue it nevertheless remains the core of subjectivity. However, unlike Chapter 4, I 
suggest bodily-orientated treatment strategies cannot constitute a part of a 
schizophrenic’s return to a ‘healthy and normal’ selfhood, but rather support 
rehabilitation, therefore distinguishing between extended and embedded cognition.  
Strengthening arguments for extended SCALED selfhood, Chapter 6 explores a new 
treatment for auditory hallucinations: avatar therapy. I propose this therapy exhibits a 
clear extension of mind, providing multiple arguments that suggest similarities 
between Clark and Chalmers’ (2010) examples of cognitive extension and how 
patients approach the therapy. I argue parts of the therapy accord with the trust and 
glue conditions Clark and Chalmers (2010) provide as necessary requirements for 
extension, and suggest it can be subjected to manipulation to elicit specific cognitive 
responses that the patient alone cannot achieve. When patients engage in this 
therapy, I propose they form coupled systems that, understood holistically, are 
cognitive. I then make the final necessary step from extended minds, to extended 
SCALED selves. This chapter presents a unique contribution to the philosophy of 
psychiatry. Whilst Chapters 4 and 5 include current debates about the role embodied 
cognition can play in refining existing strategies and exploring new body-based 
therapies (Maiese, 2016; Fuchs, 2005), as yet, I am unaware of philosophical 
investigation into patient-avatar relationships within this therapy. Thus whilst this 
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chapter remains somewhat speculative, it provides systematic discussions where 
further research is also possible. 
But can the treatments I discuss ever ‘repair’ a schizophrenic self? Chapter 7 reflects 
upon what SCALED selfhood implies for therapeutic treatments. As human 
subjectivity is fundamentally embodied, to regain the personal ownership that one 
normally tacitly experiences, I propose that treatments should firstly seek to 
transform individuals’ “overall bodily and neurobiological dynamics” (Maiese, 2016: 
xxii). Secondly, as one’s ‘full’ or ‘thick’ sense of being comes from 
phenomenologically informed dialogical narratives, I propose that treatments should 
enable intersubjective couplings between patients and others. This will invariably 
lead to the notion of extended selves. Arguably, the positive results of avatar therapy 
suggest alternative modes of ‘extended therapies’ deserve further consideration. 
This thesis concludes that body, mind and world are invariably interconnected, and 
therefore all three must feature in schizophrenic recovery.  
1.4 WHY THIS RESEARCH? 
Davidson (2003) suggests the experience of severe mental illness like schizophrenia 
does not just involve alienation and uncertainty, but also patients will lose first-
person authority with regard to their sense of self. These people may stop seeing 
themselves as “somebody, somewhere about whom a story might be told” 
(Davidson, 2003: 221). Arguably this loss occurs because schizophrenia “involved 
alterations in the core of a person’s subjectivity” (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 1). 
However, what exactly is lost is something of debate amongst philosophers and 
psychologists alike: Sass and Parnas (2003) suggest the minimal self (Zahavi, 
2005), namely the first-person perspective, can be disrupted and come apart in 
schizophrenic episodes. However, Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 2) maintain 
schizophrenics retain an irreducible first-person dimension. Adequate conceptions of 
schizophrenia must therefore track the self’s fate throughout the illness, and 
determine what part(s) of human selfhood are disrupted. This thesis categorises 
these levels of disrupted subjectivity via my conception of a SCALED self.  
This research has empirical implications. Presently, sustained recovery occurs in 
less than 14% of patients within the first five years following a psychotic episode 
(Robinson et al., 2004). Yet, new non-pharmaceutical treatments like avatar therapy 
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can boast success rates of 61.6% immediately after implementation, with a pilot 
study of twenty-six patients showing sixteen benefiting from significant reductions in 
the frequency and intensity of their auditory hallucinations of voices (Leff et al., 2014: 
168). Insel (2010: 191) hopes the continued expansion in knowledge of 
schizophrenia and recognising that furthering understanding and treatment 
strategies may, and can, come from distant fields in science that as yet, have not 
engaged with this debate.  
At present, one is diagnosed ‘schizophrenic’ after exhibiting late symptoms that 
emerge in a psychotic episode where the schizophrenic displays abnormal rationality 
and/or behaviours. Current treatments aim to reduce these psychotic symptoms. 
However, developments in discovery technologies continue to transform our 
understanding and treatment of other medical disorders that can revolutionise our 
understanding of schizophrenia. Less acute features of schizophrenia, such as social 
and behavioural deficits, and genetic vulnerability (Insel, 2010: 190) may be more 
noticeable, and treated by focusing on the cognitive deficits schizophrenia causes. 
The ultimate goal is for cognitive science to enable personalised care and 
therapeutics on a one-to-one basis that assess and serve the individual needs of 
each patient; I suggest such treatments can extend the cognitive capabilities of the 
patient concerned. This means not identifying possible pre-psychotic symptoms and 
responding accordingly, but ensuring every patient has access to intervention 
strategies and care, and ensuring full social inclusion for all people, anywhere on the 
schizophrenic spectrum (Insel, 2010: 191). 
Rehabilitation literature suggests an important observation: schizophrenic patients 
can recover more empowered selfhoods “through the active construction of 
narratives regarding both their illness… and their relation to it”, if those constructions 
are enhanced by on-going environmental interactions and engagements (Lysaker 
and Lysaker, 2008: 30). I explore a rethinking of common therapeutic practices, and 
consider the phrase “on-going interactions and engagements with the environment” 
to allude to two-way interactions between the schizophrenic and the world, creating 
coupled systems that can constitute more empowered first-person perspectival 
experiencers to whom narratives can be attributed. I think developments in 
personalised care should acknowledge the schizophrenic’s unique relationship with 
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the world, and their subjective experiential viewpoint. This is demonstrated in one 
30-year-old man’s statement that “If you had been able to talk with the “me” that 
knew how frightened I was… then we could have handled that [first person 
subjectivity]” (Anderson and Goolishan, 1992: 25).  
Therefore, this thesis’ exploration of schizophrenic patients’ on-going interactions 
and engagements with the environment has practical applications. I argue extended 
mind theory accords with the narratives surrounding rehabilitation, and can explain 
why treatments such as psychotherapy and avatar therapy are successful. 
Consequently, this thesis should explain the reasons why interventions that include 
an “aggressive focus on cognition…” may prove surprisingly effective for pre-empting 
or forestalling psychosis. I therefore agree with Insel’s (2010: 191) statement that, 
“[i]f the preemptive interventions are as effective as what we have today for coronary 
artery disease and if these are widely deployed, by 2030 we should expect a 
profound reduction in first-episode psychosis.” 
 
 
 
  
 18 
CHAPTER 2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC ILLNESS 
2.1 THE HISTORY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA  
Bleuler (1911) and Kraepelin (1919) first conceptualised schizophrenia almost 100 
years ago. These authors are credited with documenting and linking the 
disturbances now regarded as characteristic symptoms of the illness (Lysaker and 
Lysaker, 2008: 9). The non-specific concept of madness has existed for thousands 
of years, with historical evidence traceable back to Pharaonic Egypt, in the second 
millennium before Christ. Further brief descriptions of an illness resembling 
schizophrenia are found in the Hindu Ayurveda, 1400 BC. However, the earliest and 
unambiguous descriptions of schizophrenia were made in the 18th century, and it 
was still unclassified as a distinct mental disorder until 1887 by Emil Kraepelin 
(Kendell, 1993: 397). He first distinguished between what he called ‘dementia 
praecox’ and manic depression. Kraepelin considered dementia praecox primarily a 
disease of the brain, specifically, a form of dementia. He called it ‘dementia praecox’, 
meaning early dementia, or ‘premature deterioration’ (Roe and ben-Yishai, 1999: 
371), to differentiate it from other types of dementia like Alzheimer’s. Then, in 1911, 
Bleuler used the word ‘schizophrenia’ (Schizophrenia, n.d.). This term intended to 
capture the meaning underlying his theory (‘schizophrenic’ deriving from the Greek 
‘skhizo’ [split] and ‘phren’ [mind]). Bleuler did not intend for his term to convey the 
idea of split/multiple personalities, commonly associated with schizophrenia today 
(Birchwood et al., 1989: 16).  
2.2 THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION  
Since Bleuler, the definition of schizophrenia has continued to morph, as scientists 
attempt to more accurately delineate the different types of mental diseases. Bleuler 
was first to describe the symptoms as “positive” or “negative” (Schizophrenia, n.d.). 
He thought that the loosening of associations is the essential feature of 
schizophrenia. The definition of schizophrenia is disjunctive in nature; it is defined 
according to multiple sets of characteristics. Thus, there are no necessary or 
sufficient identifying conditions. Consequently, two patients, both classed 
‘schizophrenic’ may exhibit no common symptoms. Whilst this might appear counter 
to a definition’s function, disjunctive definitions are not unusual; few definitions are 
based on necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e. ‘monothetic’ definitions). 
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Birchwood et al. (1989: 17-18) explain how in zoology the classification of animals is 
‘polythetic’, meaning that they are defined by the presence or absence of sets of 
features, none of which are essential for class inclusion. For example, we define 
one-legged feathered creatures as ‘birds’, despite most featuring two legs. A 
disjunctive definition is useful when defining schizophrenia because it is inclusive to 
multiple symptoms. Family resemblance, discussed by Wittgenstein in Philosophical 
Investigations (2009: 76) suggests that things thought to be connected by one 
common feature alone are actually connected by multiple, overlapping similarities 
with no singular feature common to all, as schizophrenic symptomology illustrates.  
Yet, it is questionable, ‘where’s the schizophrenia that exists beyond the presence of 
these unusual experiences?’ Szasz (1978) for example, suggests schizophrenia has 
no substantive existence as an illness beyond the minds of psychiatrists; its 
biological character is unlike other “organic” diseases (Szasz, 1979: 90) such as 
cancer’s ontological existence, and patients suffering from schizophrenic episodes 
should be considered primarily as individuals, not lumped together as class 
members bearing a family resemblance. (Members of a class would be the 
‘idiopathic’ approach). However, this claim is ultimately erroneous; medical 
classifications like the (DSM) IV-TR sufficiently determine a class relationship within 
a group of patients where individual members may nevertheless be symptomatically 
isolated.  
2.3 SYMPTOMS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA  
In the twenty-first century, the conception of schizophrenia has become so pervasive 
approximately 1% of individuals may be labelled ‘schizophrenic’ during their lives 
(Bentall, 1990: 23). This statistic holds for both industrial and Third World countries. 
Schizophrenia manifests in numerous ways with varying degrees of severity, 
meaning ‘schizophrenia’ is ultimately a descriptor that signifies a conglomoration of 
symptoms. The diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’ relies upon observations that illustrate a 
change in the patient’s experiences; specific perceptions, behaviours, thoughts or 
emotions may drastically diminish or magnify over the course of many months 
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 2-3). 
Within present psychiatry, three major diagnostic classification systems are used. 
These are: the ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1992), the Diagnostic and 
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Statistical Manual (DSM), and the Research Diagnostic Criteria. The ICD-10 is more 
prevalently used throughout Europe whilst the United States more commonly relies 
upon the DSM-IV. They have similar criteria for diagnosis, both consisting of primary 
lists of symptoms. To qualify for a diagnosis of ‘schizophrenic’ according to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000), an upgraded version of the DSM IV, a person must exhibit at least two 
characteristic symptoms from a list of five: 
a) Delusions 
b) Hallucinations 
c) Disorganised speech 
d) Grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour 
e) Negative symptoms 
Furthermore, there must be continuous signs of disturbance for six months or more, 
and the characteristic symptoms must last for one month, unless treated. These 
symptoms cannot result from intoxication or drug use or be attributable to depression 
or other distinct medical conditions (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 4)1. 
Schizophrenics undergo changes in their mental and social functioning. Sometimes 
these changes are transcient, but most commonly these changes are episodic or 
permanent. It is estimated less than one third of patients can expect to return to 
‘average’ levels of functioning (Birchwood et al., 1989: 4). It varies how and when 
symptoms manifest in patients; it is not uncommon to first manifest in adults over 45 
years (Jeste et al., 1997), although women tend to have relatively later onset than 
men. Males also have significantly higher rates of schizophrenia than women: 2.4% 
vs. 0.9%. For men, earlier onset seems to correlate to poorer long-term outcomes, 
whilst women who experience earlier onset may face a better prognosis (Lewine, et                                                         
1 I recognize the DSM IV-TR has since been updated to the DSM V in 2013 with modifications to its definition of 
schizophrenia: “Specific changes in its definition include elimination of the classic subtypes, addition of unique 
psychopathological dimensions, clarification of cross-sectional and longitudinal course specifiers, elimination of 
special treatment of Schneiderian ‘first-rank symptoms’, better delineation of schizophrenia from schizoaffective 
disorder, and clarification of the relationship of schizophrenia to catatonia” (Tandon et al., 2013: 1). However, as 
my research includes literature predating this recent publication, I refer to the DMS IV-TR for consistency. 
Nevertheless, schizophrenia’s fundamental nature that this thesis discusses remains understood in the same 
way in 2016.  
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al., 1997). It also occurs in children, although rarely (Asarnow et al., 2004). I now 
explore the characteristic symptoms the DSM IV-TR highlights for diagnosing 
‘schizophrenia’. 
a) Delusions 
Schizophrenic delusions involve odd, bizarre thoughts that other people consider 
incredulous. They represent beliefs that are unshared by the individual’s cultural 
peer group (Birchwood, 2001: 2). Examples might include: thinking one’s relatives 
are poisoning them, believing that signs or traffic patterns hold special messages for 
them alone, or even believing their heart is stone, or that they were raised by 
radioactive sharks (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 3). Characteristically, schizophrenics 
tend to be “unshakable” in their faulty beliefs while ‘normal’ people commonly 
change their beliefs according to new information (Bernheim and Lewine, 1979: 26). 
One 23-year-old schizophrenic reported: 
“…I began to get delusions… I kept thinking the Mafia were after me, and the 
FBI were protecting me, ready to send me away to get trained… I made a 
false confession of murder so that they [the police] would incarcerate me and 
protect me from the Mafia” (Birchwood and Jackson, 2001: 2-3). 
There are three main types of schizophrenic delusions. The schizophrenic may 
believe and feel his behaviour is being influenced or controlled by external forces 
(delusions of influence and control). Equally, he may feel that thoughts he does not 
own are put into his mind (thought insertion), or conversely that his own thoughts are 
being removed (thought withdrawal) (Kendell, 1993: 401).  
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 8) provide testimonies illustrating this schizophrenic 
symptom. One unnamed man had been married and employed for years, then 
became ill, experiencing delusions of control. “One day, he would attribute his 
actions to commands sent to him through electrical currents [(a sensory 
hallucination)] by non-corporeal spirits. A month later, he could coherently talk about 
his past and future and argue there was no reason to defend his previous belief 
about spirits”. Then, one month on, he destroyed his furniture and starved himself to 
punish the spirits he believed were guiding his actions. Two months later his beliefs 
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again vanished and he reorganised his life, yet soon after he was arrested for 
shoplifting from a department store, claiming he needed items for a ritual to honour 
the spirits controlling his actions. This report illustrates that schizophrenic symptoms 
are stable traits, but can dramatically fluctuate over short time periods. The subject’s 
interpretation of these delusions, arguably depends on the individual’s cultural 
background. For example, Europeans afflicted with thought disturbances may 
attribute their source to God or the Devil, whilst Africans and West Indians may cite 
spirits or witchcraft. In the 21st century, inhabitants of modern industrial countries 
may attribute their thought disturbances to technologies capable of broadcasting 
information, such as laser beams, televisions and satellites (Kendell, 1993: 401).  
Schizophrenics can secondly experience delusions of persecution, believing they are 
being watched, followed, or persecuted somehow (Birchwood et al., 1989: 6). Such 
delusions illustrate the unpredictable nature of the schizophrenic mind. The halo 
effect is how we unintentionally but unavoidably bias our feelings towards someone. 
For example, if we dislike someone’s overuse of ‘like’ in their conversations, this 
dislike will carry over, against reason, to our judgement of other things they do. This 
is a negative halo effect. A halo effect can also occur in positive ways; Bernheim and 
Lewine (1979: 26) give the example “love is blind”. These are normal biases 
operating against objective information. Whilst most people can learn to overcome 
the pull of the halo effect, the schizophrenic struggles: they can be swept away by 
biases and are unmindful of appropriate actions. They might, for example, interpret 
the person’s over-use of ‘like’ to be deliberately trying to bring about their demise. 
Finally, schizophrenics may experience delusions of identity; losing their sense of 
identity or purpose and believing they have abnormal powers or abilities (Birchwood 
et al., 1989: 6). This could include believing one’s thoughts are accessible to others 
and are broadcast externally. Joe, a 22-year-old diagnosed with schizophrenia for 
example reports, “I avoided going out because people on the street could read my 
thoughts. My mind was transparent…” (Birchwood and Jackson, 2001: 1).  
The experiences described by one schizophrenic, Frank, epitomise in parts all three 
forms of schizophrenic delusions. He first developed symptoms at around twenty-
one, having already been in psychotherapy to discuss his uncertainty about the 
course of his life regarding work and love. Having had a normal upbringing, he 
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expressed frustration at his financial dependence on his parents and shame 
concerning his lack of effort in school. During a family vacation, having taken a break 
from therapy, Frank developed serious psychosis and experienced delusions both of 
persecution (believing the spouse of a former teacher was arranging his 
assassination) and of influence and control (thinking road signs showed him sexual 
feelings that had been inserted inside him). Despite immediate pharmacological 
intervention, his psychosis did not cease. Several months later Frank still thought his 
demise was coming. He believed if he stopped thinking about his persecution, 
everything became unbearable, and he would lose a sense of purpose. “Without 
these thoughts, he felt only ‘emptiness and nothingness’, a subjective state infinitely 
more painful than fearing a death he might still avoid” (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 
37). 
Frank’s fluctuation between feelings of diminished self-affection and delusions of 
both persecution and thought insertion evidences a first-person perspective to 
Frank’s illness that requires philosophical investigation. Third-person analyses of his 
schizophrenic episode would be incomplete, failing to account for the reflexive 
dimension of his symptoms, which for Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 38) “disclose to 
him a sense of his own welfare in the world”. Such accounts would overlook how 
Frank underwent these symptoms as a part of his illness. Therefore, Owens (2009) 
says there is “something fragile about phenomenology: it requires a kind of living 
contact with thinking and clinical experience to be at its best.” I follow Sass and 
Parnas’ (2003: 427) standard philosophical use of the term ‘phenomenology’, 
referring to the subjective dimension of schizophrenia. Phenomenological feelings of 
persecution structurally entail a subject finding him/herself persecuted. This 
implicates other phenomena. For example, for Frank to experience persecution, 
regardless of this delusion’s truth, there is a subject he associates as ‘himself’, which 
is, from his first-person perspective, persecuted. I reemphasise this because it 
implies that should an account of schizophrenia fail to acknowledge the first-person 
perspective experiencing thought insertion, persecution or auditory hallucinations, 
then the account for that symptom is incomplete. Consequently, “one cannot do 
justice to schizophrenia unless one addresses its manifold first person dimensions” 
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 38). My endorsement of this approach does not entail a 
rejection of third-person biological and psychological classifications, but only 
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reiterates that the lived phenomenological dimension must be deeply considered in 
this investigation.   
b) Hallucinations 
Coupled with delusions, hallucinations form a set of ‘positive symptoms’ because 
they represent sensory experiences not shared with most people in the absence of 
appropriate external stimuli. Hallucinations range in content, severity and form, and 
can involve voices or sounds, vivid visual imagery, odours and/or bodily sensations, 
all of which lack discernible external causes. Only sometimes are patients aware 
their experiences do not match reality, which if they can, may enable them to ‘ignore’ 
the disruptive hallucinations more or less successfully. Some schizophrenics for 
instance can continue their activities whilst hearing voices, reminding themselves 
that they are illusory. This however is difficult, and others carry out the voices’ 
commands to hurt themselves, refuse to speak, or engage in other inappropriate 
behaviours. 
Bentall (1990) used research into ‘metacognition’ to explain why patients hallucinate. 
Experimental psychologists use the term ‘metacognition’ to explain the mental 
processes involved in knowledge about one’s mental processes: such processes 
enable humans to guide and command their thinking (Flavell, 1979: 906), as well as 
introspect. Research implies that one uses inferential skill to discriminate between 
‘imaginary’ and ‘real’ experiences; perceived events are not automatically endorsed 
as self-generated or externally generated phenomena. One’s available evidence 
informs our guesses between these possibilities. According to this view, 
hallucinations occur when someone wrongly infers that internally generated cognitive 
states (Bentall, 1990: 36), such as feeling electric charges run down one’s spine, are 
generated externally by ‘real’ stimuli. Another example is thinking someone else 
spoke one’s verbal thoughts. Evidence supports this hypothesis: Heilbrun (1980) 
discovered persons prone to hallucinations are relatively poor at identifying their own 
previously recorded thoughts. By asking 20 patients (12 hallucinators) on a short-
term psychiatric inpatient unit to identify lexical, semantic, and syntactic properties of 
their own thoughts expressed one week earlier, the hypothesis that the hallucinators 
were less able to do so was demonstrated. Bentall and Slade (1985: 160-163) also 
used a signal-detection task to demonstrate those most prone to hallucinations are 
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biased towards attributing experienced phenomena to external sources when 
uncertain of their origin (Bentall, 1990: 36). 
c) Disorganised Speech 
Schizophrenic patients have difficulty organising and directing their thoughts towards 
goals, thus their thought processes lose their logical continuity; associations become 
‘loose’. For example, if asked ‘how old are you?’ a schizophrenic may answer, ‘I’m 
46, 4 less than 50, which is half 100, but double 25’. Bleuler (1950: 22) describes the 
disorder as such: 
“in the normal thinking process, the numerous actual and latent images 
combine to determine each association. In schizophrenia however, single 
images or whole combinations may be rendered ineffective, in an apparent 
haphazard fashion. Instead, thinking operates with ideas and concepts which 
have no, or completely insufficient connection with the main idea and should 
therefore be excluded from the thought process. The result is that thinking 
becomes confused, bizarre, incorrect, abrupt.” 
Those affected by disorganised speech lose their train of thought during 
conversations, make loose associations between topics, and give unrelated answers 
to questions, with thoughts simply connected because they occur simultaneously. 
(Bernheim and Lewine, 1979: 27.) The schizophrenic may speak continuously, yet 
provide numerous irrelevant details and never reach the fundamental point. 
Occasionally, speech becomes so disorganised that it becomes an unintelligible 
‘word salad’ devoid of discernible meaning, despite being full of words (Nemade and 
Dombeck, 2009).  
Normal thinking follows logical rules. It had been suggested that perhaps 
schizophrenic thought processing was guided by different logical rules, which, if 
discovered, could explain its disorganised associations. Take the statements ‘all 
librarians work in the library’ and ‘Rose works in the library’ for example. These 
statements suggest no relationships between librarians and Rose. However, if 
schizophrenics typically concluded Rose was a librarian, this would demonstrate 
schizophrenics used different logical rules to predicate logic. Yet, when comparing 
schizophrenics to non-schizophrenics of similar intelligence, no consistent 
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differences in logic were found (Broen, 1968). This lack of consistency illustrates the 
diversity of ungoverned schizophrenic thought processes psychiatrists must try to 
decipher.  
d) Grossly Disorganised or Catatonic Behaviour 
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 4) define this symptom as, “acting in ways that are 
frenetic and chaotic, without any apparent purpose, or having no behaviour at all”. 
The person may just stand or sit as if frozen. “A person in a catatonic state might 
rigidly sit for an hour with a blank expression, as if made out of plastic.” Disorganised 
behaviours may range from simple problems like sustaining goal-directed self-care 
such as washing or dressing appropriately for the weather, to sudden, socially 
inappropriate outbursts. Mismatches between the subject’s emotional responses and 
the setting or topic of conversation are possible; giggling through important or 
distressing events such as during a funeral being the most common example 
(Kendell, 1993: 402). The patient thus exhibits an ‘emotional blunting’. This is 
connected to the affective flattening patients may feel, discussed under ‘negative 
symptoms’. 
Catatonic motor behaviours are a type of disturbed behaviour that can occur when 
schizophrenia goes untreated. In catatonia, the schizophrenic’s engagement with 
their surroundings noticeably decreases. They may assume rigid postures, and then 
remain motionless for extended periods, even resisting efforts to move them. “Waxy 
flexibility” is a psychomotor symptom of catatonic schizophrenia (Ungvari et al., 
2009). The patient may allow themselves to be moved into positions, but not self-
actuate their movement. If one were to reposition the arm of someone with waxy 
flexibility, it would remain there until moved again, as if it were wax. Usually, this is 
not ‘pretend’, but rather a genuine and unpremeditated symptom of schizophrenia 
the patient cannot help. This disturbance in motor control is also linked to other 
disorders, for example mood disorder with catatonic behaviour (DSM-IV TR). 
However, catatonia now occurs less frequently in schizophrenia due to advances in 
treatment (Nemade and Dombeck, 2009).  
e) Negative Symptoms 
Comparatively little progress has been made in understanding negative symptoms 
compared to other psychotic phenomena. Part of the problem of explaining negative 
 27 
symptoms is the lack of clear understanding of what these symptoms are and how 
they relate (Bental, 1990: 47). Nevertheless, there is general consensus that there 
are three ways negative symptoms may manifest. As the name suggests, these 
symptoms represent a loss of the individual’s functions, particularly relating to 
emotions and motivation. Firstly, patients may experience an affective flattening, 
namely a reduction in the range and intensity of their emotional expression. Patients 
experiencing affective flattening have fairly unresponsive facial expressions, 
frequently accompanied by poor or unnatural eye contact and diminished body 
language or movement. Such individuals might withdraw from social contact and find 
themselves overcome with a sense of emptiness, listlessness and find it difficult to 
sustain their attention (Birchwood et al., 1989: 6-7). The following schizophrenic 
narrative describes one experience of negative symptoms: 
“… I used to like football... I’d sit up late and watch it, if it was on. But now, it’s 
as if I don’t care... And him (pointing to infant son, aged 5) well of course, I still 
love him, but I don’t feel it in here, inside. Even a drink… It’s as if I can’t get 
drunk any more, well… I don’t seem to get hungry either. I eat OK, but I can’t 
get, well, really hungry… There’s not much difference between being awake 
or sleeping” (Birchwood et al., 1989: 6-7). 
This testimony further points to a second aspect of negative symptoms: avolition. 
This is the inability to initiate and persist in goal-directed behaviours, and when 
misinterpreted, can be mistaken for deliberate disinterest. The patient above 
exemplifies this, describing how he lost interest in activities that he previously 
enjoyed. He lost motivation for life, and expressed indifference towards his family. In 
extreme cases, avolition becomes catatonic (Nemade and Dombeck, 2009).  
Similarly to avolition, alogia describes a lessening of the schizophrenic’s sociality 
and wholeness of experience. Alogia refers to difficulty speaking; there is a lessening 
of speech fluency and productivity. Some schizophrenic patients demonstrate alogia 
by answering questions with short, empty replies, and their fluidity of speech is 
impaired. The following imagined conversation illustrates how alogia affects one’s 
speech output: 
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Normal speech 
 
Alogia  
Q: Do you like animals? 
A: Yes, I’ve a dog and two 
cats. 
Q: What are their names? 
A: Snowball is my dog, my two 
cats are Hairball and Fluff. 
 
Q: Do you like animals? 
A: Yes 
Q: What do you like? 
A: Dogs and cats 
Q: Do you have any? 
A: Yes 
Q: How many? 
A: Three 
Q: Are they dogs or cats? 
A: One dog and two cats 
Q: What are their names? 
A: Snowball, Hairball, and 
Fluff 
Q: Who is “Snowball”? 
A: The dog 
 
Negative symptoms all imply a diminishment in the patient’s self-affection; i.e. their 
self-worth. Ultimately, these negative symptoms may cause significant strain on the 
patient’s family. Social withdrawal, emotional detachment and staying in bed may 
cause families to have experiences akin to those expected if the schizophrenic 
person was deceased. One mother of an adult schizophrenic stated, “…She just sits 
there… they can’t bring my daughter back. Sometimes my husband and I just want 
to cry.” (Birchwood and Jackson, 2001: 5). 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
x Schizophrenia is a disorder of the first-person perspective, characterised by 
an experienced distortion of reality, impaired experiential immediacy to one’s 
actions and emotions, erroneous thought processes, and debilitated sociality.  
x Hallucinations and delusions are commonly thought to be core symptoms of 
schizophrenia (Birchwood and Jackson, 2001: 20). 
x Schizophrenia is disjunctive by nature, and two schizophrenics may have no 
similar symptoms. 
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x Despite theories of madness prevailing throughout the centuries, only with 
modern classification systems such as the DSM IV-TR have psychiatrists 
been able to reliably diagnose somebody ‘schizophrenic’. 
x The diagnostic criteria the DSM IV-TR uses has some overlaps; for example, 
catatonic behaviour and experienced emotional blunting form parts of 
negative symptoms. 
x Acknowledging and investigating the first-person perspective is an essential 
way to understand the experiential feelings schizophrenia elicits, and what 
exactly it is that requires treatment.   
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CHAPTER 3. SELFHOOD AND SUBJECTIVITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter firstly explores the nature of the first-person perspective, discussing the 
different constitutive parts of one’s self experience. I argue the first-person 
perspective is comprised of both a reflexive experience of being a subject, grounded 
in one’s sensorimotor experiences of one’s embodiment, and a reflective notion of 
being an “I” who identifies and thus owns the experience. I reject theories of selfhood 
that neglect the bodily dimension of reflexive experience or suggest the body is a 
mere “…vessel for the mental thing that one really or most essentially is” (Strawson, 
1999: 3). Secondly, this chapter develops a multidimensional notion of selfhood, ‘the 
SCALED self’, using three approaches as my orienting framework. These are the 
phenomenological, enactive and dialogical approaches. I argue the self requires a 
‘thick’ description, incorporating aspects of these different approaches. Specifically, 
this chapter combines the transcendental conditions of sensorimotor subjectivity self 
evident in experience with a dialogical world-involving self, which I argue arises 
through how one enacts one’s world. I evaluate these different views and weave 
them together into a more substantial model of selfhood. I also suggest this self’s 
relation to extended mind theory, so that, moving forward in this thesis, my 
conception of SCALED selfhood is compatible with extended models of cognition, 
and ultimately, extended selfhood.  
3.2 WHY IS SCHIZOPHRENIA PHILOSOPHICALLY INTERESTING? 
Schizophrenia has both descriptive and heuristic value. Firstly, we can use 
schizophrenia to test the adequacy of philosophical concepts of selfhood and see if 
our descriptions of consciousness and self-experience are reflected in the forms of 
consciousness that patients demonstrate. Empirical investigation and observation 
enable one to challenge one’s understandings of the basic structure and conditions 
of consciousness to accommodate the first-person narrative accounts of these 
experiences. Secondly, schizophrenia is heuristically valuable as it enables deeper 
understanding of consciousness. Schizophrenic abnormalities illuminate the ‘deep 
structure’ of selfhood, namely the self-manifestation of consciousness including 
affectivity, intentionality, temporality and corporeality. These things fragment in 
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schizophrenia and highlight the inherent fragility of subjectivity, which, consequently, 
can fracture or break.  
Bleuler and Kraepelin both considered pathologies of selfhood important 
components of schizophrenia; Bleuler (1911: 143) noted that the patient’s ego tends 
to undergo “the most manifold alterations” including an experiential splitting of their 
selfhood or passivity and disconnect from the world and their emotions. Kraepelin 
(1896) also suggested a core feature of schizophrenia was “a loss of inner unity”. 
However, neither presented concrete and systematic clinical descriptions of 
anomalous self-experience. 
3.3 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL VS. THE EMBODIED, ENACTIVE APPROACH 
Sass and Parnas (2003; 2011) adopt a phenomenological approach to the self. Their 
objective is to better grasp the self’s phenomenology holistically, taking lessons from 
schizophrenia and generalising this to a phenomenological conception of selfhood 
beyond schizophrenic pathologies. Nevertheless, they primarily focus on achieving a 
better understanding of the psychopathological architecture of disordered 
schizophrenic self. For them, schizophrenia is: 
“… a self-disorder or, more specifically, an ipseity disturbance in which one 
finds certain characteristic distortions of the act of awareness. Ipseity refers to 
the experiential sense of being a vital and self-coinciding subject of 
experience or first person perspective on the world (ipse is Latin for "self or 
"itself)” (Sass and Parnas, 2003: 428). 
When Sass and Parnas discuss disruptions of minimal selfhood, this refers to the 
minimal sense of being an experiencer. They propose three dimensions of ‘self’ that 
can separate in schizophrenia. I endorse these descriptions, but argue the ipseity 
disturbances described are grounded in more general descriptions of embodied 
selves and sensorimotor subjectivity. Sass and Parnas do not develop notions of 
enaction and interaction in ways this chapter does, favouring instead individual 
analyses of mental subjectivity. However, I will argue selfhood is grounded in one’s 
“unique continuing essential embodiment” (Maiese, 2016: 50). 
I accept the implications this brings. Most notably, by acknowledging the extent to 
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which consciousness is a dynamic process animated by precognitive habits and 
sensibilities of the lived body, this means an envatted brain would have radically 
different experiences. Its inability to experience via a proprioceptive sensorimotor 
system or kinesthesis would radically alter its subjective experiences, as its mode of 
interaction with its environment would substantially differ, making many normal 
perceptions and motor actions impossible. If embodiment is a necessary condition of 
consciousness, “then there can be no such thing as an envatted brain with a 
consciousness like ours” (Maiese, 2016: 26).  
3.4 SELF-REFERENCE  
The first dimension of selfhood Sass and Parnas discuss refers to primitive, basic 
self-awareness: ipseity. Within every conscious episode, one has a sense that one’s 
mental state is immediately recognised as given to one’s subject. It is a matter of 
experience ‘offering to’ and “imposing itself upon” one’s subject (Maiese, 2016: 6). 
This giveness of experience is not an additional phenomenological layer that one’s 
experience could lack. It is a transcendental condition of any experience that is mine, 
namely it is precisely its first-person giveness that makes the experience subjective. 
“Experience is familiar with itself or knows itself… consciousness is in some sense 
intrinsically reflexive” (Parnas and Sass, 2011: 525).  
Self-reference is considered non-propositionally. We do not have to consider the ‘I’ 
reflectively, which would be to have the perceptual experience and reflect upon the ‘I’ 
having the experience. Rather, self-reference is pre-reflective. One cannot objectify 
one’s own basic self-awareness. “In other words, a subject cannot simultaneously be 
given as his own object” (Parnas and Sass, 2011: 526). This is because if we were 
without the subjective presence of perception by way of objectifying it, nothing else 
could be experienced, because its subjectivity is a transcendental condition of 
experience. Consequently, subjectivity is inherently elusive. 
On the level of first-order experiences, we are the self-present subjects of our own 
experiences; conscious experiences are intrinsically reflexive. It is our basic 
experiential structure; all experience points back to the subject having the 
experience. This is the experience-experiencer thesis. Strawson (2011: 253) says, 
“Concretely occurring experience can’t possibly exist without the subject of 
experience existing”. This is logically coherent. Firstly, there are experiences (P); 
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e.g., when I cut myself, I feel my broken skin and experience discomfort. Secondly, 
‘experiences’ are experienced by something (Q), namely the discomfort of the cut is 
given to me. Finally, experiencers experience (R): this is a tautology; by definition, to 
be an experiencer is to be a subject that is undergoing or has undergone experience. 
The logic below demonstrates Strawson’s experience-experiencer thesis: 
1 (P→Q) 
2 (Q→R) 
∴ (P→R) 
This hypothetical syllogism necessitates that if something is an experience, then 
something must experience the experience, and secondly, if something experiences 
it, that thing is an experiencer. Strawson (2011: 254) says “Experience is 
experiencing: whatever remains if experience remains, something that is correctly 
called a subject must remain.” It is possible to reach this conclusion without 
endorsing any ontological categorisation of what the nature of the “subject” is. All the 
above logic demonstrates is that a self-referential “I” is implicated in experiences. 
This is the minimal self for Sass and Parnas; the irreducible subjectivity that must 
remain once everything other than experience has been stripped away.  
Yet, this minimal self is nevertheless grounded in its embodiment. For example, 
when I cut myself, and am tacitly aware I am feeling something, this feeling 
originates from a bodily sensation of my cut skin. Therefore, when the tactile 
sensation is given to me as the ‘thing-in-discomfort’, one is necessarily acquainted 
with the subjective experience in its embodied felt first-person mode of presentation. 
Therefore, awareness of oneself is to be in cohesion with this embodied subjectivity 
illustrated in Fuchs and Schlimme’s (2009: 571) statement that “[t]he subject body 
functions as the medium and background of our experience”.  
The phenomenological approach to selfhood suggests that the self is not to be 
apprehended outside of this necessary experience/experiencer relationship. The 
first-person perspective moulds the structure of self-reference; tangible sensations of 
matter cutting my skin are given to me: an intangible perspectival source of my 
discomfort. I agree, but argue the ‘source’ is an essentially embodied sense of self, 
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which is intrinsically reflexive and involves an “egocentrically structured standpoint 
that constitutes our embodied spatio-temporal orientation…” (Maiese, 2016: 50).  
Maiese (2016: 51) suggests the self is metaphysically real, in the sense of being 
empirically real. I interpret this as implying the self is a robust “thing” in the world, 
existing independently of our thoughts of it and whose nature is not reliant on how (if 
at all) we conceive it. We can only deal with experiential phenomena, and, at times, 
we can call our perceptions of phenomena objective. This is because the mode in 
which we perceive the world, namely through sensorimotor subjectivity, is a 
necessary element of being human, and therefore is common and consistent to all. 
We cannot experience in any different manner. The embodied ‘source’ of subjectivity 
is therefore necessarily as it is, and thus empirically real. However, it is not ‘truly real’ 
in the way Noumenal Realists describe: the self is not some kind of substantial entity 
that exists separately from one’s embodied feelings. The self is not a transcendental 
ego, or some other kind of separately existing substance that serves as a stable 
basis for our experiences. So, the self-reference cannot be apprehended outside of 
its embodiment. But it is not nothing: therefore Maiese (2016: 50) proposes both 
one’s sense of self and one’s ‘self itself’ are real, in virtue of being essentially 
embodied phenomena rooted in our biological nature. This is to hold an empirical 
realist position about the self.  
I endorse this idea of the self: it exists but does not subsist as an entity divorced from 
the neurobiological dynamics of its embodiment. Yet, I have, and continue in this 
analysis to use the phrase “transcendental condition of experience/subjectivity”. I 
must clarify how I use this term. By “transcendental condition” I mean something that 
is a necessary product (i.e. way) of our human, embodied condition. So, when I say 
“the experiencer is a transcendental condition of experience”, I simply imply a 
relationship of necessity: an experiencer must exist for the experience. For us, there 
is no possibility of experiencing things outside of this relationship. However, this is a 
contingent feature of our world as human entities. Perhaps, in another world, 
humans similar to us could experience without this subjectivity, but for us, locked 
within this transcendental condition, it remains inconceivable how this would occur. 
The embodied ‘experiencer’ present within the mode of giveness of all experience I 
now discuss in the following section.  
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3.5 FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE  
Sass and Parnas propose a second dimension of self-consciousness, namely a first-
person perspective. Their discussion relies upon a distinction they set out with 
reference to Albahari (2006) who differentiates between perspectival ownership and 
personal ownership. Perspectival ownership refers to an intrinsic form of giveness of 
all experience: all experience necessarily has a ‘for me’ character, namely a first 
person perspective. This equates to the discussion of self-reference in 3.4. Personal 
ownership however refers to a more complex, rich experience. This type of 
ownership comes from identifying perspectival ownership with particular mental 
contents, which are then experienced as ‘mine’2. 
3.5.1 PERSPECTIVAL OWNERSHIP 
Perspectival ownership is the inherent form or mode of givenness of experience (i.e., 
the ‘for me’ character). This is what Parnas and Sass have in mind when considering 
the first-person perspective. Experience always points back to a subject, following 
the experience-experiencer thesis. Hanna and Maiese (2009: 81) explain this, saying 
that for a conscious episode to be immanently reflexive is:  
“…for it to include an immediate sense of self, or for it to be directly aware of 
itself in a wholly first-order sense—that is, to be folded back upon itself, to be 
directly attentive to itself, and care directly about itself, without any division or 
opacity between itself and the content of its own experience”. 
For an experiencer to own something in a perspectival sense is for that thing to 
manifest for the subject seemingly in a way that it can appear to no other subject. All 
mental states such as thoughts, intentions and perceptions, at least as they appear 
subjectively qua subject, will be perspectivally owned by that subject. This means                                                         
2 To understand this distinction in detail, one must note how the term ‘ownership’ is used. Buddhism regards 
‘ownership’ to refer to a broad mode of recognition, in which a subject understands itself to possess the functions 
or aspects that constitute the sentient being, that underpin its role as ‘owner of X’. A subject’s assumption of 
aspects of itself rightfully being ‘theirs’ or ‘belonging to them’ demonstrates that subject’s presumed identity as 
the ‘owner’ of those traits. In Buddhism the ownership mode of identification is essential to comprehending 
selfhood, such that if a person's self exists, i.e. a ‘me’, then things belong to that self as ‘mine’, thus necessarily 
meaning a ‘self’ or ‘me-as-owner’ exists. Self qua owner comes in two contrasting forms: ‘perspectival ownership’ 
and ‘possessive/personal ownership’ (Albahari, 2006: 51-3). 
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that I, as a conscious subject, experience my mental states from my first-person 
perspective. 
Extended worldly objects external to one’s inner subjectivity will not be owned; but, 
what will be perspectivally owned is the way these objects are impregnated in the 
experiencing subject’s subjectivity (Albahari, 2006: 54). This means that the 
giveness of a perceptual object is always perspectival. Husserl presents a metaphor 
modelled on ocular optics: the perspectival self is a centrally located ego that emits 
centrifugal intentional rays, and is subjected to worldly content converging on its 
spatial location. The perspectival subject does not present itself relative to objects as 
something disembodied. The location from which we experience will always be from 
somewhere, unlike Nagel’s (1986: 61) claim that we can apprehend the world from a 
“perspectiveless” vantage point, thus for Parnas and Sass (2011: 528) perspectival 
subjectivity includes the experience of spatial character and embodiment 3 . The 
uniqueness of one’s location is explicit in perspectival ownership, with nobody being 
able to simultaneously witness the world from the same space that one experiences 
from. I accept one necessarily witnesses from spatio-temporal perspectives (Albahiri, 
2006: 8), illustrated by Merleau-Ponty’s (2012: 84) statement, "I am conscious of my 
body through the world… [it] is the unperceived term at the center of the world 
towards which every object turns its face." When encountering the world, our 
perspectival-ownership is spatially located, one experiences from certain angles, 
giving one self-specifying information about one’s embodiment. 
“The first-person perspective in perception is thus not a free-floating, 
experiential configuration but a function of the lived body, moving in space. 
This form of embodiment helps to constitute the sense of self, of being a 
substantial (spatial) subject” (Parnas and Sass, 2011: 528).    
This sense of self is necessarily egocentrically structured in the sense that it has an 
inner source point to which the organism can relate all of its experiences. There are 
two distinct ways that bodily awareness is part of this egocentrically structured                                                         
3 Although I characterise Parnas and Sass as providing a purely phenomenological perspective, they do not 
completely neglect the body from their analysis. Nevertheless, their overall taxonomy of the self in schizophrenia 
applies to more abstract conceptions of selfhood. Mere mentions of experiential spatiality are not sufficient; I am 
explicitly arguing the minimal self is grounded in embodied sensorimotor subjectivity.  
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awareness involved in perspectival ownership. The body is ontologically ambiguous; 
it has both a subjective dimension as it is lived through from the inside (body-as-
subject), whilst understanding body as spatially situated is to conceive oneself as an 
object in space (body-as-object). Firstly, as a subjective object, one experiences 
oneself as impacted on by external objects. As described, I might cut myself, and 
therefore recognise the spatial location of my body relative to the sharp object. 
Nonetheless, it is notable that one’s awareness of one’s body-as-object is not 
identical to one’s awareness of other worldly objects. My awareness of my bodily 
location is richer and fuller than that of the awareness of a chair’s physical location to 
me. I propose this is because one also experiences one’s bodily sense of self as a 
subjective subject: body-as-subject. One experiences oneself as the agent and 
source of one’s bodily movements. The sense of self lives through the body; actions 
seem to originate from within the body. One immediately feels oneself stand in direct 
and intimate connection to the movements, vital systems, processes, and overall 
condition of one’s own living body, despite the possibility of having no explicit or 
thematic awareness of one’s self or body. The body is transparent, meaning that 
often, we are unaware of body-as-object, it is experientially invisible in the sense that 
one looks through it to the world (Legrand, 2007: 504). Both types of these 
experiences grounded in bodily awareness are parts of the “egocentrically structured 
awareness involved in immanent reflexivity” (Maiese, 2016: 71). 
The ‘zero point’ for all first-person experience is grounded in the processes and 
dynamics of living organisms (Maiese, 2014: 323). The organism’s autonomy and 
autopoiesis (i.e. self generation) entails that it produces and maintains a dynamic 
identity when faced with a changing environment and thus establishes a distinction 
between self and environment. An internal pole of identity relative to an external pole 
of an outside world is created in response to the organism’s internal relations that 
self-sustain its existence and define the living system as a unified whole. As the 
organism’s generative activities delineate what counts as components of the living 
system and what is environmental matter, it possesses “an essentially self-
constituted identity that it affirms by differentiating itself from its surroundings” 
(Maiese, 2016: 23). There is an asymmetry between one’s organismic subjectivity 
and the environment such that an organism realises an internal viewpoint from which 
it interprets and understands its surroundings, resulting in an “”inwardness" present 
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in even the simplest living systems” (Maiese, 2016: 23). 
Importantly, the capacity for sensorimotor subjectivity does not rest on an individual’s 
ability to have conscious meta-representational states or thoughts about oneself and 
one’s own mental states, making it possible to possess the capacity for sensorimotor 
subjectivity even if one is incapable of self-reflection (Maiese, 2016: 7-8). Therefore, 
returning to the self-reference, which I equated with perspectival ownership, I 
suggest self-reference is also pre-linguistic; from birth humans experience with an 
immediate form of self-acquaintance. Whenever someone experiences, they are 
simultaneously given to themselves as a subjective presence having the experience, 
which involves an awareness or intuition of one’s existence as a singular, unified and 
temporally persisting subject (Albahari, 2006). This subjecthood is an integral part of 
the experience. Bodily self-awareness is developmentally basic. The “rooting 
response” illustrates this: new-born infants intentionally turn their heads toward 
things stroking adjacent to their lips, like another person’s finger (Prechtl, 1958: 217). 
Rooting is present from birth and disappears at around four months New-borns have 
limited mental awareness, yet respond to sensory tactile modalities, demonstrating 
bodily awareness. However, they do not respond when someone takes their own 
hand and brushes their cheek with it. Despite how behaviourally fragile new-borns 
are, they recognise the hand as perspectivally owned as a subject. The shape and 
position of their finger is dictated to the infant by how their skin is stretched across 
their bone and tissue, and how receptors in the joints and muscles yield information 
about how their limbs are distributed in space. This tells them the tactile sensation on 
their cheek consequently is not a food source. This demonstrates embodied 
perspectival ownership as the infant proprioceptively perceives from a “my 
perspective” (Albahari, 2006: 56); and suggests that not all first-person content 
requires expertise in using the concept “I” or first-person semantics (Maiese, 2016: 
63). 
So far, I have suggested that all conscious thoughts and sensations involve an 
immanently reflexive, implicit sense of self that is bound up with bodily awareness. 
Consequently, I propose the perspectival subject (perspectival ownership) is a 
necessarily embodied subject, therefore rejecting Strawson’s (1999: 3) claim that 
one fundamentally is a purely mental thing. Yet, I am not rejecting Sass and Parnas’ 
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(2003) phenomenological conception of the self, or the experience/experiencer 
thesis (Strawson, 2011: 253). It is true there is a reflexive subject, but importantly, 
this experiencer is an embodied being.  
3.5.2. THE NECESSITY OF PERSPECTIVAL BODILY AWARENESS 
The reflexive subject is necessarily embodied. Self-consciousness is present in 
bodily experience: within the never-ending flow of sensations originating from the 
sensorimotor body’s environmental interactions, we see the self-conscious body is 
the foundational level of subjectivity (Maiese, 2016: 68). This view contrasts with 
Descartes’ (2013) arguments, where mind exists independently from body. This 
suggestion of dependence is modal, namely the dualist suggests his ‘self’, (for my 
argument’s purpose, I equate this with perspectival ownership), could exist even if 
his body did not. Dualism is a claim of possibility: disembodiment is possible (Hart, 
1994: 265). Hart (1994: 267) argues that we can rightly imagine being disembodied: 
imagine waking up and opening one’s eyelids in front of a mirror, yet when one does, 
one’s eyes are missing and only the empty sockets remain. Equally, we can 
envisage taking a surgical saw and removing the top of one’s head, yet inside there 
is no brain, just an empty hole. Hart says that by imagining this, one has now 
successfully “imagined seeing [this in the mirror] without the two body parts... most 
people think crucial to seeing” (1994: 267). The rest of the body is inessential to 
sight, so can equally be disbanded. As Hart suggests, we have already removed the 
essential body parts required for sight, yet can still see, meaning that no physical 
form is necessary for our perception. One would only see the room’s reflection in the 
mirror; therefore perspectival selves are not necessarily tied to one’s embodiment. 
However again, one’s perspectival visual experiences will change, depending on 
one’s movements within the room: the perceived angle of the mirror relative to the 
position your disembodied perspectival experience specifies embodiment via the 
continual relational flow of your position and how objects appear.  
Evidence suggests one’s sense of spatiotemporal location is present even within the 
first weeks of life; infants as young as 18 weeks engage in visually guided reaching 
in predictive ways, suggesting this ability is, “at least partly, prewired”, (Hofsten, 
1980: 369). Spelke et al. (1989: 189) demonstrated that the position of objects 
elicited different reaching-like behaviours in infants. Reaching pattern appeared to be 
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influenced primarily by the adjacency or separation of two test objects. When 
adjacent, the infants perceived the objects as a single unit, grasping any of the 
external borders of the two-object display. However, when separated, the infants 
tended to reach for the closer of the two vertically separated objects (Spelke et al., 
1989: 186-188). This elicited behaviour is not unconscious or reflexive in Legerstee’s 
(1999: 662) view; but rather implies that infants perceive the distance of the object 
relative to their own bodily form. Therefore this suggests relative spatiotemporal 
location is an integral part of perspectival awareness.  
However, one can investigate cases of sensory deprivation, asking whether these 
examples counter claims that all consciousness involves bodily consciousness. Ian 
Waterman’s case exemplifies this. Aged nineteen, Waterman suffered a 
deafferentation (i.e. a destruction of afferent connections of nerve cells) of his body 
from the neck down, resulting in almost total loss of proprioception (McNeill et al., 
2010: 519). Consequently, his pre-reflective awareness of bodily movement was no 
longer operative and his body-schematic system never updated, so he lost all 
embodied motor control. Nevertheless, Waterman still relied on compensatory visual 
proprioception and cognitive agency, meaning he had to visually locate his limbs in 
space, suggesting that one’s embodiment remains an integral part of perspectival 
ownership.  
Yet one may imagine cases of total sensory deprivation, where one is blinded, 
muted, locally anaesthetised and paralysed to avoid any body parts touching one 
another. The closest example of this degree of disembodiment is perhaps sleep 
paralysis, a phenomenon where persons either during falling asleep or awakening, 
temporarily experience an inability to move, speak, or react. Their bodies appear 
absent from consciousness, yet they still experience this situation, suggesting 
perhaps not all perceptual experience requires embodiment. Yet, Maiese (2016: 70) 
asks, “wouldn’t one’s heart continue to beat in one’s chest (perhaps more rapidly), 
and wouldn’t one continue to experience one’s own breathing?” Despite a reduction 
in sensorimotor experience affecting the fullness of bodily consciousness, e.g. being 
unable to feel where one’s limbs are, embodiment remains present in other forms. 
For Maiese (2016: 70) “It simply is not clear that it is possible to remove all 
proprioceptive data”. Furthermore, I am willing to accept that if this is possible, 
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having rejected what Strawson (1999) considers the “core self”, what would remain 
is not something remotely like perspectival awareness. Perspectival awareness is 
necessarily embodied.  
3.5.3. PERSONAL OWNERSHIP 
Sass and Parnas’ first-person perspective however is not just the reflexive subject of 
experience: as subjects we commonly identify perspectival ownership with mental 
contents, which are then felt as ‘mine’. Personal ownership requires an additional 
step: not only is the experience given to a first-person perspective (perspectival 
ownership), but it is then identified as belonging to the subject. One’s “…subject 
identifies as a personal owner” (Albahari, 2006: 55) over the experience.  
This heavier notion of ownership is explicit in how we own external objects. For a 
subject to own something possessively requires them to regard that thing as ‘theirs’ 
by right or social convention, actual or ideal. Albahari (2006: 54) says that in relation 
to possessively owned objects, the subject can be described as a ‘possessive 
owner’. Whenever there is a possessively owned thing or a sense of ‘mine’, there 
must be a personal owner-self. Similarly to how experiences necessitate an 
experiencer, any my-ness towards some X, necessitates a self as a possessor, a 
personal self. Personal ownership thus involves a subject whose identification with 
various mental states reflects its overall self-identity as a personal owner. If the 
subject is indeed an owner-self, the sense of self experienced introspectively must 
be grounded in an owner-self that is felt phenomenologically. If the first-person 
perspective is not an owner-self, then the sense of self one experiences will not be 
grounded in an owner-self that is sensed.  
These two dimensions of Sass and Parnas’ first-person perspective can decouple in 
schizophrenia. Normally, the first-person perspective inherent in instances of thinking 
is simply the quality of ‘me-ness’. There is no distance between my thoughts and 
myself; the perspectival and personal selves are intertwined, meaning there is no 
requirement to have to justify one’s ownership over one’s thoughts. The first-person 
perspective is a unified “me-ness”. However, in some schizophrenic episodes, while 
sensations, perceptions and thoughts necessarily present a unique perspectival 
aspect to the subject, as a transcendental condition of experience is an operative 
perspectival experiencer, the subject feels as if the very same mental episodes do 
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not belong to it. Schizophrenics may lack the ‘belongingness’ of personal ownership. 
They will experience the experience, but it is alien to them, it is not something with 
which they identify. There is either no attempt to appropriate the experience, namely 
identify with it, or they will attribute it to an external agency, for example in cases of 
thought insertion.  
On this account, we can hold onto what Billon (2013) calls the “Cartesian principle”, 
affirming that if a thought is conscious, then it is subjective; as consciousness entails 
subjectivity. Even though there are disruptions of self-experience, the subject 
nevertheless is capable of subjectivity insofar as the thoughts in question are 
presented in the first-person; it is a thing having the experience. Thoughts are 
therefore ‘inside’ the subject, but lack acknowledgement of them belonging to the 
subject as ‘his’ or ‘hers’. Resulting from this breakdown in personal ownership, the 
schizophrenic fails to identify the thoughts as theirs but they nevertheless remain 
aware of where the thoughts occur, namely within their mind. Thought insertion is an 
unusual phenomenon because it presents a case in which a subject introspects and 
experiences subjectivity, but nevertheless does not acknowledge their ownership 
over their internal mental phenomena.  
In order to understand why this is, one must investigate what enables a sense of 
ownership. The self can be defined in terms of personal ownership, for example in 
Buddhism, and thus, in terms of identification (Albahari, 2006: 56). This involves the 
subject assuming that various psychophysical attributes are somehow incorporated 
within its being. Albahari thinks it is therefore important to draw a further distinction 
between firstly, identifying AS, which describes the subject’s action of thinking itself 
to be assimilated with the attributes, and secondly, identifying WITH, which 
describes the state of affairs the subject assumes true; namely, the subject 
experiences itself as assimilated with various psychophysical attributes which are 
therefore its true state of affairs (Albahari, 2006: 56). However, just because a 
subject identifies itself with some X does not imply the subject truly is identified with 
X, rather it is simply the subject’s possessive identification with said X. (Albahari, 
2006: 57) Identifying WITH can be illustrated with regards to the body. The person or 
subject assumes various aspects of the body or mind to be the self. So if we think 'I 
feel tired today', it seems misunderstood to analyse this as 'the body feels tired' or 
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'witnessing from the first-person perspective feels tired' (Albahari, 2006: 58). Rather, 
by identifying oneself with the tired body, the subject takes the body to be the ‘self’, 
the “I”. Albahari (2006: 59) then suggests from this sense of self in the capacity of 
"body/mind-as-subjectivity” will emerge assumptions of personally owning the 
aspects of sentient beings relative to this assumed identity WITH. If buying fitted 
shoes, one’s prior identification as a bodily self now supports the experienced my-
ness directed towards the shoes. Distinct from simply possessing these objects, 
there is a sense of personal my-ness that reflects the subject’s identification as a 
person who owns the shoes. Here, the subject identifies WITH the possessive owner 
of the shoes by identifying WITH the aspects of the body/mind-as-subject that 
harvest the idea of possessive ownership, and therefore identifies AS being their 
personal owner. One’s selfhood in this context refers to a subject AS a personal 
owner, namely the possessive owner as assimilated with the subject. 
However, I think this explanation is overly intellectualistic; whilst Albahari claims that 
whether a mental state is experienced as mine or not depends on whether one 
identifies WITH and AS the owner of it, she does not acknowledge how these 
experiences are grounded in more general systems of subject-world interaction. Both 
identifying WITH and AS require impressions of one’s entitlement to it. One feels 
entitled to identify WITH one’s mental states if the subject experiences sadness for 
example, one cannot say ‘the witnessing perspective is sad’; rather, one is entitled to 
say “I am sad” because the thing purporting to feel sad is something like the 
“intellectual-capacity-as-subject” (Albahari, 2006: 58). Likewise, one feels entitled to 
identify AS a personal owner because of the felt entitlement of the possessive 
owner. Bortolotti and Broome (2009) suggest entitlement is a matter of self-
ascription: the subject acknowledges the thought as his/her own and can provide 
reasons for endorsing the content of thought, which one can give when that thought 
is causally integrated within the relevant contextual information. Maiese (2016: 163) 
distinguishes between phenomenologically intrinsic perspectival subjectivity, and the 
relational nature of personal ownership: whether mental states are mine or not 
depend on whether they are causally integrated within the relevant contextual 
information. Because a schizophrenic’s gestalt organisational processes are 
impaired, such that they struggle integrating contextual information into various 
domains, they experience “basic deficits in the perceptual organisation processes 
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that normally bind elements into a context-appropriate whole” (Martin and Pachiere, 
2013: 114). Such “a context-appropriate whole” is one governed by a sense of 
entitlement: personal ownership.  
3.5.4. AFFECTIVE FRAMING  
Affective framing is a natural, non-inferential and developmentally basic way of 
sifting through the overwhelming clutter of sensory information impregnated upon us 
by our senses, and allows us to filter and condense this information "to something 
first-personally manageable and confer upon it specific cognitive importance” 
(Maiese, 2016: 38). What Maiese describes as affective framing is therefore a pre-
reflective biasing device that involves background patterns of bodily attunement and 
results in carving out feeling-contoured patterns of discrimination, attention and 
comprehension. It selectively attunes the organism to its environment such that 
certain objects take on particular “affective prominence” (Maiese, 2016b: 127) in light 
of its particular needs, body size, ways of moving and current situational factors. This 
selective attunement to the environment “operates at the level of pre-reflective bodily 
consciousness, so that the animal makes sense of its surroundings through its 
affectively aroused body” (Maiese, 2016: 39).  
Maiese (2016: 80) suggests the body is the locus of desiring and caring. I have 
already explored how the body is the centrifugal point of convergence for perceptual 
experience: for objects and events to matter there must be an “I” to whom they 
matter. The body is the locus of convergence between perceiving worldly events and 
willing events to happen, thus taking action. Therefore one’s basic self-experience 
consists in desiderative bodily feelings that enable the subject to care about its 
surroundings and will its felt body to move in goal-directed ways (Maiese, 2016: 81). 
A person’s various affective frames constitutes a kind of ‘survival map’ that enables 
them to navigate the world, making sensory data intelligible and meaningful to that 
subject; it is a personal viewpoint from which environmental artefacts take on 
significance (Maiese, 2016: 85). 
In cases of thought insertion, schizophrenics believe thoughts are not theirs, 
arguably because these thoughts do not occur against the backdrop of affective 
framing and subject import (Maiese 2016b: 127). Inserted thoughts are both 
unintended and lack a sense of personal ownership. The subject’s sense that the 
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inserted thoughts are alien results from a failure to integrate the relevant contextual 
information within their pre-reflective psyche. In schizophrenia, one’s egocentricity 
and background bodily orientation is severely crippled, and when thoughts arise 
without background bodily wants and needs, thoughts seem contextually disengaged 
as the information received is not framed in an embodied organismically-centred 
way. The self-origin of thoughts becomes unnoticeable. Therefore, one can consider 
inserted thoughts that are decoupled from personal ownership as "decontextualized" 
because “they do not occur against the backdrop” of that subject’s implicit affective 
frames (Maiese, 2016: 168). 
Once again, I have shown how Sass and Parnas’ (2003) phenomenological 
investigation is actually grounded in embodied subjectivity. One feels entitled to 
one’s personal ownership over one’s first-person perspective, and this reflective 
entitlement is grounded in contextual information that arises through how one 
perceives one’s body in the world.  
3.6. PHENOMENALITY  
The third dimension of the minimal self Sass and Parnas (2011) discuss is 
‘phenomenality’, referring to the ‘what it is like’ character of experience (Nagel, 
1974). It is the qualitative feel of experience. Conscious mental states are those that 
feel like something to have. A mental experience’s ‘vitality’ or ‘thickness’ is 
sometimes described in phenomenology.  
The sense of self that emerges is not purely a minimal self, namely an “empty 
structural feature of consciousness […which alone cannot…] exhibit phenomenal 
character” Krueger (2011: 51-52). Mind’s transcendental structures need 
phenomenologically “filling in” through the reciprocal interaction between one’s 
experiential embodiment and the world (Maiese, 2016: 73). The phenomenality or 
feel of experience is thus not (just) a feature of individual mental states, but rather 
the qualia of phenomenality is tied to the basic structure of consciousness. Albahari 
(2009: 39) explains this relationship using a metaphor of light and illumination: light is 
required to illuminate objects perceptible to us, yet the light beams themselves are 
(normally) invisible. Nevertheless, they exist. Analogously, consciousness is 
ontologically autonomous and self-subsistent. A phenomenological version of the 
light metaphor is a flame’s luminosity. For Parnas and Sass (2011: 531), the minimal 
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self is flame like in nature; illuminating itself and other objects around it. The source 
of the feeling of experience is consciousness as subjectivity, meaning that the 
subject is the medium (or ‘vehicle’) of the manifestation of feeling.  
3.7. THE DIALOGICAL SELF  
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008) talk about a kind of phenomenality of the self. Our 
experience of the self has a certain kind of thickness. For example, when we are 
happy, we experience as ‘self-as-happy’. If one is transsexual, one experiences from 
the first-person perspective as ‘self-as-transsexual’. Their conception of selfhood is 
more substantial than the form of selfhood I have been advocating; the self is not just 
one’s embodied self, reflected through experience and supplemented by affective 
framing; they suggest that we have a multiplicity of different narrative selves. “[W]e 
sense ourselves within and through encounters that are at once intra- and 
interpersonal, and that reflect complementary and dissonant facets of our being” 
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 70). 
A ‘dialogue’ is typically something external, a process carried out between subjects 
conversing through interaction. ‘Dialogue’ is an appropriate term to describe this self, 
as different and semi-independent self-positions interact, bringing about a sense of 
self (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2011: 200). Accordingly, the self is “…a disclosure of a 
being to itself through an interanimating play of multiple, often partially discontinuous 
self-facets within shifting worldly context” (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 70). 
Importantly, these self-positions may be complementary, for example, self-as-barista 
and self-as-labourer, dissimilar, e.g. self-as-barista and self-as-criminal, or even 
contradictory as schizophrenic cases may illustrate. The self is populated by a 
multiplicity of self-positions with the possibility to entertain dialogical relationships 
with one another. The dialogical conception of self infuses the external and internal. 
Therefore, the self is considered ‘extended’, as external parts of the world, for 
example individuals and groups, are incorporated within the boundary of the 
individual self.  
I now intend to integrate my embodied rethinking of Sass and Parnas’ (2003) 
phenomenological approach in terms of embodiment and enactivism with this 
dialogical approach. This is fruitful to my analysis as I show how when living 
organisms enact their world through environmental engagement and inter-subjective 
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interactions, this is a kind of dialogue, which I term a ‘worldly dialogue’. To achieve 
this, I firstly explore the dialogical model of selfhood. 
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 70) suggest, “meaning emerges from these dialogues 
because shifts in positions prove both responsive to world situations and more or 
less internally coherent, if occasionally dissonant.” This implies that the 
“interanimating play of self-positions” (p. 70) emerges from our interactions in the 
world. The relationship between the Lysakerian self and the world is therefore one of 
dependence: the sense of self depends on the experiences the person has in the 
world. For instance, whilst on an international business flight, one’s dialogical self 
could emerge from the interactions between one’s sense of self as ‘excited’, ‘a 
successful businessman’, ‘apprehensive about presenting one’s paper’, ‘missing a 
partner’ and so on. The interactions among these different facets may change 
depending upon external changes to one’s environment, for instance if a fellow 
passenger begins conversation, if a meal is served, or, if the oxygen masks dropped 
suddenly, resulting in alternative self-facets such as ‘self-as-scared’ or ‘self-as-
endangered’ coming into play. Again, the sense of self described here arises out of 
exchanges between these individual facets in particular contexts. Consequently, “for 
dialogical psychology, the sense of self is not given in an intuitive introspective grasp 
of a stable core self, but in a disclosure of some facet of the temporal, polyphonic 
constellation that each of us is” (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2011: 201). 
To clarify, the perspectival minimal self Sass and Parnas (2003) discuss, is not 
dependent on experience to be moulded. Rather, it is the ineffable subject that is 
reflexively experienced as a transcendental condition of the experience. The same 
idea here applies to my re-thinking of the minimal self in embodied terms; the 
embodied sense of self does not arise as an after-effect of one’s engagement with 
the world, but rather is a transcendental condition of human experience: one’s 
subjectivity is embodied from its immediate existence. Evidence supports this, 
(Butterworth (1999), Legerstee (1999), Rochat (1998)). All imply one’s core 
fundamental mode of conscious self-awareness is physically tied to the 
neurobiological dynamics of one’s living body (Maiese, 2016: 3). I make this 
distinction between being bound up with the experience (transcendentally) and 
emerging from the experience because of the type of emergence Lysaker and 
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Lysaker seem to endorse. This is important because it means that the dialogical self 
is not as fundamental as an “essentially” (Maiese, 2016: 2), (i.e. necessarily) 
embodied self.  
I propose Lysaker and Lysaker’s emergence is a form of diachronic emergence, as 
opposed to synchronic emergence. In synchronic emergence, the higher-level 
emergent phenomena are simultaneously present with the lower-level phenomena 
from which they emerge. Common in the philosophy of mind, this form of emergence 
describes the simultaneous supervenience of mental states on the brain’s neurons. 
This means higher-level mental states coexist with brain states. Strong ontological 
emergence is thus usually understood to be synchronic, vertical emergence. 
Diachronic horizontal emergence however evolves over time: the structure of the 
lower-level properties from which the novel properties emerge exist prior to higher-
level properties emergence.   
Arguably, this definition of diachronic emergence characterises what happens during 
the self’s dialogical emergence: the structure from which the novel property (self-as-
X) emerges exists prior to its emergence. Think about the self-position, ‘self-as-
barista’. For a ‘self-as-barista’ self-facet to develop, it must be cultivated through 
engagement with the world. This might include working as a barista, learning how to 
make various drinks, and developing customer service skills. Even once all aspects 
have been covered, only after much repeated engagement in the world for the 
person to confidently fulfil this role, does the dialogical ‘self-as-barista’ emerge from 
these structures4. 
One may respond to this description of the dialogical self by suggesting this slow 
diachronic emergence of novel selves only covers more ‘complex’ self-facets, such 
as those including jobs, sexuality or personal narratives like self-as-mother, where 
prolonged worldly engagement is required to develop an identity as ‘self-as-X’. Other 
self-positions such as ‘self-as-scared’, when faced with life threatening situations                                                         
4 This has affinities with the enactive approach, which proposes strong life-mind continuity. An autopoietic life 
form participates in generating intrinsic meaning for itself via processes of sense making grounded in interactive 
engagement between its embodiment and environments. This means that cognition arises through the dynamic 
interaction between the organism and its environment; there is no pre-given mind over and against a pre-given 
world. 
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surely emerge synchronically, namely simultaneously with one’s online 
environmental engagement. 
However, I reply that whilst the emergence of ‘self-as-scared’ and the event that 
cultivates this self-facet may occur at times imperceptible to us, the event 
nevertheless occurs prior to the dialogical self’s emergence. This argument is logical: 
firstly, the event would begin happening. At this moment, the being (i.e. self) is not 
scared. Secondly, the subject would begin processing this event and respond 
accordingly. Thirdly, the interplay between the world and the being would develop a 
new self-facet. This would be the emergence of ‘self-as-scared’. Analogously, if 
someone throws something at one’s face, one’s reflexes do not involuntarily respond 
and instigate a reaction at the same moment the object begins its trajectory. 
Watched in slow motion, a small amount of time lapses between the event 
commencing and one’s reaction. Therefore, the higher-level emergent self-facets are 
not simultaneously present with worldly lower-level phenomena from which they 
emerge. Consequently, the dialogical self is not a most basic form of selfhood. Whilst 
self-facets may (always) emerge through one’s environmental interactions, they are 
not necessary conditions of one’s initial engagement. They are not the source of 
subjectivity: a perspectivally owned embodied experiencer is.  
Nevertheless, Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 49) try and stress the irreducible first-
person dimension of the multiple self-facets, which, if true, would imply a synchronic 
emergence. Lysaker and Lysaker suggest dialogical selves are irreducible because 
‘self-as-X’ involves the disclosure of worldly events to an experiencer whose life is 
unfolding in that environment. For example, ‘self-as-barista’ involves the events of 
making coffees in Starbucks relating to a subject who identifies with those ‘dialogues’ 
and thus is ‘self-as-barista’. Consequently, Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 49) suggest 
that self-positions are inherently reflexive. Thus searching for dialogical selves 
requires a first-person perspective, third-person modes of knowing are insufficient to 
find them.  
Whilst the dialogical self requires a first-person perspective, this is not reflexive like 
perspectival ownership: self-positions are not reflexive (and irreducible) as Lysaker 
and Lysaker suggest (2008: 49), but are reflective; narrating one’s fundamental 
embodied experience. The dialogical self arises directly from the lived experience of 
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the embodied subject (Menary, 2008: 76) but it is not itself the experiencer. 
Therefore a diachronic emergence is appropriate. To have a dialogical self one 
reflects on one’s personal ownership over one’s experiences, associating oneself 
with the extended, worldly dialogue, and it is those experiences (namely being an 
embodied, experiencing thing in the minimal sense) that reflexively point to a minimal 
perspectival self. A sense of entitlement (Bortolotti and Broome, 2009) must pervade 
personal ownership, and, as discussed, this originates from the affective framing of 
one’s desiderative embodiment, reflexively illuminating a perspectival, sensorimotor 
subjectivity. Therefore, I retain some sense of the transcendental phenomenology of 
the experience/experiencer thesis. However, rather than conceptualising this 
abstractly as Strawson (2011) and Sass and Parnas (2003) arguably do, I 
emphasise how this self is transcendentally structured by sensorimotor subjectivity. 
3.8 REVISING ‘THE SELF’ – THE SCALED SELF 
This final section now categorises my conception of selfhood. The SCALED self has 
multiple levels, each of which have been distinguished and separated in this chapter, 
yet build upon one another, enabling the thick, rich texture of human experience. As 
this chapter has argued, my notion of SCALED selfhood, spelled out below, relies on 
the minimal self as being dependent upon brain processes and an ecologically 
embedded body (Gallagher, 2000: 15). Therefore, before moulding the SCALED 
self’s levels into something compatible with the literature and evidence, I highlight 
one possible question: is embodiment really a “transcendental condition”, i.e. 
something that exists prior to our experience in the world? I suggest it is. 
I have argued as part of my endorsement of the embodied approach that the body is 
the centre of orientation; what one experiences is not an empty, homogeneous, 
mathematical space; but rather lived, oriented space whose directional axes (i.e. left 
right, above and below, in front and behind) are assessed from one’s own 
perspectival lived body as the central point from which all objects are relative. Yet, it 
seems depth perception itself is enacted (and thus dialogically emergent), therefore 
meaning that this experience of body in relation to objects is not itself 
transcendental. Held and Hein (1963) performed an experiment in which two kittens 
circled a carousel. Whilst one had its paws firmly on the ground, and therefore 
looped the carousel via self-actuated movement, the other was simply suspended 
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above. As the one kitten walked, both moved in a circle. Despite receiving identical 
visual stimulation, only the self-moving kitten developed normal depth perception. 
Noë suggests that from an enactive standpoint, this is because “only through self-
movement can one test and so learn the relevant patterns of sensorimotor 
dependence” (Noë, 2004: 13). This implies some form of emergence of bodily 
sensation. Despite this, my intuition remains: embodiment is a transcendental, i.e. 
fundamental, necessary condition of experience. This chapter has argued that the 
body is always a part of the story; and in this case, I would respond by distinguishing 
between the emergence of how the subject perceives depth, and the ability to 
perceive depth itself, which remains transcendental. Such evidence favouring 
enactivism does not damage my endorsement of Merleau-Ponty (2012) and my 
claim that perspectival-ownership is spatially located, thus embodied. 
The SCALED self’s unity I propose “is anchored in our embodiment” (Menary, 2008: 
76). At the heart of human subjectivity “[t]here is a minimal sense of self as a subject 
of experience and this minimal self is an embodied subject” (Menary, 2008: 76). The 
diagram below pictures this “minimal self” with the letter ‘C’, short for ‘core’.  
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Level 1, “Embodied Perspectival Ownership”, refers to the self-reference or 
perspectival first-person perspective of Sass and Parnas (2003). It is the core 
(transcendental) experience-experiencer thesis, but fundamentally, this necessary 
subject is embodied. “It is with our bodies that we perceive, act, experience and 
engage with the world and with others” (Mackenzie, 2009). Affective experiences 
such as pains are not simply ascribed to a body, but rather to lived, experiential 
bodies that feel like something to experience. Therefore, affective experiences are 
thus firstly given immediately, non-inferentially to the subjective body (Fuchs, 2010: 
549). Tied up with the notion of embodied self-experience, is how things are, and 
what is experienced. Affective framing, as I have argued, is an embodied, pre-
reflective way of discriminating and selecting salient features of our environment 
based on our fundamental background patterns of bodily attunement. It is thus a pre-
reflective tool with which the subject can engage with the world. 
The second level, “Personal Ownership” admittedly is still referring to a very thin 
conception of selfhood. In the broad spectrum of experiences, which encompass 
thick dialogical self-facets narrating entire life stories, simply owning an experience 
personally via immediate reflection remains very ‘basic’. However, as Chapter 4 will 
illustrate, schizophrenic patients can exhibit a diminution, and even complete loss of 
personal ownership, and thus the SCALED self must distinguish between reflexive 
and reflective modes of experience. This is something I remain unsure about Sass 
and Parnas’ work. They propose schizophrenic patients experience a loss of minimal 
selfhood, yet with little differentiation between the first-person perspectival 
perspective, self-reference and personal ownership, their meaning can be lost.  
The third level of the SCALED self is the “Dialogical Self”. These ‘worldly dialogues’ 
“arise directly from the lived experience of the embodied subject and these 
narratives can be embellished and reflected upon if we need to find a meaningful 
form or structure in that sequence of experiences” (Menary, 2008: 76). Menary’s use 
of the phrase “reflected upon” illustrates how these ever-changing self-facets require 
active deliberation and an understanding of the first-person pronoun “I” to emerge, 
which is grounded in the structural entailments of Level 2. Importantly, I am not 
saying the dialogical level of the SCALED self is in itself embodied, but rather I am 
pointing out that its origin is body based. Therefore, “[i]t is not narratives that shape 
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experiences, but, rather [bodily] experiences that shape [the] narratives” (Menary, 
2008: 79) that emerge.  
Regarding the spectrum of experiences we have, and the varying mental capacities 
of individuals, I agree with Menary’s (2008: 64) claim that “[w]e shouldn’t expect to 
find narratives [i.e. dialogical selves] in our more basic bodily engagements with the 
world”. An infant for example, will only have rudimentary experiences of the self as 
an actor and may be unable to sustain the reflective requirements to develop a self-
facet that accords with its worldly interactions. Importantly, SCALED selfhood 
develops over time and requires sophisticated cognitive capacities. I propose the 
developmental trajectory of SCALED selfhood from infancy to adulthood is of rapid, 
increased expansion.  
The notable advantage of the SCALED model of selfhood is it enables one to 
measure self-experiences according to the requirements for each level. Chapters 4 
and 5 will illustrate how the ipseity disturbances of schizophrenia diminish the levels 
attainable by the patient afflicted with the mental disorder. However, I will argue that 
both levels 2 and 3 can extend beyond the boundary of the individual, such that their 
reflective nature can be structurally supported and/or widely realised by artefacts that 
in part, are external to the body. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the core 
realiser, the body, is not equally present.  
I accept endorsing a position somewhat akin to Menary’s (2008: 63) “embodied 
narrative account”, where “the [SCALED] self is constituted both by an embodied 
consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives 
themselves” has some unwanted implications. Yet I am willing to accept a ‘person’ 
devoid of sensorimotor subjectivity, proprioception/kinesthesis and minimal 
experiential whereabouts in the world is consequently no longer a self. Nevertheless, 
it is debatable (and in my opinion impossible) whether any ‘experience’ could occur 
in this way; it would not even reflect, or more basically reflexively entail a subject, 
and so, following the logical thread of the argument presented, could never even be 
termed ‘an experience’ in virtue of the experience/experiencer thesis. 
3.9 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has taken the transcendental conditions of experience discussed in 
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Sass and Parnas’ phenomenological approach and has then incorporated them 
within embodied sensorimotor subjectivity, arguing that all experience is reflexively 
characterised by pre-reflective self-awareness that is present in all experience, 
without requiring introspection (Fuchs, 2010: 549). These experiences are (normally) 
personally owned: one commonly appropriates the experience with oneself based on 
a feeling one has of entitlement, determined and structured by the contextual 
information (i.e. the environment) in which the organism is embedded. This 
characterisation of the self accords with Lysaker and Lysaker’s (2008: 64) 
suggestion that each character position reflects a pre-reflectively operatively, 
determinative way of being-in-the-world. Each organism acts in accordance with its 
desires and wants via pre-reflective attunement to certain environmental aspects, i.e. 
affective frames. It is this sort of affective bodily engagement by way of continuous 
reciprocal interaction with one’s environment (a form of worldly dialogue) that 
enables the diachronic emergence of personally owned, rich, phenomenologically 
“complete” selves. Whilst the SCALED self appears a thick conception of ‘selfhood’; 
this is the kind of complexity I propose underwrites our being-in-the-world.  
I consider this description accurate, according with developmental psychology, 
introspection, and human-environmental engagement. Cognition can only be 
understood with reference to on-going interactions between organisms and their 
environments. Enactivism explicitly rejects traditional cognitivist notions of internal 
mental representations and passive computational input-output conceptions of 
cognitive processing prevalent in cognitive science.  
Finally, I reiterate that my conclusions regarding the SCALED self are necessary 
characterisations of selfhood for this project. To discuss selfhood in the context of 
extended mind theory, I require a fluid and dynamic model of selfhood, exploring 
different levels of selfhood and how they may couple together both internally, and 
with external artefacts, such that they form one cohesive whole: the SCALED self. 
The following chapter now elaborates on how levels 2-3 are subject to possible 
extension, namely being partly constituted by ‘artefacts’ external to the self’s Core. 
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CHAPTER 4 EXTENSION AND DIMINISHED SELF-AFFECTION: 
IPSEITY (1) 
4.1 IPSEITY  
The core abnormality in schizophrenia is a disruption of the sense of self, namely 
ipseity. ‘Ipseity’ derives from the Latin ‘ipse’ meaning ‘self’ or ‘itself’, and refers to the 
experiential sense of being a vital and self-identical first-person subject of experience 
(Sass et al., 2011: 7). In the prodromal phase of schizophrenia, ipseity disturbance 
happens in two complementary ways. Firstly, there is a weakened sense of existing 
as a vital and self-coinciding source of awareness and action. This is diminished self-
affection. Secondly, aspects of one’s consciousness are experienced as akin to 
external objects. This exaggerated self-consciousness is ‘hyperreflexivity’ (Sass and 
Parnas, 2003: 427). This chapter focuses on the former of these two disturbances, 
arguing that a schizophrenic’s fuller sense of self can be redeemed through 
interactive engagement with psychotherapy, which extends their selfhood.  
4.2 DIMINISHED SELF-AFFECTION  
Diminished self-affection refers to a reduction in the transparent, lived-through sense 
of existing as an aware subject or agent of action with which people are normally 
acquainted. It means that there is a lessening of existing as a first-person 
perspective on the world (Sass et al., 2013: 431). Patients may complain about 
profound changes occurring in their subjectivity, for example saying they “…lost 
[their] feelings, entailing loss of myself, making me another person.” or experience 
“pervasive feeling of unreality” (Møller and Husby, 2000: 222), yet cannot pinpoint its 
exact nature as this change is difficult to express in prepositional terms (Sass and 
Parnas, 2003: 437). Some complaints, like “I am not present in any assortment”, 
coupled with referring to oneself in the third-person (Berze, 1987: 57), imply the 
subjectivity one lives through transparently is somehow dwindling; it indicates the 
patient lacks intimacy with their own experience.  
Frank, the schizophrenic discussed at 2.4, presented himself in terms of “emptiness 
and nothingness” and felt anguish at continually feeling persecuted. Lysaker and 
Lysaker (2008: 37) suggest Frank considered the person he once was had 
‘exploded’, leaving him with mere remnants held together weakly by ‘gravity’ in the 
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place he had been. This description seems to suggest Frank still experienced from a 
spatial location, namely there was a perspectival self located at a particular point for 
whom the experience reflexively was for. However, the predominance of the self-
facet ‘self-as-persecuted’ made engaging with him nearly impossible, unless one 
addressed his persecution. His previous life as a complex self was inaccessible to 
him: Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 81) suggest Frank was predominantly a 
monological self; ‘self-as-persecuted’. Here the internal and worldly dialogues that 
normally characterise the dialogical self, for Frank are replaced by a singular 
monologue. His self-world relations are consistently ordered into a singular manner: 
persecution. This monologue, whilst internally consistent is inflexible, and thus 
prevents the patient from engaging spontaneously with the world (Lysaker and 
Lysaker, 2008: 81). Arguably, Frank has lost the fluid interplay of self-facets that 
emerge through environmental interaction. He admitted to his therapist that if he tried 
to think of anything outside of the rigid confines of his (monological) dialogical ‘self-
as-persecuted’, he felt emptiness and nothingness, concluding that a part of him had 
been destroyed.  
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 90) suggest a second model of endangered self-
organisation: a barren self, which arguably applies to Frank’s experiences here. This 
form of disturbed self-experience in schizophrenia follows the distinction I set out in 
Chapter 3 between perspectival and personal ownership within the SCALED self: 
perspectival ownership remains but personal ownership, the slightly more 
sophisticated level of selfhood, is disrupted. The barren self is undeveloped. It has 
mostly discontinuous self-positions, which lead to a fragmented life-narrative and is 
populated by few meta-positions, with limited descriptions of worldly interaction. 
Webern, a schizophrenic, exemplifies this; when asked what he meant when he said 
‘I have schizophrenia’, “…would state that he was too old for strenuous activity. 
When asked for his thoughts he would usually deny having any… Webern could 
describe events, but he never linked those events to anything he felt, thought or did” 
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 83). The statement that Webern never linked any 
events to anything he experienced suggests a diminishment in his being. He lacks 
personal ownership. 
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Robert’s testimony of his schizophrenic experience also exemplifies this. This 
twenty-one year old high-school graduate had complained for over a year about 
feeling cut off from the world. Troubled by the surreal and unnerving feeling of not 
experiencing being fully present in experience or alive, he said, “My first-personal life 
has been lost and is replaced by a third-person perspective” (Sass and Parnas, 
2003: 438). An example Robert gave concerned music: if he heard a melody, he 
found music lacked its natural fulness “as if something was wrong with the sound 
itself”. He realised he was somehow “watching” his own receptivity to the music; 
namely, the way his subjectivity received and registered the tunes (Sass and Parnas, 
2003: 438)5. 
Chapter 3 discussed the transparency of the first-person perspective: one cannot 
attend to it as if an object, whilst concurrently living through it. Robert’s statement 
above illustrates this truth: in objectivising his first-person subjectivity, he lost the 
lived dimension. Consequently, Robert periodically experienced his own movements 
as reflected upon and de-automatised. His thinking processes acquired distressingly 
acoustic qualities (Parnas, 2000: 124-125). Sass and Parnas (2003: 438) suggest 
the cause was a loss of the normal tacit, prereflective ‘myness’ of experience that is 
the condition and medium of spontaneous intentionality. However, this explanation 
conflicts with my previous endorsement of the transcendental condition of 
prereflective (reflexive) myness as an experiencer. The word “prereflective” implies 
that Robert lost his entire self, which if so, suggests he could not experience; as no 
experiencer existed to experience his third-person experience. I highlight this, not to 
disagree with Sass and Parnas, but to illustrate the disparity between the language 
available for this philosophical taxonomy and the rich phenomenological experiences 
being deciphered. 
Applying Albahari’s discussion of perspectival vs. personal ownership to this 
description of Robert’s experiences, one can say Robert feels his movements do not 
belong to him because he fails to identify as those movements’ personal owner. 
Robert does not view his self as possessing a first-personal perspectivally lived                                                         
5 Although this testimony exemplifies a diminishment of immediate personal ownership, Robert’s experiences 
also highlight the second dimension of ipseity disturbance, hyper-reflexivity. Chapter 5 addresses this, yet I 
footnote this here to illustrate how these disturbances are somewhat congruent.  
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through body with respect to his movements. By failing to associate with himself a 
subjective ownership over the movements and so unable, by not identifying with his 
actions, to generate experientially felt possessive ownership towards his 
movements, Robert does not feel his selfhood encompasses his actions. Therefore 
he does not experience himself as the movement’s personal owner. Equally, when 
not experiencing his movements as integrated into his implicit embodied selfhood, 
this means that Robert, as a subject, cannot identify with those bodily movements as 
an aspect of his selfhood (Albahari, 2006: 61). 
4.3 REHABILITATION  
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 30) claim that rehabilitation literature contains an 
important observation. A schizophrenic can recover a more empowered sense of 
selfhood than barren or monological selves by enhancing their narratives regarding 
their illness and relation to it by continuously engaging and interacting with the world. 
I suggest this is because the schizophrenic’s process of enactive meaning-making is 
shaped via on-going interactions with social and institutional contexts (Roe et al., 
2006). Therefore, I am adopting an enactive position, in accordance with my 
discussion of the (embodied) SCALED self. 
To reiterate, self-acquaintance is a phenomenological feature of mental states: once 
we have an experience, we immediately have an ipseity dimension to the 
experience. We experience it as ‘mine’; given to me non-inferentially. Diminished 
self-affection picks out cases like Robert’s where this feeling is lessened. So, the 
question becomes, ‘how can the environment contribute to our experience such that 
it reflects an experiencer and personal ownership over that experiencer’s 
experience?’ 
The answer I suggest is that the self’s personal ownership can extend. Through an 
analysis of extended selves, we can see how rehabilitative treatments can scaffold 
and constitute the personal ownership lacking in cases of diminished self-affection. 
This chapter firstly explores extended mind theory, and discusses its relationship to 
extended selves, introducing Clark’s (2003) notions of ‘soft selves’ and tool use. 
Secondly, I argue Clark’s notion of ‘tools’ can encapsulate strategies used in talk 
therapy, where psychotherapy may serve as a “dialogical prosthesis” (Stanghellini 
and Lysaker, 2007: 174). Thirdly, I investigate the disparity between my 
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endorsement of an embodied locus of subjectivity, building on previous concepts of 
sensorimotor subjectivity, and Clark’s notion of soft selves. This leads me to reject 
Clark’s (2003: 136) claim that there is no substantive selfhood and highlight an 
inconsistency with Clark’s later work, Supersizing the Mind (2008). This chapter 
concludes by reflecting on the implications of soft selfhood. We should reconsider 
the schizophrenic patient and therapist’s relationship during talk therapy. We must 
acknowledge that the schizophrenic can recover a more empowered sense of self 
through the construction of narratives about their mental illness and their relation to 
it, if those self-dialogues are complemented by on-going environmental interactions 
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 30), precisely because SCALED selfhood incorporates 
the external world. The moral is; the schizophrenic’s environment is the 
schizophrenic, and acknowledging selfhood’s extended nature can lead to 
improvements in the way we administer, and interpret psychotherapy.  
4.4 EXTENDED MIND AND EXTENDED SELVES 
As humans, we circumvent deficits in our cognition by outsourcing cognitive 
processing onto the external world. Because environmental artefacts external to the 
brain play significant roles in realising cognitive processes, human minds and 
environments can act as coupled systems, which can be conceived as complete 
cognitive systems in their own right. A thought experiment illustrates: Imagine an 
accountant, Severus, who perform s mathematical equations in his head; this 
requires the skilful informational processing of numbers. However, imagine Severus 
suffers a stroke, rendering him unable to calculate mathematical problems 
intercranially. Therefore, Severus has a chip inserted into his brain, which duplicates 
the functions his brain can no longer do. The chip’s performance would not only be 
exactly the same as the part of the brain it is replacing prior to its malfunctioning, but 
would once again assist Severus in solving mathematical equations in his head. 
Solving mathematical equations is a function his brain previously performed, and, is 
something he can once again do; thanks to the inserted chip. One can therefore 
reasonably consider the chip has as much right to be considered a part of Severus’ 
brain as the neurons lost during his stroke; the same cognitive processing of 
numbers occurs with the chip, as did before. The only difference is that the physical 
realiser (i.e. brain+chip) is different after his illness. Now, if we accept the 
mathematical equation-solving chip is a part of Severus’ mind, then consider 
 60 
Severus’ brother, Barnabas. Barnabas has always struggled with mental arithmetic, 
yet can solve the equations Severus completes in his head both before and after his 
stroke, with the help of a pocket calculator. (Bray, 2008: 10). So, “How much 
cognition is present in these cases?” (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 28). Arguably, all 
three are similar. Severus’ mentally taxing internal informational processing prior to 
his stroke appears to be functionally identical to his later internal cognition, which is 
physically realised by a combination of his biological brain and the neural implant. 
And Barnabas, with his pocket calculator, displays the same sort of computational 
structure as Severus, once he has the neural implant, despite Barnabas’ 
informational processing being distributed across agent and calculator, rather than 
being internalised within the agent (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 28). Therefore, it 
might be best to capture what is occurring in these cases by saying that both the 
chip and calculator form constitutive parts of Severus’ and Barnabas’ respective 
minds. This leads to the argument that: 
“if an external object is used habitually, and in a dependent fashion, to 
perform a function that would otherwise be carried out by a part of the brain, 
why should we not consider that object as a part of the functional apparatus of 
the mind?” (Bray, 2008: 10).  
It is arbitrary to claim mind is contained only within the boundaries of the skull. One 
cannot simply point to the skin/skull boundary as justification for the internalist 
position, arguing that Severus’ cognition is realised by his ‘brain’ or his ‘brain+chip’, 
yet Barnabas’ ‘brain+calculator’ is not the metaphysical basis for his problem solving, 
since the legitimacy of that arbitrary boundary of skin is precisely what is at issue.  
Evidence suggests the human mind does indeed circumvent mentally taxing tasks: 
when playing Tetris, a game displaying images of various two-dimensional geometric 
shapes that players must rotate to fit into the shapes below, players have two 
options: they can mentally rotate the shape in their head, or can physically rotate the 
images on the screen. Intuitively, one would suppose that some speed advantage 
accrues to physical rotation rather than mental rotation. Kirsh and Maglio (1994) 
demonstrated this was correct. They calculated that a shape’s physical rotation 
through 90° takes about 100 milliseconds, plus an additional 200 milliseconds to 
select the rotation button. To achieve the same result via mental rotation requires 
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around 1,000 milliseconds. Kirsh and Maglio argue the physical manipulation of the 
shape often helps players determine whether the shape and slot are compatible. 
They therefore label rotating the shape an “epistemic action” (1994: 527), namely an 
action that alters the world so as to aid and augment the individual’s cognitive 
processes (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 28). When performing physical rotation as 
opposed to internal calculations alone, subjects were between 800-900 milliseconds 
faster determining whether shapes were compatible with slots. Players were 
performing extended, external calculations; extending their minds by way of the 
screen, their hands, and the computer’s information processing machinery. This 
active human-environment interaction supplemented the brain’s cognitive abilities 
and is known as coupling. 
A coupled system is where “…the human organism is linked with an external entity in 
a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive 
system in its own right” (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 29). Clark and Chalmers (2010) 
suggest a criterion for the constitutive thesis. For an organism’s cognitive processes 
at times to literally be constituted by both the organism and material features of its 
environment the following must be true: 
1. All components of the system must play an active role. 
2. All components of the system must jointly govern the organism’s behaviour in 
similar ways internal cognition normally does. 
3. If we remove external components of that system, the organism’s cognitive 
competency will drop, just as one would expect if one removed a portion of 
their brain. 
Based on 1-3, coupled extended processes count as equally as cognitive processes 
as internal biological or neuronal processing. 
There are two interpretations of causal coupling. Firstly, asymmetric influence 
describes cases where environmental features have causal influence over one’s 
internal cognitive processes. This means one can change the external environment 
in ways that enhance the individual’s cognitive competence. For example, notes 
might remind oneself of a chore. If removed, one forgets. Therefore, the environment 
can prompt certain cognitive acts, like remembering. However, no further explanation 
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is necessary; just because notes inspire remembering, this is insufficient to motivate 
claims that it is a part of one’s memory. However, the second interpretation of causal 
coupling describes stronger cases where internal cognition and external artefacts 
have mutually constraining causal influence over one another that emerges over 
time. Such artefacts, unlike notes do not simply prompt cognition; rather the external 
artefact and the internal cognition coalesce as ‘extended cognition’, jointly governing 
one’s behaviour. Menary (2007) refers to this as “cognitive integration”, whereby 
there is continuous, reciprocal causation between constitutive parts, linking the brain, 
body and world (Clark, 1997: 163). Although we can identify the relevant 
components, categorising them as ‘internal’ or ‘external’, the nature of reciprocal 
coupling makes it difficult to study the components as separate systems, as they 
continuously influence and respond to one another. Yet, still we remain unable to 
distinguish between coupled cognitive systems, and coupled non-cognitive systems. 
Clark and Chalmers invoke the parity principle to help make such judgements. 
The parity principle makes us reconsider our Cartesian prejudice; just because a 
process is external should not be the defining feature that determines it as non-
cognitive. Parity introduces functionalist credentials into the extended mind 
hypothesis; placing the importance on the cognitive function of the process, not 
where the cognition is located (Menary, 2010: 6). Clark and Chalmers make this 
clear in their discussion of Inga and Otto. They imagine a fictional Alzheimer’s 
patient, Otto, who always carries a written notebook containing his dispositional (i.e. 
non-occurrent) beliefs. The notebook is functionally poised to play the role usually 
played by biological memory. Otto’s notebook is like Inga’s memory, it just happens 
Otto’s non-occurrent beliefs lie beyond his skin. Clark and Chalmers’ argument is as 
follows:  
1. Otto’s notebook of dispositional beliefs is functionally identical to Inga’s 
memory.   
2. “There is nothing sacred about skull and skin” (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 
29).  
3. If the causal dynamics between internal and external “cognition” are identical, 
(following the parity principle) then mind is extended. 
Based on 1-3 
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4. Otto’s mind is extended.   
Clark and Chalmers (2010: 34) argue the alternative internalist explanation is 
pointlessly complex. Insofar as beliefs and desires are characterised by their 
explanatory roles, Otto’s and Inga’s are equivalent. One is happy to explain Inga’s 
actions (heading to the Museum of Modern Art) in terms of her desire to visit the 
museum and her standing belief that it is at 53rd Street. Plausibly Otto’s actions have 
a similar story. If not, the alternative is to explain Otto’s similar actions (heading to 
the MoMA) firstly in terms of his occurrent desire to visit the MoMA, secondly his 
standing belief that the MoMA is where the notebook describes, and thirdly the 
accessibility of knowing the MoMA’s location. This substantially complicates a simple 
cognitive process, and is “pointlessly complex”, similarly to how overly complex an 
explanation of Inga’s cognitive process would be if it explained her actions in terms 
of beliefs about her memory. Clark and Chalmers (2010: 34) therefore say, “[t]he 
notebook is a constant for Otto, in the same way that memory is a constant for Inga; 
to try and point to it in every belief/desire explanation would be redundant. In an 
explanation, simplicity is power.” The underlying point is that an agent’s coupling to 
an environmental artefact is transformational in nature. Clark (2003: 142) thinks that, 
as humans, we are naturally prone to be subjects of repeated transformations. We 
manipulate our abilities and transform ourselves into beings-that-can-do-X.  
Now, if the mind can extend beyond a person’s biological boundary, then arguably, 
selfhood too, is similarly extended (Krueger, 2010: 569). It is commonly accepted 
that the self outstrips the boundaries of consciousness. One’s dispositional beliefs 
for example constitute in some deep sense a part of one’s self-identity, yet are not 
about things presently being consciously endorsed; rather, they are things people 
are prone to believe, under certain circumstances. Despite normally these 
dispositional beliefs being beyond immediate consciousness, we still consider them 
central to selfhood. And as the above discussion argues, one’s dispositional beliefs 
may fall beyond that organism’s physical boundaries; Otto’s notebook for example, is 
central to his identity as a cognitive agent. Consequently, both Otto and Severus 
may best be regarded as extended systems, constituted via a coupling of their 
biological organism to an external resource. External artefacts can thus constitute a 
part of a person’s self-facet by enabling certain behaviours that develop narratives.  
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Consistently resisting this conclusion would require shrinking selfhood to a mere 
bundle of occurrent states, severely threatening its deep psychological continuity. 
Clark and Chalmers (2010: 39) therefore suggest a broader view is better, 
understanding agents themselves to be extended selves, blurring the divide between 
the internal and external, and spreading out into the world. We can think of many 
artefacts, whether cultural narratives, other people or institutions, which house 
dispositional beliefs we consider essential to selfhood. By accepting this, I suggest 
no fixed thing or substance constitutes the higher levels of a SCALED selfhood, after 
the minimal, self-reflexive “I”. It would make a difference to the personally owned 
narratives/dialogues, namely the thick conception of “I”, to find itself moving, thinking 
and acting in a more highly biotechnologically integrated world. Clark suggests we 
are ‘soft selves’, prone to assimilate other things into ourselves. Selfhood thus has 
plasticity: our boundaries are malleable, and changeable.  
Clark considers the self’s extension in two ways. Firstly, the self is comprised of 
things that one directly controls. This includes one’s body and thoughts, but also 
parts of the external world. Control is an important feature of our self-experience; it 
differentiates us from other inanimate things as we exhibit both organisational 
coherence and intentionality. Dennett (1984: 82) suggests control is the ultimate 
criterion of selfhood: “I am the sum total of the parts I control directly.” The notion of 
“direct control” therefore intends to rule out cases where we first control our bodies, 
and, manipulating them accordingly, control something else (Clark, 2003: 131), as in 
these cases, first-order, direct control remains confined to the biological boundaries 
of the individual. Examples of extended, direct control are perhaps most clear in 
people who incorporate prosthetic limbs into their body schema. Stelarc, a 
performance artist for instance, incorporated a third hand into his body schema. 
Slowly, Stelarc learned to control its fingers and movements in very fine-grained 
ways with his abdominal movements; reporting that he experienced the hand as a 
part of himself. This accords with the sense of personal ownership discussed in 
Chapter 3: Stelarc experienced from the first-person perspective as the thing that 
owns, controls and manipulates the hand; appropriating himself with this external 
prosthesis. He acquired a conscious sense of control over the hand, and so 
according to this first criterion of Clark, the hand became a part of himself. Clark 
(2003: 131-132) thus says, “[t]he most basic notion of the self, on this model, is 
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simply the plastic, multiply negotiable sense we have of our own physical presence 
in the world. This sense is determined by our experience of direct control”. 
However, conceptualising the extended self via the notion of control does not enable 
schizophrenic patients to extend their selfhoods. This is because what is often 
absent in their experience is precisely this tacit first-person governance over their 
experience, exhibited in diminished self-affection. Therefore, explaining how the 
environment can play a part in a schizophrenic’s experience such that it enhances 
the self-affection that is experienced as lacking, I turn to Clark’s second notion of 
extended selfhood. Clark suggests the self is a bundle of on-going goals, projects 
and commitments, referring to the narrativity of selfhood. We are partly constituted 
by the things we, and others, say about us, integrating our life experiences into an 
internalised, evolving story of our individualised selfhood. Clark suggests the notion 
of self-narrativity opens the door to a radical possibility: the narrative self is a 
biotechnological hybrid. This is because one’s on-going projects, goals, and the very 
way one defines oneself, would differ in a world where one has smooth, immediate 
access to enhanced capabilities via some technological device. If an individual had a 
different sense of what they could do, then the self-descriptions personally owned by 
that first-person subjectivity would differ, and consequently, that self will have 
different aims and projects. Clark’s proposal that how we act in the world is a hybrid 
process involving the brain, body and environmental tools, is compatible with 
Chapter 3’s endorsement of the dialogical self.  
4.5 PSYCHOTHERAPY AND TOOLS 
I now apply Clark’s analysis of ‘tools’ and extended selves to talk therapy, arguing it 
is an external scaffold that can be ‘used’ analogously to Clark’s technological 
devices. Talk therapy is a form of psychotherapy, and includes multiple 
psychotherapeutic practices that use verbal communication to alleviate symptoms of 
mental disorder, rather than strategies that require drugs or physical exercise. “[B]y 
definition it is a conversation between two or more people, and often seeks the 
explicit goal of enriching the client’s personal narratives” (Lysaker and Lysaker, 
2008: 136). Evoking the so-called ‘talking cure’ is widely practiced in psychotherapy 
and opens the door for the schizophrenic to discuss their issues, feelings and life 
events. By articulating their problems and sharing their perspective with the 
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therapist, it is hoped that the client will gain a deeper insight into their experiences 
and find relief (Maiese, 2016: 235). The therapist establishes a professional 
relationship with the patient, aiming to firstly mitigate or reshape the client’s existing 
symptoms, secondly mediate their disorganised patterns of behaviour and thoughts, 
and ultimately further positive psychological growth and improvement (Wolberg, 
2013: 29). This is accomplished via a thorough scrutiny of the client’s life history, 
involving an analysis of the patient’s current relationships and life situation. The 
therapist attempts to understand the “historical roots and current ramifications of 
maladaptive interpersonal patterns as reflected in the doctor-patient relationship and 
in daily life” (Gabbard, 2007: 346). The expectation is that this will result in 
modification to the patient’s maladaptive interpersonal patterns and personality 
development.  
I argue that conversing with the therapist is a kind of tool the schizophrenic can 
capitalise on. Talk therapy enables the schizophrenic to rekindle interpersonal 
dialogues and strengthen compromised dialogical capacities (Lysaker and Lysaker, 
2008: 136). I propose the client can use the therapy session, and therefore change 
him/herself, by developing a different sense of what they can do (i.e. acknowledging 
their personal ownership as opposed to experiencing diminished self-affection). This 
will enable them to develop enhanced self-descriptions, namely using the first-
person pronoun “I”, and thus they will cultivate different aims and projects. 
Whilst I cannot maintain this position by exploring the schizophrenic’s control over 
the therapy session analogously to Stelarc’s control over his ‘third hand’, as the 
patient by no means controls the discussion (arguably the therapist does this), Clark 
makes a second conceptual point. He says that because external technologies 
become more reliable as one uses them, they change the extended individual in 
terms of their tacit, implicit sense of their capabilities. This in turn changes the ways 
that one describes oneself, posits goals, and develops projects. I suggest this 
premise is applicable to talk therapy sessions. Clark (2003) supposes that one does 
not need to ‘feel’ all the biological and technological processes for them to be 
constitutive parts of a self in the process of performing some task. For Clark, they 
are all part of you-in-the-process-of-achieving-X. Likewise, I suggest the 
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psychotherapy sessions are part of patients-in-the-process-of-enhancing-their-
personal-ownerships.  
Before detailing how psychotherapy can extend a schizophrenic’s selfhood, I make 
some preliminary clarifications. Firstly, the psychotherapy is not an unconscious 
process in the way that Clark conceptualises inanimate tools. Therefore, my analysis 
does not make a similar stark contrast between conscious and unconscious parts 
that constitute the schizophrenic’s selfhood. Rather, the relationship is more that the 
schizophrenic is affected by the therapist’s words, and what the therapist tells them, 
they have no power over.  
I claim patients use the conversations in therapy as a tool to retard their existing 
diminished self-affection. However, my rebuttal of the first concern leads to second 
clarification. Initially, it appears strange to say patients use the therapy, because, as 
stated, they cannot predict exactly how the therapist will approach their treatment. 
The possible criticism here is grounded in a narrow understanding of ‘use’: one can 
accept ‘using’ inanimate objects because specific goals are sort after. Scissors for 
example are used to cut, and we know the exact sequence of events required to 
actualise this result. Likewise, Stelarc employs the necessary steps to use his third 
hand to write. This worry is therefore summarised in the question ‘whilst we might 
say the therapist broadly helps patients, can we legitimately say patients use the 
therapist?’ 
Arguably, yes. Patients still expect therapists to do specific things. Glass for 
instance, a schizophrenic patient Lysaker and Lysaker (2008) describe who suffers 
from diminished self-affection, often wanted his therapist to explain events in his life. 
“[H]e repeatedly asked his therapist for an account of his own, i.e. Glass’s, problems” 
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 143). This request demonstrates Glass explicitly wants 
a resource beyond his physical body (i.e. the therapist/therapy) “to do the work” (p. 
143) of presenting and synthesising his life. It is irrelevant that Glass does not know 
‘how’ this request may be actualised; rather one must acknowledge that this is his 
desire, and he hopes this therapy is a means to restoring his personal ownership. A 
parallel may be drawn with medicine: people commonly use medicines to restore 
their health without knowing ‘how’ this occurs, or the exact outcome; rather they 
simply aim to feel better. The only difference between these cases and the case of 
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using scissors, is how narrow and guaranteed the outcome of the tool-use is. 
Therefore, a broad desire to regain personal ownership is not reason to question the 
patient’s intentional use of the therapy.  
Finally, I suggest the word “tool” itself may elicit possible misunderstandings. 
Clarifying this has made me tighten the scope of my analysis of an extended self that 
is partly constituted by psychotherapeutic practices. Admittedly, my above 
clarification, whilst expressing my position, will nevertheless still arouse the question 
‘is the client really using the therapist?’ I think this question persists because ‘tool’ 
seems to objectify the other, denying the therapist’s autonomy. This is hard because 
the technologies Clark (2003) discusses are unconscious. We rarely (if ever), 
conceptualise tools as possessing independent consciousness. It would be confused 
to say for example Stelarc’s third hand has autonomy. Whilst Stelarc may not control 
its every process; it may make internal movements that Stelarc does not determine, 
the hand nevertheless remains unconscious; it is robotic. Yet, once you consider 
people, it becomes harder to talk about soft selves. Criticism may be levied saying 
that this ‘using’ is more akin to an intersubjective relationship between therapist and 
client6. 
However, Clark and Chalmers (2010: 38) nevertheless say that in unusually 
interdependent couples, “it is entirely possible that one partner’s beliefs will play the 
same sort of role for the other as the notebook plays for Otto”. The argument’s 
functionalist grounding gives it credibility. A person can play a functionally equivalent 
role to an inanimate object and thus fulfil the criteria to be an enabling condition for 
another subject to achieve X, thus making that person a part of the subject-in-the-
process-of-achieving-X. Whilst true that “[I]n other social relationships these criteria 
may not be so clearly fulfilled… they might nevertheless be fulfilled in specific 
domains”, for example one’s dispositional beliefs might be embodied in one’s 
secretary, one’s collaborator (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 38), or even in one’s 
therapist.  
                                                        
6 Whilst I do make this argument in 4.4, focusing on one’s fundamental embodiment, this will compliment rather 
than contradict my more clinical characterisation of psychotherapy here. 
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I think arguments that imply therapists can become constitutive parts of their clients’ 
extended selves have plausibility. However, as discussed, it remains controversial, 
and requires rethinking the nature of ‘tool’, ‘use’, and autonomy 7 . Therefore, 
discussing therapists themselves is now side-lined, whilst I conduct my analysis of 
talk therapy and ‘tools’. My specific focus is on the linguistic structures at play within 
psychotherapy. The majority of cognition taking place within the therapy, and the 
using of the therapy by the schizophrenic patient, I argue, is carried out within the 
therapy’s linguistic niche. Without language, we might be much more akin to an 
internalist, Cartesian view, in which complex cognition relies largely on intracranial 
information processing.  However, the advent of language enables us to spread this 
burden into the world, complementing our inner states. Clark and Chalmers (2010: 
39) suggest language “serves as a tool whose role is to extend cognition in ways that 
on-board devices cannot”. The line of argument I therefore develop below is that in 
talk therapy, the client, however intentionally or unintentionally, exploits the 
transformative power of language (Colombetti, 2009: 13) to enhance their personal 
ownership. Because this external prosthesis changes the client’s abilities, and thus 
their self-descriptions and self-facets, the language structures used in talk therapy 
can be seen as a constitutive part of the client’s selfhood; re-establishing their lost 
personal ownership.  
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008) do not think the therapist’s role is to remain silent. 
Rather, they are to explicitly and repeatedly notice the perceptions Glass offers in 
the session, no matter how minimal they are, and illustrate that Glass himself 
experienced these perceptions. The aim of this therapeutic process is to help Glass 
establish the “intentional arc” that connects his selfhood to the present context                                                         
7 Bray, (2008: 11) also highlights possible issues arising from reliance on other people. She suggests that 
dementia sufferers like Otto can make fairly free use of a notebook or other inanimate objects to supplement their 
memory. The objects will not refuse help, grow bored or find another person to help that they prefer. People, 
however, are subject to all of these disadvantages, and make notoriously unreliable tools. ‘‘Once other social 
actors are recognized as (at least) potentially deceitful, extending one’s mind into another’s brain becomes an 
extremely risky business…’’ (p. 11). It is possible to criticise this argument by reminding the critic of the rules and 
regulations surrounding psychotherapy, meaning that the therapist is a reliable and trusted person. However, it 
remains possible bad tempers, tiredness or illness on behalf of the therapist nevertheless render them more 
susceptible to problems, and thus less reliable than inanimate, unconscious notebooks.  
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(Stanghellini and Lysaker, 2007: 174). This arc, described by Merleau-Ponty (1945), 
cements the self within its current context and bridges the gap between intentional 
objects of perception, namely the external artefacts one experiences, with the 
background proprioceptive sensations of one’s body. In healthy individuals, one’s 
desiderative bodily feelings keep the person continuously aware that they personally 
own the experience of the intentional object (Stanghellini and Lysaker, 2007: 174). 
This arc can be restored via the linguistic structures employed during talk therapy.  
To accomplish this, the therapist may exemplify the second-person dimensions of 
the therapeutic address. For example, in one therapy session, Glass says he 
watched television, leading the therapist to stress the ‘you’ in questions like, ‘What 
did you watch?’ or ‘Did you like what you watched?’ (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 
144). Stressing the second-person in psychotherapy sessions inherently treats 
clients as participants in their own lives, implying that they are the narrator of their 
experiences. The second-person grants them as something more than simply 
passive players. The therapist means to allude that Glass is not simply perspectivally 
witnessing these experiences, but rather he personally owns them. Furthermore, 
questioning Glass in the second-person calls upon him to participate more robustly 
in his own life. By spotlighting ‘you’, Glass is made to try and recall the experiences 
he has undergone. This linguistic structure also reaffirms the expectation implicit in 
all communication, that Glass should be able to articulate to himself and others a 
narrative about what he has experienced in which he is the central player. Therefore 
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 144) suggest that using the second-person may also 
“serve as an enabling condition for the generation of meta-positions and large-scale 
life narratives”. It is even plausible that personal ownership of the first-person 
perspective can be restored because the schizophrenic finds their “I” in the structural 
entailments of the second-person “you” to which they respond: if the client is 
responding to questions about their experiences as that person (i.e. by correctly 
using the first-person), then acknowledging that they own the experiences seems 
possible, and even likely.  
One’s understanding of oneself as the protagonist on one’s on-going narrative is 
conditioned by one’s understanding of one’s capacities and potentials (Clark, 2003: 
142). In the case above, this understanding is impacted in a deep way by the 
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linguistic niche in which Glass’ experiences and perspective are “conceived, 
incubated and matured” (Clark, 2003: 142). However, rather than this being a 
“technological cocoon” as Clark (2003) envisages, it is a linguistic scaffold. The 
language, the conversation itself, is the key cognitive tool through which Glass can 
objectify, intentionally consider and therefore consciously engage with his capacities 
of thought, reason and self-understanding (Clark, 2005: 265). 
An example helps illustrate my argument. During Glass’ therapy, Glass explains that 
whilst at work, a colleague tried making small talk to him whilst he was occupied, and 
he was unsure how to respond, or even recognise how he felt. Lysaker and Lysaker 
(2008: 146) suggest Glass was ‘empty’ at that moment, unable to consider what he 
should have done. The therapist’s response is to ask, if he, the therapist, was in that 
position what would he have felt and done. Glass can comprehend these questions 
and form clear answers, enabling Glass to consider how he felt and how he could 
have handled the situation differently. In responding to the therapist’s question, 
Glass would articulate his thoughts using the second-person pronoun, saying, “you 
would feel”, and by imagining the therapist possessing those attributes and 
intentions, Glass could further apply them to himself, generating his individual sense 
of selfhood by way of contrast (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 146). Framed in object 
relation terms, Glass firstly needed to experience his mental life located within a 
mental representation of the therapist’s mind by considering how the therapist would 
socially engage, before he could secondly experience his mental life within himself.  
Language works as a tool that enables us to consider our own thinking. Therefore, 
Clark (2005: 265) thinks that we can “devise cognitive strategies aimed at modifying, 
altering or controlling pretty much any aspect of our inner life”. To perform well in 
strategic and skill based actions, as cognitive agents, we can capitalise on 
language’s ability to scaffold our thoughts. When playing the piano for instance, one 
may notice that, when playing one’s favourite well-known section the tempo 
incorrectly increases. Therefore, the player will believe that they are prone to playing 
the section too fast and thus, whenever approaching this part, the sentence ‘DON’T 
speed up’ will flash through their mind. This sentential prop scaffolds the pianist’s 
awareness and subsequent behaviour. In such cases, Clark suggests that with 
sufficient practice the person may learn sets of strategies whose emergent outcome 
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is that the piece maintains a consistent tempo. Likewise, following the talk therapy, 
sentential props will enhance the schizophrenic’s personal ownership. They may 
internally narrate their actions to emphasise their agency over their actions saying, 
“I’m doing this”, “I’m thinking this”. In this way it becomes even more natural to 
acknowledge language as a tool once the patient is independently using it. Whilst 
this final point may backtrack on my claims, as this tool is internally mediating the 
schizophrenic’s experience8, its linguistic structure and pattern of thinking is found 
externally in worldly dialogue and collectively endorsed grammatical rules.  
The process of making explicit what were previously un-owned experiences for the 
schizophrenic is far more than just cheats for patients suffering from diminished self-
affection. Rather, the linguistic structure that externally scaffolds the patient’s self-
reflection is central to what matters most about the human mind and about one’s 
unique capacity to hold oneself accountable for one’s actions. This only makes 
sense in the presence of some degree of possible-control, and, as this control is 
externally scaffolded via linguistic structures, it seems natural to extend Glass’ 
selfhood, to encompass this external tool. The language therapy is an extended 
source of selfhood that unlocks self-aware personal ownership. The linguistic niche 
gives Glass the capacity to comprehend himself as a subject moving within the 
world.  
Consequently, I think Clark (2005: 262) is correct in claiming, “[l]anguage… may thus 
act as a kind of affect-dampening layer of insulation, enabling us to pursue our goal”. 
Selfhood comprises our on-going goals and commitment; and Glass’ on-going 
projects, commitments, and the very way he defines himself is different in a world 
where he is able, through the linguistic devices employed by the therapist, to access 
his personally-owned self. The linguistic niche is the enabling condition for this 
change, and following the counterfactual conditional, as the behavioural competency 
of these self-facets will decrease without these linguistic tools, then Glass’ selfhood 
must include these external resources, thus extending. I use the counterfactual in the 
following way: without the linguistic scaffolding (P), Glass cannot achieve self-
reflective competence (Q). 
                                                        
8 It has only been highlighted as further directions this approach could take. 
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1 (~P→~Q) 
∴ (Q→P)  
However, if the criterion for linguistic structures and patterns to partly constitute 
Glass’ selfhood is simply that without P, we cannot have Q, one can ask why in 
psychotherapy is P so important, yet other circumstances are not? My answer 
returns to the nature of therapy; psychotherapy may serve as ‘dialogical prosthesis’ 
because the patient can become coupled to the linguistic structures, generating 
feedback loops between the patient’s thoughts, how they intuit and express them 
propositionally, and the deeper reflection and appreciation for their selfhood the first-
person and second-person syntaxes can elicit. Other circumstances, like the ceiling 
colour or position of the door do not enable these rich couplings9. As Stanghellini 
and Lysaker (2007: 174) suggest, psychotherapy may re-establish the lost intimacy 
between a patient’s bodily feelings, their emotions, and interpersonal situations, and 
it is the specific coupling of the patient capitalising on the linguistic structure that 
enables these feedback loops and enriches their personal ownership.  
The notion carried forward from this discussion is that phenomenologically informed 
psychotherapy takes place in the public space between the therapist and the patient. 
It is not purely internal (Perez-Alvarez et al., 2011: 191). The goal of patients 
engaged in psychotherapy is to enhance their selfhood, achieved by enabling them 
to acknowledge their subjective presence within their experiences and take an 
intentional stance towards them (Stanghellini and Lysaker, 2007: 175). Patients like 
Glass want to attain personal ownership, and so use the therapy as a means to an 
end, treating the therapy as a tool.  
4.6 BRINGING THE BODY BACK INTO THE STORY: ENACTIVISM 
Using talk therapy as a “dialogical prosthesis” (Stanghellini and Lysaker, 2007: 174) 
is enactive in nature. I have argued the therapy is a tool, but this does not mean I do                                                         
9 I remain wary of this claim however, as it is possible a schizophrenic’s delusions of persecution do arise from 
such circumstances we normally take for granted and thus a patient may be more attuned to benign 
environmental artefacts. For example, a ceiling colour may convey some ‘hidden message’ for the patient. Yet it 
remains unclear how a coupled relationship could emerge; rather I would be inclined to suggest an internalist 
understanding of this: the ceiling colour elicits thoughts internal to the patient, which they then believe and 
perhaps act upon. 
 74 
not acknowledge its intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the meaningful engagement 
between subjects; it is how we collaborate to make sense of the world and one 
another (De Jaegher, 2015: 113). The public space between the therapist and the 
patient that evokes feelings of the ‘you-and-I relationship’ via the syntactical 
structures used, necessarily involves feelings of “being there” as a bodily presence, 
and acknowledging the bodily presence of the other (Perez-Alvarez et al., 2011: 
191). The schizophrenic must recognise that both they themselves and the therapist 
are embodied entities in the world that can do things. Acknowledging this is a 
necessary requirement for re-establishing the first-person perspective that is absent 
in cases of diminished self-affection.   
The therapist and patient engage in participatory sense-making, namely the sense-
making of the two autonomous agents is “mutually modulated” as they engage in this 
interactive encounter (Cuffari et al., 2015: 1099). New understandings emerge; 
patients may comprehend themselves as personal owners over their experiences, 
and therapists may learn more about the nature of their patients’ conditions. These 
understandings emerge through the actual process of “second-person interaction” 
(Maiese, 2016: 237), and importantly, happen literally between the individuals: the 
schizophrenic’s appreciation of their personal ownership over experiences happens 
in the joint space between the two people, and is mutually constructed (Fuchs and 
De Jaegher, 2009: 466). Such interpersonal engagement is enactive because the 
individuals participate in generating meaning for things that matter to them (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007: 488). I suggest that both parties do this during their 
active engagement in conversation, achieved through a number of embodied actions 
including: coordinating, synchronising and mimicking the gestures, facial 
expressions, and postures of the other.  
To elaborate, I turn to an example explored by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007: 500-
501). In social engagement, commonly the sense-making activity of one person 
orients the attention of another. In charades for instance, when miming a word, the 
intention is to orient one’s teammates, and so generate meaning from one’s 
embodied actions. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007: 501) explain how, as the 
interaction unfolds, what begins as orientation becomes more symmetrical as one’s 
team-mates alter their sense-making so as to correctly interpret meaning that 
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conforms with the gestures being offered. For example, when words are suggested 
that rhyme with what one is performing, one might rotate one’s hands to signify they 
are close. It is apparent how the new meaning of the gestures is jointly constructed 
during the interactions between the one miming and the guessers, so that the mimes 
offered, such as spinning one’s hands to signify the guesses offered are nearly right, 
follow from the suggestions. Once guessed correctly, it is apparent that the new 
meaning of the gestures has been jointly constructed during interaction and evolved 
through patterns of orientation, coordination and breakdowns. The mimes become 
jointly understood, and can be further used within the game or transformed into 
something similar.  
Maiese (2016: 238) thinks that such “participatory sense-making” is explicit in the 
transformative process of effective talk therapy. Whilst the therapy comprises a 
dialogue, this interaction nevertheless includes synchronisation, mirroring, 
anticipation and imitation of bodily expression. The way both party members 
understand the situation is mediated by the sense-making activities of the other. She 
proposes that during “face-to-face second person encounters, our whole bodies, not 
just our brains resonate with the other person…” enabling the generation of joint 
meaning and modification of others’ understandings. I suspect within the therapy, the 
therapist’s gestures may participate in generating the meaning of sentences for the 
schizophrenic. When Glass is reminded ‘you watched television’, and asked ‘do you 
remember something about that?’ (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 144), deictic 
gestures may accompany these comments. Deictic gestures connect aspects of 
speech to other ideas, objects, locations or actions (Kelly et al., 2008: 2). When rock-
climbing for example, the comment ‘watch that loose stone’ may be accompanied by 
gesturing to it. Equally, in Glass’ talk therapy, the therapist may point to Glass and 
spatially locate him, thus reaffirming for Glass the therapist’s understanding of him 
as a person with a narrative. This explicit deictic gesture evokes participatory sense-
making; new domains of social sense-making are generated that were unavailable to 
each person individually. This explanation particularly applies to Glass, who alone, 
cannot make sense of his experience. Yet, one should not dismiss this as the 
therapist simply telling Glass his observations; it is intersubjective in nature as, 
depending on how Glass responds to these statements, the therapist will continue in 
different ways. Glass’ verbal and bodily responses help the therapist understand how 
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the statement “you watched television” resonates with his patient. In this way, the 
individual’s sense-making is mutually modulated as they engage in interactive 
therapy.  
Expression, communication and relatedness all feature in talk therapy, and all are 
rooted in the body. This is because the dynamics of intersubjective influence in 
conversation are at least somewhat grounded in our bodily responsiveness and 
affective awareness of another’s gestures and expressions. Maiese (2016: 238) 
suggests that “[b]odily responsiveness and the establishment of a communicative 
base can be understood as a matter of deep bodily attunement and the entrainment 
of interactors’ affective framing patterns”. Most explicit in face-to-face social 
encounters such as psychotherapy, subjects undergo noticeable affective re-
orientation that changes how they understand and interpret their surroundings, and 
their location within it.  In the rock-climbing example, arguably the instructor pointing 
to the loose rock is trying to make the novice adjust his affective framing patterns. 
Suppose both instructor and novice are aiding a cliff rescue, so need to be attuned to 
one another’s actions and intentions: the instructor may tap the loose rock, adjusting 
what become salient features of the novice’s environment. The communicative base, 
namely: this rock is loose, is established “through their direct, face-to-face bodily 
engagement” (Maiese, 2016: 238).  
Likewise, during psychotherapy, the schizophrenic’s affective framing patterns 
change, their perspective and patterns of attention shift, and they begin to interpret 
and understand their experiences in new ways. Glass’ attunement to the therapist 
conceivably helps to ground his first-person perspective, and the overall to-and-fro of 
the conversation serves as an enabler for participatory sense-making. I propose 
Glass’ patterns of focus and attention will recalibrate as a direct affect of the 
therapist’s bodily gestures, such as possible deictic pointing and ‘interested’ body 
language, which supplement the overall grammaticality of the conversation. Maiese 
(2016: 239) nevertheless highlights that, whilst the therapy aims to rehabilitate the 
schizophrenic, to the extent that empathetic attunement involves “feeling with” the 
patient, the therapist’s perspective is equally reshaped during the discussion. 
Therefore, I am justified in supposing once the interactors’ gestures, facial 
expressions and emotions align with one another, the subsequent affective framing 
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patterns become entrained so that each individual’s bodily movements modulate the 
behaviours of the others. There is an interpersonal looping; literally interpersonal in 
the sense that a part of the understanding process is constituted by processes that 
happen between people. Importantly, Maiese (2016: 239) suggests, “the reason why 
social interactions such as talk therapy can be so transparent and direct, and also 
potentially transformative, is that they engage the subjects at a basic bodily level”. 
She is claiming that the bodily attunement that occurs during these interpersonal 
couplings can involve “motor resonance”, namely physical bodily changes that alter 
the way the subject experiences, such as an increased heart rate, fluctuations in 
blood pressure or hormone variations.  
Thus, the enhancement of the schizophrenic’s personal ownership over their 
experiences via their ‘using’ the therapy as an ‘external prosthesis’ or tool does not 
take place in isolation from the living body. It is misconceived to see talk therapy 
simply as a way to enhance the mind or intellect. One must remember the 
fundamental argument from Chapter 3: the self is an embodied self. Therefore, whilst 
the schizophrenic’s enhanced narratives help to unite the experience of subjects 
such as Glass, all their “perceptions, emotions, beliefs, and experiences take place 
against the backdrop of a subject’s affective framing patterns” (Maiese, 2016: 239). 
In this chapter thus far, I have provided a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between the therapist and the schizophrenic patient during psychotherapy. I have 
argued that the therapy can be seen as a tool ‘used’ (broadly speaking) by the 
patient, who capitalises, however intentionally, on the structure of the I-You 
perspective within this dialogue. Thus, the dialogue is an external prosthesis, and is 
the “wide realization” (Wilson, 2004) of the schizophrenic’s personally owned 
selfhood. In the latter part (4.4), I have introduced the notion of embodied 
intersubjectivity, arguing that the client’s ability to capitalise on this external 
prosthesis is grounded in their embodiment. The following section offers a potential 
counterargument to my position, namely that the linguistic structure of talk therapy 
extends the embodied subjectivity of the patient, by following Clark’s (2003) criticism 
of “a kind of privileged user” (p. 136). I overcome this position. 
 
 
 78 
4.7 THE EXTENDED SELF, RECONSIDERED 
Clark (2003) raises a plausible objection to the consideration that the tools one uses 
constitute a part of an extended self. Criticism may be levied that although the 
incorporation of external props, such as the grammaticality employed during talk 
therapy, constitute a part of the schizophrenic’s personally owned self, it is 
nevertheless the brain that controls and chooses the actions. The brain alone 
capitalises on the I-You relation in the therapy. This is a typical internalist objection 
and is endorsed by the likes of Rupert (2004) and Adams and Aizawa (2001).  
Clark (2003: 136) replies by noting that if you think the self is constituted by what is 
‘controlling’, this shrinks the self drastically. Selfhood is not just the brain, as the 
brain does many different things, and not all of them are involved in controlling and 
decision-making. Neuroscientists now consider the prefrontal cortex the seat of 
“executive functions” (Kane and Engle, 2002), governing one’s decisions and 
thoughts. These are higher cognitive functions, and so it is questionable:  
“Do we now conclude that the real ‘me’ is to be identified only with those 
select elements of the neural machinery involved in ultimate decision making? 
Suppose only my frontal lobes have the final say – does that shrink the 
physical machinery of mind and self to just the frontal lobes?” (Clark, 2003: 
136) 
Clark disagrees; this reduction is absurd. If one raises the brain objection, arguing 
that someone uses the tools, but the brain is the seat of the self controlling which 
tools one uses, this controller itself is reducible to its constitutive parts: the prefrontal 
cortex. This too then also becomes suspect, and possibly further reduced. Therefore, 
to avoid this criticism Clark (2003: 136) suggests “[w]hat we really need to reject… is 
the seductive idea that all these various neural and nonneural parts need a kind of 
privileged user. Instead, it is just tools all the way down”. The brain is a tool; just as 
one’s body parts and the world are tools. The brain, body and world are intertwined, 
the complementary parts enabling people to achieve goals, such as Otto’s 
successful navigation, Severus’ accountancy duties, or Glass’ retention of his 
personal ownership. Apart from giving rise to our sensitivities, our incorporation of 
language is noticeable in how we, as humans, structure our actions, manage our 
memory and plan or make decisions. The total enmeshing of language and cognitive 
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abilities is a reason why it is so challenging to demarcate where language begins 
and ends (Cuffari et al., 2015: 1117). It is a tool, incorporated into our natural, human 
selves. Cuffari et al. (2015: 1116) suggest we most noticeably incorporate a linguistic 
style of being. “Our biological being co-evolves with our linguistic and existential 
being”. Clark does not deny that some elements play more important roles than 
others in our sense of self. Likewise, within the brain, neural circuits contribute in 
different ways to the sense of self, some, like the prefrontal cortex playing crucial 
functions whilst others are expendable. This means that whilst the brain provides 
some vital features, it is human nature to incorporate external non-biological 
elements into our bodies that provide our further capacities. These “tools” enhance 
us in various ways, yet all remain parts of our “nonlocalized” (Krueger, 2010: 569) 
selfhood. Clark’s view is epitomised in his claim that “[n]o single tool among this 
complex kit is intrinsically thoughtful, ultimately in control, or the “seat of the self”” 
(Clark, 2003: 137). He uses the term “soft-selves” to refer to our ever-changing 
amalgamation of tools. We continuously absorb new tools into our psyche and are 
driven to leak through the arbitrary ‘skin’ boundary drawn by internalists, 
incorporating evermore “nonbiological elements as aspects of the machinery of mind 
itself” (Clark, 2003: 137). Consequently, there is no Lockean self (1984). Strawson 
(1999) endorses a Cartesian understanding of selfhood, postulating a central 
cognitive essence that is my personal identity. However, all there really is, is “a 
rough-and-tumble, control-sharing coalition of processes—some neural, some 
bodily, some technological—and an ongoing drive to tell a story, to paint a picture in 
which “I” am the central player” (Clark, 2003: 138).  
4.8 HYPOTHESIS OF “ORGANISM CENTERED” COGNITION: IT IS NOT “JUST 
TOOLS ALL THE WAY DOWN” 
Clark (2003) rejects the idea that an ‘essence’ underlies the self-facets that emerge 
through couplings of organisms to environmental tools. To explain this, he imagines 
pouring sand onto the ground, such that it forms a stable pile of particles. If the pile 
somehow developed self-awareness, he suggests it may falsely intuit an inner 
essence that has governance over and organises the constitutive parts, so that the 
stable arrangement is achieved. However, this would be mistaken; the grains rather 
simply self-organise. Likewise, when pouring water into a container, the H2O 
molecules fill the container’s total available space. The liquid’s bonds are strong 
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enough to keep the particles together, but weak enough to allow them to flow past 
one another easily, meaning the water’s surface remains flat. These apparent 
patterns are not intended, but rather simply self-organised. No essence underpins 
them.10 
However, Clark seems to disregard the spatial location of the individual. This is 
understandable, given his endorsement of EMT and thus subsequent dismissal of 
any arbitrary skin boundary. Yet, in doing so, he seems to remove the inherent 
embodied experience we have of ourselves as an entity which capitalises on our 
ability to use tools. Strawson (1999: 4-5) employs a phenomenological constraint, 
suggesting investigations of selfhood must begin by addressing how the self is 
experienced. Only then, can we answer the metaphysical question, what is it? And it 
seems that answering this question by suggesting it is ‘nothing’ as Clark does, does 
not accord with evidence or with one’s individual embodied experience.  
Lysaker and Lysaker (2008: 37) say Frank’s diminished self-affection made him 
believe and feel that the person he once was had “exploded”: he was left with the 
mere remnants that were held weakly in the vicinity of one another by “gravity”. To 
refer to Chapter 3’s argument, Frank’s experiences nevertheless remain spatially 
located; the experiencer (a perspectival self), i.e. the minimal self (Zahavi, 2005) that 
enables Frank to experience at all, remains localised. Therefore, whilst I accept the 
basic premise of Clark, namely that the narrative dialogical self can be constituted by 
parts external to the subject, such as the talk therapy, Clark has set up an 
irresolvable conflict: he endorses the narrative self, which requires an “I”, and thus 
                                                        
10 Examples of self-organisation are frequent in nature. Ant colonies are capable of achieving complex patterns of 
behaviour, including finding new food sources, exploiting them efficiently and reacting swiftly when they are 
depleted. Without a central controller, the apparent organisation is achieved by the ants sharing information using 
their acute sense of smell: when ants go foraging they leave pheromone trails behind them that others can follow. 
If they find food, they lay more pheromone on their return, strengthening the trail. Consequently, the ants self-
organise; following the pheromone trails without a central commander. Each ant deals with simple rules, but 
collectively intelligent behaviour emerges. Dennett (2005) asks; “what is it like to be an ant colony?” The answer 
suggested is that it feels like nothing, even if it feels like something to be an individual ant. This is because no 
organised subject exists as the enjoyer or sufferer, owning the experience. The candidate subject is disunited 
(Schmid, 2014: 6). Ants, like human cells, have different functions within the nest, yet operate together as an 
ordered whole without an underlying essence. 
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personal ownership, yet rejects a perspectival experiencer that underpins this 
(slightly) higher level of minimal selfhood11.  
This price is too high to pay, and thus an alternative hypothesis, namely “organism 
centered” cognition (HOC) better accords with my analysis. HOC suggests human 
cognitive processing can literally extend into the organism’s environmental 
surroundings, yet the organism, or more specifically the brain within the organism, 
remains the core and most active element of this extended system. “Cognition is 
[therefore] organism centered even when it is not organism bound” (Clark, 2008: 
139).  Clark (2008: 123) suggests under this alternative view, it is the biological 
human organism that orchestrates the webs of cognitive scaffolding to which it 
becomes coupled. The therapy’s grammaticality can thus be a part of the extended 
machinery of Glass’ thoughts and reasoning, and whilst Glass’ cognition extends 
beyond the skin and skull boundary, it nevertheless remains “organism centered”. 
We can imagine this like a spider and a web; whilst the web extends the spider’s 
capabilities this fly catching system still has a central operator, which is very much 
the organism and its possibilities as an embodied thing12. My previous discussion of 
embodied intersubjectivity (4.4) exemplifies this: extended systems still retain bodily 
cores, which enact and thus shape the meaning of the entire extended operation, 
namely how it is used, works and aids the subject. Furthermore, Clark (2008: 117) 
says that the “most important thing to notice is that there is no incompatibility 
whatsoever between EXTENDED and the notion of a persisting common biological 
core”.  
Consequently, I am inclined to accept a coarse grained approach to understanding 
the term “use”, rather than reducing this “user” to parts of the brain as Clark (2003)                                                         
11 This slightly odd grammar which seems almost contradictory, is referring to the SCALED self’s distinction 
between what commonly is just referred to as ‘minimal selfhood’, namely within Sass and Parnas’ (2003) work. 
The SCALED self splits this into perspectival and personal ownership, the second of which, although still very 
thin, sits at a different level to embodied reflexive subjectivity.   
12 HOC is therefore a different formulation of extended selves to cases where there is no centre initially, such as 
an ant colony. This is a natural phenomenon where a nonlocalised entity achieves self-organisation, a function 
entirely performed by non-bounded entities. There is no core. Clark (2008: 118) notices that we do not find or 
individuate human beings by firstly finding their cognitive mechanisms. Instead, we conceptualise an agent based 
on our identification of a reliable, “easily identifiable physical nexus of perception and action, apparently driven by 
a persisting and modestly integrated body of goals and knowledge”. 
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imagines. We should accept that the embodied organism is the centre of the 
extended cognitive activity. There is an embodied perspectival self to which an 
extended dialogue can be attributed. I endorse this position because in Chapter 3, I 
equated the perspectival self with the embodied entity, which has a spatial location, 
and that is the core “I”. A coarse grained approach to understanding this perspectival 
location therefore means that a localised centre remains, and it is not just tools all 
the way down. This is a tenable position, compatible with my notion of the SCALED 
self, and Clark himself seems to have a conception of the organism, evidenced in his 
(2008) notion of “organism bound”.  
4.9 WHY INTERPERSONAL INTERACTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENGAGEMENTS ENHANCE REHABILITATION 
Taking the soft-self hypothesis seriously invites us to reconsider our understandings 
and prejudices concerning cognitive rehabilitation strategies and how cognitive 
impairment is environmentally overcome (Clark, 2003: 140). Schizophrenics can 
recover more empowered sense of their selves by constructing narratives regarding 
their mental illnesses and their relations to it if those constructions are enhanced by 
the on-going interactions with the environment precisely because personal 
ownership incorporates the external world. Psychotherapy can be seen as an 
external prosthesis of the schizophrenic’s selfhood. As embodied entities, patients 
can capitalise on the therapy sessions’ structures, furthered by interpersonal 
engagement, using the second-person’s grammaticality to structure their diminished 
personal ownership over their experience. 
I acknowledge criticism surrounds claims of extended minds, e.g. Sterelny (2004, 
2010), and Rupert (2004). It is questionable whether the therapy’s linguistic niche, in 
supporting and scaffolding the cognition of Glass and other patients, really is a 
constitutive feature of the schizophrenic’s enhanced selfhood. Yet, I suggest what is 
important is the complexity of these integrated systems: we should focus on the 
different properties or qualities these elements elicit when combined, rather than 
quarrelling about whether they are extended or embedded. The more general project 
of ‘external cognition’ aims to synthesise the complex and often unobvious 
relationships between internal and external forms of representation (Wilson and 
Clark, 2008: 66). Therefore, the moral of this chapter is that certain environmental 
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harms are simultaneously harms to ourselves. Glass’ cognitive relation to his own 
words and the therapist’s languaging defies simple categorisation of inner vs. outer. 
The linguistic niche reconfigures his personal ownership, and restores wholeness to 
his experience via interactive feedback loops. Consequently, I endorse Clark’s 
(2003: 141) claim, “our worlds, ourselves”.   
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CHAPTER 5 – EXTENSION AND HYPER-REFLEXIVITY: IPSEITY (2) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the compensatory strategy (Mishara, 2005: 147) the 
schizophrenic may adopt when they feel a decline or compression in their 
experienced self-affection: they become hyper-reflexive, namely hyper-aware of 
aspects of their bodily consciousness. Firstly, I reiterate the tacit embodiment of our 
perspectival subjectivity, exploring the concepts of ‘transparency’ and ‘body schema’; 
secondly describing how hyper-reflexivity is fundamentally a disruption of embodied 
consciousness. Referring to body-as-object and body-as-subject, I question whether 
this implies a disembodiment of the SCALED self’s core, and consequently whether 
the embodied viewpoint I hold, holds. It does: I provide reasons why the hyper-
reflexive subject is still necessarily embodied, despite appearances. Thirdly, I 
explore how body-orientated therapies may recalibrate the schizophrenic’s 
embodiment, referring specifically to yoga’s therapeutic properties.  
The final section then applies Wilson’s (2004) notion of “wide realization” to the 
SCALED self, making a critical distinction between the relationship of therapies that 
target the second tier personal ownership, and those targeting perspectival 
ownership. My analysis can be summarised by asking, ‘Do both tiers of the SCALE 
have equal possibility of extension?’ I argue they do not: body-based treatments for 
hyper-reflexivity cannot extend the core level of selfhood similarly to psychotherapy’s 
constitutive role in generating personal-ownership. I point to the levels’ important 
differences in cognition, and the core self’s inability to become coupled to external 
resources, concluding that bodily-orientated treatments for hyper-reflexivity may be 
best characterised under the hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC) (Rupert, 
2004), whilst psychotherapy implies an extended view of cognition (HEC). This 
conclusion provokes my final chapter’s topic: a detailed exploration of how avatar 
therapy can become a constitutive part of a schizophrenic’s mind.   
5.2 THE SCALED SELF: TACIT EMBODIED PERSPECTIVAL OWNERSHIP 
Chapter 3 argued the SCALED self originates from an embodied core. This 
embodied subjectivity has a mass, which is transparent to one’s subjectivity. Micali, 
(2013: 210) says “…the transparency of the lived body is a necessary condition for 
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this specific experience of one’s own body”. Mind is integrated within the living 
processes of the body, which are transparently lived through by our consciousness. 
Our bodily processes “render themselves transparent to the world” (Fuchs, 2005: 
95). In this way, we experience “body-as-subject”. Our lived immediacy to our bodies 
renders it impossible to perceive our seeing, or experience our experiencing via 
sense modalities. Rather we live through our senses, and they cannot be taken as 
objects of reflection. Fuchs (2005: 95) notes that we neither see the biochemical 
alterations in our retinas, nor how our brain deals with the sensory data. Rather, 
through seeing itself, the subject embodies and enacts these processes: “Their 
invisibility precisely means their transparency” (Fuchs, 2005: 95). Such processes 
are implicitly present in every instance of seeing. This is similar to how we hear 
music; we focus on the melody that emerges from an orchestra’s performance, and 
whilst each individual instrument’s note is implicitly present in the ensemble, we are 
unaware of them.  
Our body’s transparency is enacted through our practical worldly engagement. We 
have bodily know-how (Siewert, 2005), namely practical knowledge of how to act 
with our body using our sensory modalities. Merleau-Ponty (1945: 137) describes 
this as the body consisting in a sense of “I can” (de Vignemont, 2016). This tacit 
bodily knowledge is taken for granted, and primarily based on one’s neuronal 
couplings of single sensorimotor units that emerge by repeated perceptions and/or 
actions (Fuchs, 2001: 324). Paradigmatic of such muscle-memory motor skills of 
performance are things like writing, playing instruments and skilful actions in sport. 
These motor skills are sensorimotor because they involve the ‘performer’ 
coordinating their sensory perception with their movements of action (Shusterman, 
2011: 4). Our bodies hold implicit memory of how to perform actions; previous 
experiences aid our performance of bodily tasks without conscious awareness. A 
pianist’s body schema for example incorporates “the instrument, so that he lives in it 
like a limb and inhabits the expressive musical space it opens, without paying 
attention to his or her single movements.” (Fuchs, 2005: 97). Skilful bodily-
knowledge is learnt and forgotten simultaneously and enables us to act smoothly in 
the world.  
However, one can alternatively attend to each individual bodily movement commonly 
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taken for granted in one’s implicit performance, fragmenting the usually connected 
events (Fuchs, 2001: 324). For example, as a pianist I know that when relying on my 
implicit muscle-memory to perform, if I stumble over a note, suddenly attending 
explicitly to how each individual finger is moving over the keys makes the 
performance very hard. I seize up and the movements lose fluidity. “Explication [i.e. 
making the tacit clear] thus disturbs the former familiarity and leads to an alienation 
or disintegration” (Fuchs, 2001: 324). 
5.3 HYPER-REFLEXIVITY AND THE SCALED SELF’S EMBODIMENT 
Hyper-reflexivity specifically refers to a pathologic explication of the implicit or 
transparent sensorimotor modalities with which we are normally tacitly acquainted. 
‘Reflexive’ refers to situations in which a self takes itself, or an aspect of itself, as its 
own object of awareness (Sass, 2003: 246), and so the exaggerated way that this 
occurs frequently in schizophrenic consciousness can be termed a hyper-reflexive 
disposition. The relationship between hyper-reflexivity and diminished self-affection 
is of the most intimate kind, “involving something more like mutual phenomenological 
implication than causal interaction; they are, in a sense, different aspects of the very 
same phenomenon, but described from two different standpoints” (Sass, 2000: 152). 
For example, the writer Antonin Artaud (1976) who suffered from schizophrenia, 
describes simultaneously “losing contact with” his self, thus displaying negative 
symptoms, whilst also becoming deeply aware of “all those first assumptions which 
are at the foundation of thought” (1976: 290). The diminishment in the intentional 
arcs of self-experience implicate or, as Stanghellini (2004: 152) puts it, “induce” a 
hyper-reflexive pathologic strategy to retain one’s experiential existence, which 
results in the schizophrenic adopting an objectified, third-person stance over their 
subjectivity and can cause feeling bodily alienation.  
In cases of hyper-reflexivity, one’s intuitive bodily connections between different 
actions are deconstructed. Therefore a patient instead takes each self-movement 
itself as a direct object of attention. The schizophrenic must consciously compensate 
for losing their immediacy to their actions by being aware of each movement and the 
steps involved: they must prepare each action and actuate it deliberately (Fuchs, 
2001: 325). Those affected may, for example, have to concentrate on calibrating 
their grip and moving into the right position when putting books on bookshelves. 
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Therefore, Fuchs (2001: 325) thinks it is natural that those afflicted with hyper-
reflexivity complain of a split between their mind and body, or feel hollowed out and 
robotic. One’s lived actions become unfamiliar and object-like. Therefore hyper-
reflexivity may be best understood as hyper-objectification or self-objectification 
Irarrázaval, 2013: 14). Now, Toombs (2001: 87) says that the objectification of the 
body results in the loss of embodiment. This hyper-objectification comes in the form 
of uncomfortable self-consciousness and is akin to a third-person perspective, 
namely looking at one’s own body as if it is an external object. Thus, the body can 
become an object of thematic attention (Krueger and Henriksen, forthcoming). 
Instead of living through one’s body from one’s first-person perspective, hyper-
reflexive patients objectify their bodies (Krueger and Henriksen, forthcoming), 
similarly to how someone may objectify their body when judging their physique.  
One schizophrenic testimony exemplifies this objectification of the body saying: 
“None of my movements come automatically to me now. I’ve been thinking too much 
about them, even walking properly, talking properly and smoking - doing anything. 
Before, they would be able to come automatically” (Badcock, 2009: 113). In hyper-
reflexive cases, patients “become abruptly aware of [their] body as a thing impeding 
[their] action” (Krueger and Henriksen, forthcoming). Rather than the body enabling 
our action, it becomes an obstacle. “[W]hen the implicit body-as-subject becomes 
explicit (i.e., a thematic object), the usually inhabited or automated bodily processes 
characterizing the transparent functioning of the body-as-subject become disturbed” 
(Krueger and Henriksen, forthcoming).  
I prefer this characterisation of hyper-reflexivity as a ‘disturbance’ or ‘diminishment’ 
in one’s subjective embodiment, rather than Toombs’ (2001: 87) crude notion of 
“disembodiment”. Hyper-reflexivity is not precisely a loss of embodiment, but rather 
the relationships schizophrenic subjects assume with respect to their bodies change. 
One’s tacit experience of ‘I feel myself’ morphs into a third-person perception of 
oneself, namely ‘I perceive myself’; one’s immediate ‘I think’ experience becomes 
unconcealed, becoming ‘I dialogue with myself’; and feeling bodily-immersed in 
one’s actions becomes explicit to one’s awareness, making one a spectator of one’s 
own actions. (Stanghellini, 2004: 151). There are two connected reasons to be more 
specific than asserting hyper-reflexivity is a loss of one’s core embodied selfhood, as 
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Toombs (2001) suggests. Firstly, the body remains present in these experiences, the 
schizophrenic is aware they have lost their lived immediacy to their bodies, 
complaining for example “When I walk sometimes I become aware of every single 
step” (Stanghellini, 2004: 152). There is a decoupling of the self and oneself, but this 
does not mean oneself (i.e. the body) vanishes, only that an internal distance 
appears, whereby the self is not inhabiting itself properly. Secondly, taking this 
hyper-objectified stance towards the body does not disembody the self but, as the 
walking example illustrates, assumes a different relationship to it: “the lid has been 
taken off my head and I see my brain’s silver filaments” (Stanghellini, 2004: 152). 
These are both sides of the same coin: the phenomenologically felt body does not 
disappear from one’s perspectival ownership, rather the SCALED subject’s 
grounding in an embodied core shifts. The perceptive angle is from the third-person, 
observing it thematically.  
Consequently, whilst the SCALED self may suffer a disruption of its core, there 
remains a loose coherence. A hyper-reflexive experience is not a disembodied, 
empty experience, such as those found in Zen Buddhism, where “to forget the self is 
to be actualized by myriad things. When actualized by myriad things, your body and 
mind… drop away… No trace of realization remains” (Dōgen, 1995: 69-70). Unlike 
Zen, where one must cast off the body and mind altogether and experience a dis-
identification (Mathers et al., 2009: 11) and even more minimally, a dis-association of 
the body, hyper-reflexivity retains perspectival ownership. It is just there is an 
“unplugging” (Stanghellini, 2004: 152) of the intimacy between subjective experience 
and bodily feeling. Therefore, cases of hyper-reflexivity do not compromise my 
model of the SCALED self, which accommodates this pathology of schizophrenic 
selfhood. Furthermore, this reaffirms my conclusions of Chapter 4: the self’s 
fundamental core is embodied, making Clark (2003: 136) wrong to assert, “it is just 
tools all the way down”. 
Yet, as discussed, this core can be disrupted. Therefore, the remainder of this 
chapter answers the following two questions:  
1. What innovative treatments are available for hyper-reflexivity? 
2. How might these treatments feature in the organisation of the core self? 
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5.4 BODILY ORIENTATED THERAPIES FOR HYPER-REFLEXIVITY  
Hyper-reflexive monitoring of normally ‘inhabited’ bodily movements cause elements 
of self-experience to become alien. What is thus required is the re-coupling and 
‘gluing’ of the subject within the body so that the subject achieves a “fluid, automatic, 
and context-sensitive preunderstanding of everyday situations” (Fuchs and 
Schlimme, 2009: 572).  Reforming this tacit bond may be achieved through the 
immersion and absorption in body-orientated therapies that give the subject the 
sense of seeing/living out through the body, rather than down, onto it, from an 
objectified viewpoint. By engaging in mind-body orientated practices, the patient 
becomes immersed in “a process that leads to embodiment and integration” (Mehling 
et al., 2011: 7), minimising these hyper-reflexive processes. 
Body-based therapies can enhance one’s lived experience as body-as-subject 
including yoga, music, dance, and movement therapy. The American Dance Therapy 
Association (1974) defines dance or movement therapy as “the psychotherapeutic 
use of movement as a process which furthers the emotional and physical integration 
of the individual” (Pallaro and Fischlien-Rupp, 2002: 19). As these therapies redirect 
the patient’s awareness and attention to their body and its boundedness with their 
selfhood, they intervene at the core of the schizophrenic’s pathological self. Such 
bodily-orientated therapies “involve attentional focus on and awareness of internal 
body sensations” (Mehling et al., 2011: 2), and thus are key interventions in treating 
misled subjective experiences of one’s body (Röhricht, 2009: 140). This is because a 
central skill the patients develop through training and repetition of bodily movements 
within these therapies is the ability to notice “sensations, thoughts and feelings as 
they occur in their actual immediacy” (Mehling et al., 2011: 6).  
Franziska Boas’ work illustrates this idea. A teacher of ‘creative’ and improvisational 
dance, she volunteered at Bellevue Hospital (New York) between 1939 and 1943, 
and, working in collaboration with Dr. Lauretta Bender to pioneer dance therapy, 
explored how dance could facilitate mental therapy. Boas gives the example of a 
schizophrenic boy who wanted to complete a backward somersault, yet each time he 
tried he stopped, for fear of dying or losing himself. This illustrates how a disrupted, 
unnatural acquaintance with one’s body-schema inhibits the possibilities of bodily 
action. Boas thus suggested that just as body-image affects the repertoire of actions 
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afforded, deliberate changes within this repertoire will affect the body-image. 
Consequently, she encouraged patients to engage in new movement experiences, 
for example subjecting them to different postures and exploration of movements that 
brought the body into close contact with the floor (Levy, 1988: 110). I suggest such 
movements will have helped patients become acquainted with their embodiment, 
and the absorption in new movements in close proximity to the floor will have 
encouraged an instinctual coordination of their self and themselves, as they will have 
experienced their bodies in a spatial relation to a solid object, and thus located their 
perspectival vantage point onto the world.  
However, there remains a dialectical tension within these bodily-orientated therapies: 
whilst they try to alleviate the hyper-reflexive stance of patients by getting them 
moving spontaneously, they themselves are simultaneously modes of structured 
hyper-reflexivity. These therapies aim to get patients thinking and attending to 
different bodily movements, enhancing their tacit awareness of their lived immediacy 
to the actions performed. The therapies do not demand a total abandonment of the 
pathological, hyper-reflexive stance, but rather facilitate a softening and controlled 
application of bodily awareness. Yoga therapy epitomises this.  
5.4.1 YOGA 
Daubenmier (2005: 208) states that the underlying goal of yoga is “… to unify the 
mind and body, in part, by immersing oneself in subtle sensations of the body”. 
Executing sequences of yoga movements strikes a chord with the subject’s bodily 
feelings and importantly such immersion in bodily activity is “…a potential reprieve 
from hyper-reflexivity” (Maiese, 2016: 241). “[T]hrough a direct experience of the 
body, physical activity may counteract self-objectification” (Daubenmier, 2005: 208). 
By repeating actions and poses, as well as an enhanced sensory self-awareness, 
patients begin to feel more at home in their bodies, forging a felt connection between 
their subjectivity and their body that does not simply objectify their movements. It 
unifies the body and mind (Maiese, 2016: 241). Yoga enables hyper-reflexive 
patients to feel comfortable in their own skin and expertly perform their movements, 
as their actions are self-originating and immediate. In yoga, one is acquainted with 
one’s body in such a way that one can skilfully move it accordingly; in the same way 
that someone is fluent with a language. Therefore, I suggest yoga achieves a ‘bodily 
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fluency’. This is how I interpret Maiese’s (2016: 242) claim that, “what is needed is a 
“cultivated immediacy”: a relationship to the body that is characterised by sensitivity, 
attunement and acceptance”. 
A large part of the skill in yoga comes from sensing how far to go with a pose. If one 
does not move far enough, then the muscles are not challenged, but pushing too far 
can result in pain/injury. Therefore, yoga practitioners “may increasingly value 
autonomic processes and physical abilities, thereby diminishing the importance of 
physical appearance to one’s physical self-concept and overall sense of self” 
(Daubenmier, 2005: 208). This explanation points to a spontaneity and tacit 
understanding of one’s bodily abilities, suggesting an intuitive ‘know-how’ of the 
pose, whereby the practitioner is attuned to the bodily sensitivity of their muscles, 
without objectifying themselves hyper-reflexively. Yet, this simultaneously implies an 
attunement of the subject to a reflexive dimension of bodily experience, namely 
being subconsciously aware of bodily feedback from the muscles. Therefore, as 
stated, I think the goal of therapists who engage schizophrenic patients in yoga 
therapy should be to ‘reset’, rather than remove their client’s capacity for reflexive 
objectification.  
Movement within the sessions should be fluid and poses should not be held 
statically, as this allows the participants’ minds opportunities to return to familiar, 
disordered thought patterns (Visceglia, 2007: 99) and self-objectified positions. 
Visceglia, who practices yoga therapy with schizophrenics, regularly begins the 
movement section of class by focusing on opening and grounding the feet. She 
prompts the schizophrenics to “inhale and lift up to stand on tiptoes, exhale the entire 
foot to rest on the floor, inhale and pull the toes back toward the shins, and exhale 
return to full standing”. This movement enables clients to proprioceptively feel the 
length and width of their feet, and prepare them for following poses (2007: 99). 
Importantly, the leader must attend to the bodily desires and needs of participants, 
and so Visceglia may follow the lead of a client who begins their own sequence of 
stretches. This facilitates an environment in which participants can “listen to and trust 
the messages they are receiving from their bodies” (Visceglia, 2007: 100), thus 
illustrating that yoga-therapy can cultivate a natural unity between one’s self and 
body.  
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Maiese’s (2016: 241) claim that yoga enables subjects to feel more “at home” in their 
bodies is demonstrated in the testimonies of schizophrenic participants. One 43-
year-old woman who suffered from chronic stiffness throughout her body, after yoga, 
realized “…the pain I had not only in my mind, but in my body too. Then I can try to 
fix it” (Visceglia, 2007: 100). Now, whilst not demonstrating a direct reduction in this 
client’s hyper-reflexivity, it does illustrate a direct appropriation of bodily experience 
to subjective, embodied experience. Therefore, Visceglia’s (2007: 101) claim that 
yoga practice frequently permits clients to feel their actual body suggests the 
possible fruitful application of yoga therapy to treating hyper-objectification. Other 
cases of enhanced bodily attunement support this hypothesis; one 57-year-old man 
reported after trying breathing retention exercises for the first time, “Now when I 
breathe, I can feel the relaxation move all the way into my toes” (Visceglia, 2007: 
101). This implies his immediacy to his ‘lived dimension’, such that he is subjectively 
attentive, yet one-with his bodily experience. This feeling was achieved through 
exercises that began by consciously noticing one’s breath entering and exiting the 
body. 
Therefore, I think these studies suggest yoga therapy provides a viable alternative 
way for subjects to re-inhabit their bodies and restore bodily attunement, so that their 
sense of prereflective embodied ownership and bodily unity begin to be reinstated. 
Yoga therapy can forge a more tacitly felt connection with one’s bodies and achieve 
what many yoga practitioners describe as “mind–body unity” (Maiese, 2016: 241). 
5.5 “ENTITY-BOUND REALIZATION”, “WIDE REALIZATION”, AND THE 
SCALED SELF 
The following section now applies Wilson’s (2004) notion of “wide realization” to the 
SCALED self, in order to distinguish between the relationship of talk-therapies that 
target personal ownership, (tier two of SCALED selfhood), and bodily-orientated 
therapies that seek to reconfigure the self’s core perspectival, embodied ownership. I 
propose yoga features differently in ‘treating’ this embodied core, compared with 
psychotherapy’s constitutive role in reinstating personal ownership. This is because 
there is a fundamental distinction between these two levels of the SCALED self.  
To make this argument, I first clarify the foundations of the SCALED self. This core, 
as described in 3.8, is perspectival embodied ownership. Most fundamentally, this 
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core has properties as an experiencing thing, it has phenomenological ‘what it feels 
like’ proprioceptive experiences, demonstrated for example in studies of the rooting 
response (Rochat and Hespos, 1997). Myowa-Yamakoshi and Takeshita’s (2006) 
evidence that between nineteen and thirty-five weeks of gestation over half of the 
foetus’ arm movements result in the hand touching the mouth, as well as the foetus 
opening its mouth prior to contact further suggest embodied perspectival ownership 
is developmentally basic. Infants, and even foetuses seemingly explore themselves 
from a phenomenologically felt, “my perspective” (Albahari, 2006: 54). This is 
because it feels like something to be an embodied subject. This pre-developmental 
“tacit acquaintance” is an experiential property of the core self. 
Wilson (2004) argues against the physical constitutivity thesis, which says that the 
realizers of states and properties are exhaustively physically constituted by the 
intrinsic, physical states of the individual to whom those states and properties 
belong. He distinguishes between ‘core realizers’, namely a state or specific part of 
the system that is most readily identifiable as playing a critical causal role in bringing 
about, producing, or sustaining a property; and ‘total realizers’. This is the state of 
the whole system that contains the core realizer, which all together, is metaphysically 
sufficient for generating a new property. We can apply this notion to the core self: the 
core realizer of kinaesthetic, embodied experience is the sensorimotor system. This 
is the neuromuscular makeup of our body. The total realizer is the entirety of our 
body that houses our sensorimotor system. When applying this concept to the 
SCALED self’s foundational level, there is little distinction between the core realizer 
and the total realizer, because the realized property, i.e. the perspectival, bodily 
subjectivity is embodied, and so distinctions between core and total realizers are 
difficult to come by. However, whilst one might point to our neuromuscular makeup 
and sensorimotor system precisely as the core realizer of embodied subjectivity, the 
total realizer may encompass a hair or a nail that we do not proprioceptively feel, but 
nevertheless is a part of our entire embodiment. Our embodiment is therefore 
metaphysically sufficient for the property of “the embodied perspectival subject”. This 
is a case of entity bound realization, as the neuromuscular sensorimotor system is 
the physical realizer of perspectival subjectivity. The entirety of this system is 
contained within the bearer of this subjectivity. Crudely put, all of this subjectivity’s 
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perspectival ownership exists within the individual: the system that realizes this state 
of self-acquaintance is completely within its body. 
However, there are times when the physical realizer(s) of properties, namely the 
system from which the property arises, are not exhausted by the internal physicality 
of the individual bearer of that state. In these cases of wide realization, the system 
includes the bearer of said property, but it also includes parts of things external to 
this individual’s embodiment. My discussion of psychotherapy at 4.3 is illustrative of 
wide realization: to realize the property “personal ownership”, this includes the 
embodiment of the schizophrenic, evidenced in my discussion of intersubjective 
facial expressions and interpersonal couplings (4.4), but it also includes the linguistic 
niche. Therefore the system that realizes ‘personal ownership’ includes something 
beyond the individual. To make this clear, let us recap an example from Glass’ 
therapy sessions. In one session, the therapist asks, “What did you watch [on TV]” 
(Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 144). I argued that the grammaticality of the second-
person constituted an external part of Glass’ extended personal ownership. 
Therefore, applying this to Wilson’s notion of wide realization, I suggest that 
‘appropriated excitement’ i.e. Glass’ personally owned mental state of excitement 
towards the programme, is partly realized by this external prosthesis. Therefore, part 
of the physical realizer of ‘appropriated excitement’ is external to Glass, and thus his 
mental property is widely realized.  
Yet, one may question this, asking, ‘why is ‘appropriated excitement’ widely realized 
and not entity bound?’ After all, the mental state of ‘being scared’ seems entity 
bound realization, on the grounds that ‘being scared’ is something that happens 
through the body, if endorsing my embodied approach. Consequently, the total 
realization of ‘being scared’ is entity bound: the core and total realizers are internal; 
affective phenomenon like fear is determined by circulatory functioning, and the 
heartbeat influences how and when fear inducing stimuli are produced (Gallagher, 
2014: 16). However, the mental state of ‘being scared of X’ is arguably widely 
realized. Imagine being scared by wolves. If this situation occurs in real-time, one 
may experience a mental state of ‘fear of wolves’. This discrete emotional state 
emerges from the interplay between sensory information from the world (seeing 
wolves), internal bodily sensations, (e.g. a racing heart, tensing of muscles and 
 95 
dilating of pupils), and conceptual representations linked to previous experiences 
that are relevant to the situational context (Oosterwijk and Barrett, 2014: 250). Parts 
of the physical total realizers of this state are external to the individual. Likewise, I 
suggest mental states that possess an “I own” qualia are not purely internal 
phenomena. They are not solely realized within the entity simply because one has to 
own something, and the things that one owns are contingent on an external 
environment and one’s interactions with it, just like fearing external stimuli13. 
Furthermore, one’s experience of personal ownership is contingent on an external 
environment because, as Chapter 3 argued, mental states develop a qualitative 
personal ownership when those mental states are causally integrated into the 
contextual information. This contextual information is external to the individual, and 
in the case of diminished self-affection, it is the external linguistic niche that provides 
this contextual background, and thus is the total wide realization of ‘I personally own 
X’. In the exemplar case of Glass, one cannot tell whether he experiences personal 
ownership unless you look precisely at his interaction with the therapist, namely 
whether he is responding positively and coherently to the grammaticality of the I-you 
syntactical structure. I propose SCALED selfhood’s personal ownership is a 
relational property, and thus widely realized.  
However, Wilson (2004) argues subjects cannot extend, saying that in this world, 
with our biological make-up, we have grounds for marking “individuals as the 
subjects or ‘owners’ of the corresponding mental properties… Individuals are ‘spatio-
temporally bounded, relatively cohesive, unified entities that are continuous across 
space and time” (2004: 142). This seems a natural intuition, and I am inclined to 
agree; having endorsed an embodied core to one’s self that underlies the SCALED 
tier of one’s experiential qualia. This embodied core has a perspectival spatial-
temporal location in the world. Yet, I have also endorsed the possibility of an 
extended (or widely realized, to follow Wilson’s (2004) terminology) second tier of 
selfhood: personal ownership. So, the question becomes: how can I coherently 
endorse both claims? For clarity, they are: 
1. The core selfhood of individuals is entity bound by that individual.                                                          
13 Admittedly, line of argument rejects the brain in a vat’s (Putnam, 1981) ability to have ‘experiences of’. 
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2. The personal ownership of that individual’s SCALED selfhood can be widely 
realized.  
My interpretation of Wilson here is very specific, making the same distinction I made 
with Sass and Parnas’ (2003) conception of selfhood. When Wilson (2004: 142) 
says, “…individuals are the subjects or ‘owners’ of the corresponding mental 
properties”, I interpret this as referring to perspectival ownership. The subjective 
experiencer is not able to extend. This is because the perspectival self is 
fundamental, by nature embodied, and the total realizers internal to that individual 
necessarily constitute an embodied perspectival ownership. This means the core of 
the SCALED self is fundamentally bounded.  Therefore, following this logic, bodily-
orientated therapies may supplement and scaffold the core self, recalibrating its tacit 
phenomenology such that the subject no longer takes oneself or a part of oneself as 
objects of intense reflection (Perez-Alvarez et al., 2011: 189), but these therapies 
cannot constitute this bodily awareness. The constitution claim, as made in the 
previous chapter, can only be endorsed with regards levels two and three of 
SCALED selfhood.   
Consequently, HEMC is a more appropriate characterisation of the schizophrenic’s 
interaction with bodily-orientated therapies that seek to treat disturbances in 
perspectival embodiment. HEMC suggests that intimate interactions between 
organisms and their environments, for example yoga movements and interaction 
with the mat and instructor, supports what we would normally take to be the cognitive 
and mental capacities of the individual clearly in possession of them (Rupert, 2004: 
428). Therefore, I suggest we can characterise the schizophrenic’s recalibrating of 
their hyper-reflexive cognitive processes by only taking into account how the agent 
exploits bodily-orientated therapies to carry out its cognitive work. In contrast, within 
psychotherapy, I think the unit of analysis should be the patient and certain aspects 
of the linguistic niche, treated together as a single system, unifying internal and 
external domains.  
My reasoning for this distinction is because patients do not become coupled to the 
yoga or other forms of bodily-orientated therapy as their body, despite possibly 
experienced from a third-person perspective, is bounded: perspectival subjectivity is 
necessarily embodied. One’s tacit experience of body-as-subject is not something 
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that requires conscious reflection. It is wholly transparent and therefore the core of 
the SCALED self. However, personal ownership requires some sort of conscious 
endorsement. Therefore, in psychotherapy, this newfound cognitive state can literally 
comprise, as wholes do their proper parts, elements of the therapy. As discussed, 
you become coupled to the linguistic niche and there is a to-and-fro interaction 
between the grammaticality expressed in the session, and how the patient interprets, 
applies to oneself, and responds. Personal ownership can thus be widely realized, 
namely extended (HEC). 
However, bodily-orientated therapies cannot extend the schizophrenic’s core 
perspectival ownership as they focus on recalibrating one’s embodied feelings. 
Within yoga sessions, grounding one’s breathing and body let the mind follow the 
body’s movements, and practicing moving meditation creates bodily peace and 
control. These are internal feelings, and whilst one’s conscious movement may 
become smoother and more orderly, there is no external stimulus, no extended 
feedback loop, that constitutes a part of the orderly perspectival self. Therefore, 
whilst I endorse HEC when considering psychotherapy’s treatment of personal 
ownership, I only endorse HEMC when considering bodily-orientated therapies that 
treat hyper-reflexivity. The core of the SCALED self remains entity bound.  
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the hyper-reflexive stance schizophrenic patients may take 
regarding their bodies. Schizophrenics may experience an attention disturbance of 
one’s cognitive unconsciousness, such that they becomes self-aware of features of 
cognitive processing that normally are presupposed (Frith, 1979). However, it is 
important to note my analysis is niche. Although not discussed in this chapter, hyper-
reflexivity may also make one’s thinking processes lose their sense of subjective 
mastery and control over what is thought. Like bodily alienation, the thinking process 
too may be experienced as increasingly objectified (Parnas, 2003: 230). Parnas 
(2003: 229) gives the example of one man who found that if a thought passed 
through his brain without his direct awareness, he was forced to re-direct his 
attention back to it, scrutinising his mind to explicitly know what he had been 
thinking. Such attentiveness to thoughts again reaffirms the idea the schizophrenic’s 
perspective becomes decoupled from the fluency of perspectival ownership.  
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I argued via bodily self-exploration in body-oriented therapies, subjects can forge 
more noticeable felt connections with their bodies and minds, enhancing their 
sensory self-awareness, thus reinstating the tacit dimension of perspectival 
ownership: body-as-subject. These therapies scaffold the subject’s bodily attention, 
yet cannot extend organism-bounded feeling of the individual’s body. Whilst one’s 
bodily attunement may be embedded within the yoga practice, these therapies do 
not constitute one’s experiential body-as-subject. However, building on Chapter 4, I 
argued personal ownership can be widely realized.  
Critics of the SCALED self may ask, but why endorse HEC at all? HEMC still seems 
to explain these phenomena, exemplified in cases of yoga therapy. Arguably the 
processes I described where personal-ownership was partly constituted via external 
linguistic vehicles equally does not exemplify extension but rather illustrates niche 
construction, where organisms engineer environments to support their activities. My 
integrationist approach, depicting the organism and environment as forming a “hybrid 
system” that gives rise to mental processes the organism alone, “de-coupled from 
the relevant environmental structure, would be incapable of instantiating” (Slaby, 
2014: 37) is arguably “explanatorily equivalent” (Sterenly, 2010: 472) to niche 
constructivism. Patient-environment relationships can be interpreted either under 
niche construction, scaffolding levels of the SCALED self, or as extended systems. 
Why make the further extension claim?  
But such objections beg the question, for it is far from certain human-environment 
interactions are reducible to scaffolding alone, as the feedback loops I described 
between personal ownership and external grammaticality were self-stimulating and 
self-generated (Clark. 2008: 131). Glass’ referring to the therapist as “you”, 
stimulated his own feelings of “I”, thus making him the instigator and enabler of the 
discussion. Languaging, unlike movements designed to attune oneself to the body, is 
an effortlessly maintained structure in our internal and external environment. 
Consequently, Glass’ cognitive relation to his words and languaging defies simple 
demarcations between inner and outer (Clark, 2005: 265). There is reason to 
consider the degree of cognitive co-activity among patients and elements in their 
psychotherapy to create an interactive system that might more fruitfully be discussed 
and interpreted as a single, unified system (Rupert, 2004: 394).  
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Ultimately, I think my distinction between bodily-orientated therapies (HEMC) and 
psychotherapy (HEC) depends upon the cognition they elicit. For therapies to extend 
the schizophrenic’s SCALED self, explicit cognitive elements must exist, i.e. 
reflective components in which the client consciously engages with some aspect of 
the therapeutic device. This happens in psychotherapy, where cognition is explicit, 
but not in bodily-orientated therapies where cognition is implicit. To explore this, my 
final chapter returns to fundamental arguments of extended mind, arguing that higher 
levels of SCALED selfhood may extend when treating auditory hallucinations. I 
suggest that in avatar therapy, the schizophrenic’s cognitive processes required to 
overcome their hallucinatory voice extend into the environment, and thereby are 
constituted (in part) by external resources outside the individual’s embodiment.  
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CHAPTER 6 AVATAR THERAPY AND THE EXTENDED MIND 
6.1 OVERVIEW: WHAT IS AVATAR THERAPY? 
Avatar therapy is a new treatment for people suffering from hearing phantom voices. 
The project was developed and is being led by Professor Julian Leff at UCL Mental 
Health Sciences. Presently, between 25% (UCL, 2013) and 30% (Williams, 2013) of 
schizophrenics continue to suffer with persecutory auditory hallucinations despite 
antipsychotic medication.  Williams (2013: 1) suggests the worst aspect about 
hearing persecutory voices for many patients is the feeling of helplessness it 
induces. Adapting “voices dialogue” therapy, where patients are encouraged to enter 
into dialogues with their voices yielded positive results (Romme et al., 2009) and 
informed the development of avatar therapy. If dialogue can be sustained with the 
hallucinatory voice, then patients feel far more in control (Nayani and David, 1996). 
As avatar therapy facilitates such dialogue, patients feel empowered (Leff, 2014: 
166), and thus this treatment may enable long-term improvement in schizophrenics’ 
experienced persecutory hallucinations. 
Maintaining dialogue with invisible entities is difficult. Normally, moment-to-moment 
social interaction involves many embodied resources, including bodily orientation, 
posture, gesture and facial expressions (Keating and Sunakawa, 2011: 194), which 
we use to communicate our agreement, attention to, and signal turn-taking in 
conversation. However, with auditory hallucinations, these ‘dialogues’ are devoid of 
facial expressions or non-verbal communications. Therefore, the way Leff et al. 
(2014) chose to initiate genuine patient-voice conversational interchange was for 
patients to create avatars of their voices and encourage them to enter into dialogue 
with them. Leff said, “Opening up a dialogue between a patient and the voice they've 
been hearing is powerful. This is a way to talk to it instead of only hearing 1-way 
conversations” (Medscape, n.d.). 
This chapter firstly discusses the set-up of avatar therapy and successful cases 
where patients benefited from significant reductions in their auditory hallucinations. I 
secondly argue avatar therapy can be considered a form of extended mind, offering 
three related arguments. I compare the recording of the session given to the patient 
after the therapy with Otto’s notebook (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 34), proposing 
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that the MP3 recording accords with the trust and glue conditions that must be 
fulfilled for an extension of the mind (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 38), and also allows 
for the required active manipulation of its content. I also suggest avatar therapy is an 
external representation of the patient’s internal auditory hallucination, and suggest 
the therapist thus sees the patient’s mind. I acknowledge this argument, although 
interesting empirically, makes the fallacious assumption that if one takes an internal 
process and externalises it, this is ‘extension’. Yet, I overcome this by exploring the 
nature of the coupled system, patient+avatar+therapist, arguing that, as the patient 
enhances their mental capacity to overcome the voices, the external avatar plays a 
constitutive role in actualising this cognitive capability. Thirdly, this chapter reviews 
these arguments in light of my exploration of the SCALED self, arguing that, similarly 
to Chapter 4, the external environment (i.e. avatar therapy) can be understood as an 
extension of both the SCALED self’s personal ownership and dialogical self. This is 
because patients gain ownership over their thoughts that they experienced as 
originating from external sources, and thus they develop new self-facets, such as 
‘self-as-safe’ or ‘self-as-powerful’. 
6.1.1 THE SET-UP  
Leff accepted the patients’ experiences of persecutory voices, assisting them to 
create avatars, and asking them how closely the avatars resembled their persecutors 
both physically (i.e. how they imagined) and vocally (Leff et al., 2014: 171). Avatar 
therapy uses customised computer software that enabled patients to create avatars 
that match the voices of their auditory hallucinations (Stewart, 2013). Leff and 
colleagues made the patient consider how they envisaged the persecutor’s 
appearance, and therefore make a physical representation of this in the form of an 
avatar. Face customisation was possible using the FaceGen© Modeller Software 
and allowed a near infinite variety of 3-D faces to be created, starting with a visual 
array of around 250 distinct face shapes and types that covered a broad range of 
features.  
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Figure 1: Avatars created by patients (Stewart, 2013) 
The avatar’s voice was also customised, typically taking about 20 minutes. Firstly, 
the client was asked to select from a sample of about 20, which voice had the 
closest characteristics of their hallucinatory persecutor. The user interface was 
designed to allow multiple promising alternatives to be saved, enabling the best 
transform to be ultimately used 14  (Williams, 2013: 3). Many psychologists and 
clinicians question this hands-on approach employed in avatar therapy, believing it is 
collusion with the patent’s pathology and therefore likely to perpetuate the 
symptoms. Whilst alternative therapeutic strategies may suggest the patient talks to 
an empty chair, avatar therapy goes beyond this; assisting the patient in creating a 
speaking image of their tormentor the therapist too can see and hear (Leff et al., 
2014: 171).  
In the sessions, the patient sits in a room facing a monitor displaying their avatar. 
The therapist sits in another room and controls it. They can talk to the patient 
directly, or via the avatar. Using two ‘push-to-talk’ buttons, the therapist controls 
whether his/her natural voice, or the converted voice is output to the client (Williams 
2013: 4). Because the therapist controls the avatar’s speech in real-time, it is 
convincingly responsive to the patient’s comments, and thus realistic dialogue 
between avatar and patient is engendered (Leff et al., 2014: 172). Importantly, the                                                         
14 A challenge facing this pilot of avatar therapy was matching hallucinations of female voices to the synthesised 
voice; patients overall reported matching accuracy between 60-90%. However, there was limited realism in 
female voices that were generated from a male therapist’s voice, sounding somewhat strained and unconvincing 
for some patients.    
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client is also equipped with a panic button to turn off the avatar immediately and 
instead the monitor displays a scenic image whilst playing soothing music15.  
The therapist prompts the patient in their own voice to enter into dialogue with their 
avatar and oppose what it says. Leff encouraged his patients saying, “you mustn’t 
put up with this, you must tell the avatar…that you don’t believe these things, that he 
or she must go away, leave you alone, you don’t need this kind of torment” (Stewart, 
2013). The content of the avatar’s speech slowly changes via the therapist’s 
manipulation, acknowledging the misery it has caused, and asks the patient how it 
can help, further encouraging the patient to do things that would actually improve 
their life (Stewart, 2013). This dialogue is in fact a ‘trialogue’, as the therapist plays 
two roles, firstly the persecutory avatar, and secondly the supportive therapist. As 
the sessions progress, these distinct roles begin to converge and the avatar 
gradually agrees to stop abusing the patient and rather be silent or make helpful 
comments that boost the patient’s self-esteem. Simultaneously, the avatar’s facial 
expressions change from menacing or neutral, to neural or smiling (Leff et al., 2014: 
170-171).  
Leff (2014: 170-171) says, “As the therapist, I'm sharing the patient's experience and 
can actually hear what the patient hears. But it's important to remind them that this is 
something that they created and that they are in a safe space…” This safe 
environment enables patients to gain the required confidence and courage to 
confront first their avatar, and then their ‘real’ persecutor (UCL, 2013). Patients can 
risk opposing their avatar, something they would not do with their voices for fear of 
reprisals.  
6.2 SUCCESS WITH AVATAR THERAPY 
The duration of time the patients selected for avatar therapy had heard voices 
ranged from 3.5 to more than 30 years. The median was more than 10 years (Leff et 
al., 2014: 167). 26 patients entered the trial and 16 received the therapy, benefiting 
from significant reductions in the frequency and intensity of the voices and in the 
disturbance to their life. The patients’ perceived malevolence and omnipotence of                                                         
15 This was rarely used, but its presence alone was useful in allaying some clients’ anxieties. A few patients 
nevertheless (numbers unspecified), when first confronted with the avatar, found its realism so great they were 
unable to view it for long (Williams, 2013: 3). 
 104 
their voices was also reduced. Furthermore a follow up revealed that the intensity 
and frequency of the voices was further reduced after 3 months. 
My table below details a selection of patients (persons A-D) Leff et al. (2014) 
encountered within the trial.  
  
Duration of their 
auditory 
hallucinations 
Number of 
voices 
hallucinated  
Taking 
antipsychotic 
medication 
(Y/N) 
Voice(s) still 
absent at 3 
month follow up 
(Y/N) 
No. of sessions 
required for a 
cessation of 
their voice(s) 
PERSON (A) 16 years 1 voice 
N (Stopped 3 
years prior to 
therapy) 
Y 2 sessions 
PERSON (B) 13 years 1 voice Y Y 5 sessions 
PERSON (C) 3.5 years 1 voice Y Y 2 sessions 
PERSON (D) 30 years+ Multiple voices Unknown Unknown 
After 6 
sessions, 
significant 
reduction in the 
voices 
 
Leff’s strategy with patients differed depending on whether they possessed some 
degree of insight into the origin of their voice as being inside their own minds. Person 
D for example believed that around 50% of the multiple voices he heard came from 
thoughts in his head, thus indicating considerable insight. D chose to target in the 
therapy the voice of one woman who made unhelpful and sarcastic comments, for 
example “…Insane at least because you’re totally out of your skull as well as out of 
your face” (Leff et al., 2014: 169).  
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Figure 2: D’s Avatar (Leff et al., 2014: 169). 
Focussing on D’s belief that this woman’s comments came from internal thoughts, D 
showed considerable improvement at the follow-up at one week after completing six 
sessions. His continuously disruptive voices had reduced to only talking for a few 
minutes a week and instead of the unpleasant and sarcastic comments, they now 
only occasionally were. Furthermore, D now believed that all the voices were 
completely self-generated. Also, his mild suicidal thoughts completely vanished and 
at a three-month follow-up, self-depreciation was absent. Leff suggests this can be 
attributed to the planned change in the avatar’s relationship to the patient, changing 
from continual denigration to a pleasant supportive role. As the avatar ceased her 
verbal abuse and expressed admiration of his good qualities, qualities D had never 
before acknowledged or experienced, his persecutory voices became far less 
frequent and rarely critical. His perception of himself was greatly improved (Leff et 
al., 2014: 169-170).  
Person C was an elderly man who had been the senior executive in a large 
company. For 3.5 years before participating in avatar therapy, he had been woken 
daily at 5:00 by the voice of a woman who held business meetings until nightfall. He 
was continuously subjected to her and her colleagues’ business discussions, yet was 
never himself directly addressed. Unlike D, C was convinced of this woman’s 
existence, but unable to develop an explanation for her disembodied voice. When 
patients completely lacked understanding that their voices were hallucinatory, Leff 
accepted the reality of the avatar for that client, and dealt with it on that basis. Leff 
accepted C’s experiences as real, telling him the woman was being unprofessional 
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and betraying her organisation by allowing him to hear these conversations, and that 
these meetings should be kept to business hours only. In the first session of 15 
minutes, C was calm and polite when addressing his avatar, and after addressing 
her unprofessionalism, a week later he reported that her voice was quieter. 
Furthermore, the meetings only began at 8:00 and finished at 17:00. In his second 
session C was more assertive, telling the avatar, “it’s treason. Keep it to yourself”. C 
also demanded the woman confined her meetings to after 14:00, saying, “I don’t 
want to hear you at 8 a.m. I have a lot to do in the mornings and you disturb me” 
(Leff et al., 2014: 168-9). When beginning the third session, C reported sleeping until 
7:00 and no longer hearing the meetings, as though the woman had “left the room”. 
Avatar therapy’s effectiveness is noticeable in C’s case, as after 3 months, the 
woman’s voice had not resumed.  
What is philosophically interesting about these cases, and others I explore, is the 
parity between how patients deal with the avatar and how they deal with their 
auditory hallucinations. Importantly, avatar therapy does not externalise the ‘real’ 
hallucinatory voice, rather a replica of it is created. This important difference was 
demonstrated when Leff encountered one adolescent girl who angrily replied when 
Leff entered the room to ask for her feedback, “It’s a fake!” (Leff et al., 2014: 172). 
Leff responded that there was no attempt to pretend this was the ‘real’ voice she 
heard. Rather, it was her creation and thus it was safe to try out strategies to counter 
its abusiveness, which she would not dare do with the voices she heard (Leff et al., 
2014: 172). I therefore suggest avatar therapy intends to evoke a functional similarity 
in how the person responds to the ‘fake’ and how they can respond to the ‘real’ 
internal voice after completing the sessions.  
6.3 AVATAR THERAPY AS A FORM OF EXTENDED MIND 
I suggest a similarity between Clark and Chalmers’ (2010) ‘conventional’ cases of 
extended mind and avatar therapy, because Leff’s treatment enhances the patients’ 
mental capacities to deal affectively with their auditory hallucinations. The patients’ 
interactions with their avatars make them develop different kinds of cognitive 
capabilities and behave differently. The schizophrenic can reconfigure their cognitive 
abilities and develop new strategies to combat their hallucinations. For example, one 
patient, known only as Claire reported, “It [the therapy] gave me the strength to say 
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no… I could tell the voices to stop, to leave me alone, and pretty much they have” 
(Feilden, 2013). I now give 3 arguments why avatar can, and should be considered 
within the extended mind literature.   
6.3.1. ARGUMENT 1 – NOTEBOOKS AND MP3 PLAYERS 
After the therapy session, the client is given an MP3 recording of their ‘trialogue’ with 
the therapist and avatar. Leff says “We record every therapy session on MP3 so that 
the patient essentially has a therapist in their pocket which they can listen to at any 
time when harassed by the voices”. Re-listening to sessions has proven helpful in 
allowing patients to recognise that their hallucinatory voices, “originate within their 
own mind and reinforces their control over the hallucinations” (UCL, 2013). Person A 
exemplifies this. A was a financier who, sixteen years prior to this study, began 
hearing the devil giving him poor advice on investments, causing serious debt. Like 
C, Leff treated the devil avatar as a real entity and encouraged A to oppose it, telling 
him to return to his rightful place in hell. A rigorously attacked his avatar in the first 
two sessions and reported that when leaving the second session, the voice began 
speaking to him and he firmly responded, “You are not coming back” (Leff et al., 
2014: 171). Despite this breakthrough, at the three-month follow-up A acknowledged 
he somewhat relapsed. The voice, whilst absent during daytime, had returned at 
night. He admitted frequently using his computer until 1:00-2:00 a.m. and had not 
been using his MP3 player, as encouraged by both the therapist and avatar within 
the sessions. Leff advised A to sleep by 00:00 and listen to his MP3 before falling 
asleep, the aim being for it to remind him how he overcame the avatar previously. At 
another follow-up two weeks later, A said his voice had completely deserted him, 
which he attributed to the therapy (Leff et al., 2014: 171).  
I question what it is about the media player that illustrates an extension of cognitive 
capacities. I think the answer lies in the player’s ability to fulfil Clark and Chalmers’ 
(2010: 38) ‘glue and trust’ conditions. These criteria are primarily meant to ensure 
the effect of ‘transparent equipment’, namely equipment “with which we are so 
familiar and fluent that we do not think about it in use, but rather rely on it to mediate 
our encounters with a still-wider world” (Clark, 2007: 106).  
Clark and Chalmers (2010: 38) say, “First, the notebook is a constant in Otto’s life—
in cases where the information in the notebook would be relevant, he will rarely take 
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action without consulting it”. Likewise, the insistence Leff places on using the 
recording daily to reaffirm one’s realisation that the voice can be combatted seems to 
suggest that this is a cognitive tool the patients can become so “familiar and fluent” 
(Clark, 2007: 106) with that they naturally know how to respond to their voice. This is 
similar to knowing song lyrics; the melodies supplement cognition and enable fluid 
recollection of phrases similarly to how the recording will remind patients of 
appropriate responses to pressures from auditory hallucinations. Furthermore, the 
action clients take is dictated to them by their previous encounter, just as information 
in Otto’s notebook directs his actions to find MoMA. Both the patients and Otto 
consult their external resources to reaffirm what their appropriate actions should be.  
Secondly, “the information in the notebook is directly available without difficulty” 
(Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 38). This is similar to the portable MP3, which is directly 
available to patients whenever they need support. There is no interference, namely 
there is no additional taxing cognitive work required when using the players; clients 
can simply begin using them. Leff et al. (2013: 432) even describes the media 
players as being “a therapist in their pocket”. It is an external resource they can carry 
on their person that supplements their internal abilities to deal with their 
hallucinations.  
“Third, upon retrieving information from the [MP3, the patient…] automatically 
endorses it” (Clark and Chalmers, 2010: 38), meaning that the patient does not have 
to verify the information or doubt its truth. This is because the recording is an 
accurate representation of their meetings, and clients, when reliving this experience 
can hear themselves successfully overcoming their persecutor. When using self-
generated notes from previous experience, or recordings of our previous encounters, 
to perform cognitive tasks such as remembering, we assume the information is 
correct, in the same way as we assume our internal know-how is accurate. Thus, this 
strategy is automatically endorsed as a successful way to deal with immediate 
auditory hallucinations.  
Yet, fulfilling these trust and glue conditions is insufficient for endorsing ‘extension’ 
claims. Critics may point out that a further necessary requirement for an extended 
cognitive system is that the individual concerned actively manipulates the external 
resource, namely interacts with it such that there is reciprocal causation in which 
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both human and artefact develop in response to each other’s interaction. The ‘pocket 
therapist’ however seems somewhat different; whilst it fulfils a cognitive deficit, it 
lacks possibilities to be manipulated further so as to elicit the desired effect (i.e. 
one’s ability to control one’s hallucination). The recording is passively listened to, it is 
fixed and thus one directional. However, I counter this by highlighting that the causal 
story behind the fixed recording is one of active manipulation. It is a recording of 
once active manipulation of an avatar, and features the patient positively overcoming 
it. Therefore, whilst critics may require active manipulation to achieve cognitive 
extension, the MP3 recording results from that interactive process, and thus is a 
verified way to overcome the voice. The pocket therapist is therefore a source the 
schizophrenic can tap into that is inevitably in the correct ‘format’, without requiring 
further manipulation.  
Yet still, whilst a good diachronic story of its origin, claims to extended mind require 
more local synchronic loops of interaction where real-time simulation is generated: 
Otto for instance encodes his notebook, and then scans it for further information. 
Likewise, with music, you may fast-forward a track to reach the melody you desire, 
then begin listening. But, in making this claim, I suggest there is no longer any 
distinction between extending the mind via music, or via the MP3 recording. Cases 
of musically extending the mind seems plausible (Krueger 2013, 2014), with music’s 
ability to change the listener’s cognitive abilities (Sridharan et al., 2007: 528), 
sharpening and sustaining their attentional focus. When pushed, proponents of the 
‘musically extended mind’ (Krueger, 2014) may suggest music’s capacity to extend 
cognition has further plausibility as one can manipulate the music itself. It is not 
‘fixed’. For instance, one might decide to remove one’s headphones, and listen to the 
desired track on a stereo, thus “revving up” (DeNora, 1999: 34) one’s emotions. One 
may work through emotions via extended musical engagement by enhancing the 
bass, embed the track within a larger playlist, or even play with the mix. The music’s 
materiality is alterable. But, arguably, a voice audio is equally malleable in this 
sense: one may loop one select bit of the therapy recording over and over, or 
perhaps raise the patient’s voice so it sounds more authoritative. I suggest the MP3 
recording, like music, has a materiality with which one can actively engage and 
manipulate.  
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But, it remains important to realise that this level of manipulation is not always 
required for extended claims. Music solicits entrainment responses (Krueger, 2014: 
4), and thus calming lullabies can be used to regulate infant emotion (Trainor and 
Hannon, 2013: 427). Music, like the recording, “gives respondents a medium in 
which to 'work through moods'” (DeNora, 1999: 40), and thus simple engagement, 
like deciding when, where and for how long to listen to audio can create extended 
interactive feedback loops between the person and the external resource. 
Importantly, when clients use the MP3, they become coupled to it, and their listening 
to this ‘trialogue’ is therapeutic. They do not just listen randomly, but rather when 
they have been experiencing auditory hallucinations and feel unable to cope. Thus 
the MP3 serves as an extended regulatory device. The process of listening therefore 
creates a coupled system between themselves and their recording. They may listen 
to a previous session, and then employ those recorded strategies to deal with their 
current persecution. Then, if unsuccessful, the client may continue to listen. My point 
is how they interact with and use the MP3 depends on how successfully they are 
authoritative; if they are unsuccessful, then the coupling between themselves and 
the external artefact dictating and prompting their next moves will continue, as they 
will continue using the recording. Again, this has affinities with Otto’s notebook 
where he can become coupled to this resource whilst needing it to find his way, and 
once he completes his journey, he can pocket it until further required. Thus the 
notebook may be a ‘map in his pocket’, similarly to MP3’s role as a ‘pocket-therapist’. 
Leff et al. (2013: 423) postulate that patients’ continued improvement after the 
therapy’s completion was attributable to the use of the MP3. However, as this use 
was not quantified, this remains a hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, I have suggested this avatar therapy provides an external object (the 
MP3) that performs cognitive work that would normally be carried out by ‘healthy’ 
individuals. It stores the patient’s know-how of how to respond in instances of 
persecution, and can be both easily transported and manipulated by the patient. 
When listening to the recording the client automatically endorses the information, 
and recognises that, as they have previously combatted the persecutor, they have 
the mental capacity to do this again, enabled and enhanced by this portable device. 
Therefore, this MP3 has affinities with Otto’s notebook, and can be considered an 
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extension of the client’s mind, allowing the patient to achieve stability behaviourally 
and emotionally that, outside of this coupled system, they cannot.  
6.3.2. ARGUMENT 2 – EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS 
My second point, whilst not arguing avatar therapy extends the mind, explores my 
initial interest in the therapy’s extended possibilities. One cannot fail to notice the 
physical replication of the client’s mental state in the external world; Leff and his 
team intended to make avatars that speak and ‘look’ identically to the auditory 
hallucinations afflicting their patients. Leff et al. (2014: 171-172) say “[b]ecause the 
externalised voice is part of the patient’s inner world, discounting it or refusing to 
acknowledge the patient’s experience of this split-off part as real negates the 
possibility of the patient reintegrating it into their psychic structure.” This phrasing 
almost suggests that the avatar physically is the persecutory part of the patient’s 
mind outside of their head. As described, Leff et al. wanted to open up the dialogue 
between the voice and the patient, such that real external dialogue between the 
persecuted and persecutory parts of the client’s mind was achieved.  
However, physically representing internal mental states is not grounds for suggesting 
an extended mind occurs. The avatars themselves are not parts of patients’ minds 
merely because they replicate or simulate internal mental states. One cannot simply 
assess whether external artefacts work in the same way as the mind. Just because a 
calculator for instance can multiply numbers with the same outcome as human 
minds does not make the calculator ‘minded’. Taking internal processes and 
externalising them is not the same as extension. Consequently, noticing the avatar’s 
functional similarity to a client’s internal persecution is not to notice an extended 
mind. My claim of extension is rather motivated by the avatar’s ability to arouse 
cognitive abilities in the patient that the patient alone cannot instigate. 6.3.3 details.  
6.3.3 ARGUMENT 3 – COUPLED SYSTEMS 
As explored, patients experience increased control over the avatars they create. 
Within the sessions, their conversations with the avatar enhance and cultivate their 
cognitive abilities to overcome their ‘real’ persecutors. This is something 
unachievable without the therapy. Crucially, the therapist slowly manipulates the 
avatar such that it stops being abusive and controlling, and becomes increasingly 
supportive of the patient. The avatar praises their achievements and compliments 
 112 
them for their good qualities. It also suggests ways they could improve their lives. In 
accordance with this, the avatar’s expression is altered to appear more friendly and 
smiling. “This may be appraised subconsciously by the patient as a substitution of a 
loving parent for a punitive, denigratory, or neglectful one, enabling them to 
reintegrate the projected unacceptable part of their internal world into their psychic 
structure” (Leff et al., 2014: 171-2). 
I interpret the external avatar therefore as replicating or mirroring the patient’s 
internal cognition, namely their hallucination. Patients such as A and C were unable 
to associate with or think positively about this internal voice, unless it was 
externalised. I suggest the set-up of the therapy instigates a reciprocal interactive 
process between the physical representation of the voice and the patient within the 
sessions; this is an active coupling. There is an interactive relationship in which the 
patient’s attacks change the avatar, and slowly the avatar’s changing facial 
expressions and words reflect back onto the patient. This is a feedback loop in which 
the avatar and the patient are functionally linked. The point is that whilst the avatar is 
not independently magically cognitive, as the patient’s brain has to be there to get 
the process going and plays a distinctly causal role, the avatar adds further 
resources that the patient, if simply talking to an empty chair, would be unable to 
capitalise on. The patient and the avatar therefore jointly govern the patient’s ability 
to oppose their persecutor.  
Nevertheless, we must remember the therapist manipulates the avatar. The avatar is 
distinct from objects such as notebooks, phones or maps, as similarly to Chapter 4’s 
psychotherapy, another minded individual influences this external device. Thus, the 
prosthetic persecutor is not a static object, upon which the patient immediately 
imposes their will, but rather it has its own agency by way of the therapist’s 
manipulation. Yet, if we recall the therapy’s set-up as a trialogue, we see that the 
therapist’s agency and the avatar are separated in the eyes of the client, and thus 
the avatar and patient, from their first-person perspective will establish a “mutually 
constraining cycle of affective responding and expression” (Colombetti and Roberts, 
2014: 1258) which appears to them, independent of external intervention. This 
understanding therefore accords with Garrett and Turkington (2011) who argue that 
cognitive behavioural therapy provides a technique to bring “thing presentations”, 
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namely thoughts or feelings experienced as external perceptions, back within the 
self’s boundary (Leff et al., 2014: 172).  
I think feedback loops are achievable in avatar therapy precisely because the patient 
knows that they themselves designed the avatar, and thus they distinguish between 
their mind and the avatar. The patient-avatar coupling enables the client to engage 
with their ‘persecutor’, recognising its similarity to their auditory hallucinations, and 
develop their own cognitive strategies and coping-systems that they cannot, if the 
external resource was absent. This is because, even though patients interact with 
the avatar as if it is real, they know it cannot harm them as they themselves created 
it, unlike their voices that may threaten them and their families. Consequently, the 
therapy enables patients to gain “confidence and courage to confront the avatar” 
(UCL, 2013). The transcript below of one therapy session illustrates this. 
 
Transcript of Therapy Session. (Source: Avatar Therapy Helps Confront Distressing 
Voices, 2014). 
AVATAR:   “You’re worthless, you’re a waste of space” 
THERAPIST:  “Owen I want you to talk back to the avatar as strongly as you 
can” 
OWEN:   “Stop it” 
AVATAR:  “You’re worthless, you’re a waste of space, your life’s going 
nowhere” 
OWEN:   “Stop saying those things” 
AVATAR:  “You’re nothing” 
OWEN:   “Leave me alone, stop that” 
THERAPIST:  “Owen, that’s really good, I want you to be as strong and 
powerful as you can” 
AVATAR:   “So you don’t think it’s right that you’re worthless?” 
OWEN:  “No, it’s not true, I’m not worthless and I don’t have to listen to 
you saying that” 
AVATAR:   “What’s good about you?” 
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OWEN:  “There’s lots of good things about me, I don’t have to listen to 
you saying that I’m worthless” 
AVATAR:   “Like what?” 
OWEN:   “I’m a good person and the things you’re saying aren’t true” 
AVATAR:   “Tell me one good thing that you’ve done this week” 
OWEN:   “I did the shopping for my mum, that’s a good thing to do” 
THERAPIST  “That’s really good Owen, you keep going telling him all the 
good things you’ve done” 
OWEN  “I’ve come here, to do this, to speak to you, I’ve been going to 
my exercise group, I’ve done a lot of good things and it’s not fair 
you saying that I’m worthless” 
AVATAR:  “I can see I may have misjudged you, you’re stronger than I 
thought, but I’m not giving up that easily, you have given me 
some things to think about you” 
 
 
In this dialogue, the avatar’s comment “You’re worthless, you’re a waste of space” 
affects the patient, and with prompting from the therapist, pushes Owen to respond, 
saying, “stop it”. As Owen experiences no immediate repercussions of standing up to 
the avatar, and as the avatar then asks, “So you don’t think it’s right that you’re 
worthless?” this arguably empowers Owen to further say that he does not have to 
listen to the abuse. This is because the feedback from the dialogue with the avatar 
influences Owen’s internal dialogues through the lenses of his various self-facets. 
From this short dialogue, we can see Owen growing in confidence and arguably self-
facets such as ‘self-as-empowered’ and ‘self-as-unafraid’ come into play, governing 
how Owen responds to the avatar’s questions. The flow of this controlled dialogue is 
affected by the development of Owen’s empowered self-facets, in the sense that the 
therapist manipulates the avatar according to the patient’s responses. When 
Colombetti and Roberts (2014) claim that self-stimulating relationships can be forged 
between musicians and instruments “quite unlike the unidirectional causal link that 
holds between an environmental happening and a feeling response in ordinary 
cases”, arguably this has affinities with the above ‘trialogue’. From Owen’s 
perspective, this avatar is akin to his internal persecutor. Therefore, an improvised 
dialogue with the avatar will shape the self-facets Owen experiences moment by 
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moment and enhance his ability to overcome his auditory hallucinations. If we accept 
that couplings between humans and environmental artefacts with which they interact 
can be considered as unified wholes, then we can view the entire interactional 
looping activity between Owen and his avatar as responsible for eliciting his 
empowerment.  
The continuous interaction with the avatar, and subsequent prompting of the 
therapist, enables Owen to achieve an enhanced level of governance over his 
hallucinatory voice. This would be impossible without the construction of the avatar 
and safe environment with which Owen can practise being authoritative. In its 
strongest form, the counterfactual can therefore be taken to support an extended-
vehicle account of the dialogical self-facet, ‘Owen-in-control’ (Colombetti and 
Roberts, 2014). This qualitative feeling of power Owen experiences, evidenced in the 
development of his responses from simply “stop it”, to clearly communicating his 
good personality traits, depends upon and thus supervenes on the entire coupled 
system of Owen+avatar. Thus the self-facet, ‘self-in-control’ is “widely realized” 
(Wilson, 2004). But, Colombetti and Roberts (2014) suggest that even if one is 
unwilling to accept the metaphysical implications of this view, namely that extended 
affectivity is possible, it remains possible that for a complete account of the 
diachronic character of such a qualitative episode must refer to the entirety of the 
coupled system.  
Arguably, because the third level of SCALED selfhood is a psychological concept 
that describes one’s ability to imagine different positions within one’s internal 
dialogue in close connection to external dialogues, avatar therapy’s external 
representations of the patient’s internal dialogues with hallucinatory persecutors will 
dramatically affect one’s rich dialogical self. The avatars will be parts of the 
metaphysical basis, alongside the patients that realise their individual self-facets that 
combat their persecutors. Consequently, I suggest avatar therapy can extend the 
dialogical aspect of SCALED selfhood.  
6.4 SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
This chapter has explored avatar therapy as an alternative method of treating 
auditory hallucinations; Leff et al.’s (2014) successful trial having shown immediate 
positive results in subjects who committed to the treatment. I suggested that by 
 116 
extending the patients’ dialogical selves via the avatar, and creating coupled 
feedback loops, the dialogical self-facets such as ‘self-as-persecuted’ can be 
remoulded into ‘self-as-authoritative’, thus enabling schizophrenics to overcome their 
persecutors. Therefore, I conclude that avatar therapy extends the dialogical level of 
SCALED selfhood. 
I think the success of avatar therapy’s trial (Leff et al., 2014) can be attributed to the 
cognitive extension of the individual that the avatar itself elicits. Whilst I accepted 
that simply externalising an internal mental state is not an extension of mind, 
replicating their persecutor and allowing the patient dialogue with it in a safe 
environment stimulates a cognitive rehabilitation in which the patient learns 
strategies to overcome their voices. One’s strategies can then be sustained by way 
of extended cognition, using the audio recording of their session. This external object 
functions with the same purpose as the patient’s internal processes of remembering 
their prior responses to the avatar, and thus aids the schizophrenic in standing up to 
their hallucinations outside of the therapy.  
A larger trial of avatar therapy, consisting of 142 patients is soon to start in 
collaboration with the King’s College London Institute of Psychiatry. Professor 
Thomas Craig, who will lead the second study said, “The beauty of the therapy is its 
simplicity and brevity. Most other therapies for these conditions are costly and take 
many months to deliver” (Stewart, 2013). Therefore, further research should be 
conducted as to how to best administer this treatment; and I think that by 
acknowledging the cognitive extension of the patient in these sessions, one can 
therefore tailor the therapy to guarantee coupled cognitive systems emerge that will 
aid a schizophrenic’s recovery.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 THE SCALED SELF, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND EXTENDED MIND 
This thesis has considered the cognitive integration of treatment strategies within a 
schizophrenic self. It has argued treatments can ‘repair’ the schizophrenic’s 
selfhood, both by supplementing the self’s bodily neurobiological dynamics and 
scaffolding one’s attention to one’s embodiment; and by constituting one’s 
awareness of one’s personal ownership over one’s experiences. Arguably, based on 
my model of SCALED selfhood, primarily intervention strategies should target one’s 
‘bodily fluency’ as the SCALED self is grounded in the whole living body. Chapter 5 
argued such therapies can be employed to treat hyper-reflexivity. After tailoring or 
reorienting one’s fundamental tacit acquaintance with one’s body via bodily 
orientated therapies like dance or yoga, other therapies, such as avatar therapy and 
psychotherapy, can then partly constitute, together with one’s body, more 
sophisticated levels of selfhood that suffer from diminished self-affection (see 
Chapter 4). Following my model of selfhood, these are personal ownership and 
dialogical self-facets, which require cognitive activity and online engagement with the 
external world. The interactive couplings between patients and others within 
therapeutic dialogues (e.g. psychiatrists and avatars), inform the emergence of 
dialogical selves that the patient experiences as their own. The treatments at times 
partly constitute the schizophrenic’s subjectivity, enabling coherent patterns of 
understanding that allow patients to act (more) skilfully in the world with regards to 
their discriminations between ‘real’ phenomena and those that are internally 
generated. Furthermore, Chapter 4 argued that psychotherapy’s languaging can 
constitute the personal ownership, which underlies the feeling of a self-facet being 
‘mine’. 
Therefore, treating schizophrenia treats not only its symptomatic manifestations, but 
also fundamentally subjects to whom these symptoms belong. Whilst diagnoses of 
‘schizophrenia’ via the DMS IV-TR may offer clinical descriptions (Chapter 2), how 
symptoms appear to a first-person perspective differs in every case. Each patient’s 
report of schizophrenic symptoms describes a personal account of pathological 
disturbances of selfhood, thus I think taxonomies of ‘schizophrenia’ must wait on 
phenomenology (Strawson, 1999). Despite this assertion sounding somewhat 
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discouraging for patients who desire explanations of their warped self-experience, 
this is not the case. Upholding the self’s tacit acquaintance with itself as the validator 
of ‘a recovery’ is vital to understand when treatment strategies are successful. Whilst 
third-person clinical accounts of patients’ enhanced abilities to express oneself 
propositionally, act with ‘bodily fluency’ and overcome auditory hallucinations are 
common in psychiatric reports, true verification of ‘success’ lies within patients’ first-
person subjectivities.   
Once acknowledged, we see the applicability of a systematic taxonomy of the 
experiential SCALED self, via which we can then analyse where on the SCALE of 
selfhood a symptom strikes. My model of SCALED selfhood served to explain 
possible treatments of each level and thus distinguish ‘constitution’ from 
‘supplementation’. Yet, for categorising the types of first-hand experiences of 
schizophrenia this SCALE requires refinement, for example, distinguishing Lysaker 
and Lysaker’s (2008: 81) monological self from the interanimating play sustained by 
‘normal’ dialogues. This is because whilst monological selves entail perspectival and 
personal ownership, they still lack the flexibility of changeable, malleable self-
positions with which most people are accustomed. And this too is distinct from 
“cacophonous” selves (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008: 86) in which patients appear lost 
amongst disorganised unstructured narratives. This highlights the requirement for 
continued investigations into reports of schizophrenic episodes as they will continue 
to develop understanding of these divides, categorising both levels of selfhood and 
its pathologies.  
7.2. IMPLICATIONS 
My research has implications for psychiatric care. Interpreting treatments in 
accordance with Clark and Chalmers’ (2010) extended mind hypothesis is a new 
way to conceptualise the patient-therapy relationship and therefore one must 
consider multiple issues. Firstly, one must acknowledge the therapist’s role and the 
‘power’ they have. There is an important distinction between a doctor treating a 
patient with a physical illness, e.g. a badly broken leg that requires significant repair; 
and a ‘badly broken psyche’, which equally requires intensive rehabilitation. The 
former, whilst challenging the numerical identity of the individual does not directly 
impact the qualitative “I” on which this thesis has placed significance, despite its 
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embodied groundings. The latter however, a ‘broken psyche’, means that the patient 
“loses his boundaries in time and space” (Bleuler, 1911: 143), and thus if the 
therapist’s words, as my analysis suggests, constitute a regeneration of the 
boundaries of their personal ownership, then this places the therapist in a position of 
power to influence and manipulate the qualitative identity of the individual concerned.  
Secondly, the role of the treatment requires attention. The fundamental implication of 
my thesis is that aspects of talk therapy and avatar therapy may constitute a part of a 
schizophrenic’s rehabilitated selfhood. Thus a reinterpretation of how care can be 
administered (and what sort) is required so as to maximise success. Following my 
model of SCALED selfhood, I have already suggested bodily activity may be a first 
base, followed by more ‘reflection driven’ therapies that elicit reciprocal causal 
couplings between patients and therapies. I have argued for example, that avatar 
therapy’s ability to incite dialogue develops the patient’s cognitive abilities.  
Consequently, I suggest alternative non-pharmaceutical treatments deserve equal (if 
not more) attention. Results from avatar therapy demonstrate external, interactive 
therapies can be effective treatments when patients fail to respond to antipsychotic 
medications (Leff et al., 2014: 174), implying research to develop this therapy further 
will be advantageous to psychiatric care.  
7.3. FURTHER RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS      
This thesis has limited its analysis to three characteristics of schizophrenia; the 
related disorders of ipseity and then auditory hallucinations, and has by no means 
explored everything of these. I chose these areas of focus as diminished self-
affection and hyper-reflexivity are “mutually implicative aspects or facets of the 
intentional activity of awareness” (Sass et al., 2013: 431), yet require substantial 
differences in interpreting their eradicative treatments. Chapter 6’s focus on auditory 
hallucinations alone was therefore chosen to further demonstrate the ‘reflective and 
cognitive’ element required in avatar therapy, and further highlight the distinction 
between ‘constitution’ and mere ‘supplementation’. Further research into non-
pharmaceutical treatments for other schizophrenic symptoms such as visual 
hallucinations may enable me to develop this distinction further.  
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Whilst conducting research, I relied upon testimonies and evidence provided by 
other philosophers and psychiatrists, being unable to interview (or have access to) 
schizophrenic patients. Thus my arguments have been interpretative of 
schizophrenic reports. To further determine the correct patient-therapy relationships, 
interview questions specifically designed to elicit a patient’s reflection on their 
treatment is required. This is because, as stated, the subjective experiencer is the 
best validator of correct characterisation. I hope this thesis’ arguments influence 
such investigation.  
Ultimately, this research has expanded the boundaries of the applicability of 
extended mind theory. Taken seriously, the ‘constitution claim’ will impact psychiatry, 
in particular psychotherapy and the developing avatar therapy. Exactly how remains 
undetermined, yet what is clear is that body, mind and world are intimately 
interconnected, and thus all three must feature in schizophrenic recovery. 
Word count: 39918 
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